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Pricing in transport; a multimodal perspective. 
An introduction 
 
Piet Rietveld 1∗ 
 





Setting the scene: efficiency and marginal social cost based pricing 
 
Pricing plays a major role in transport policies in many countries. The well-known 
motivations of pricing policies are the promotion of efficiency and equity. Efficiency 
leads to the rule that prices are based on marginal social costs implying that the 
marginal benefits of transport activities equal the marginal social costs. These social 
costs usually depend on four elements:  
 
1. costs related to time devoted to transport,  
2. costs of inputs acquired via the private market (for example with car use),  
3. costs related to the services rendered by the public sector (for example most 
of infrastructure) and  
4. external costs imposed on others (pollution, congestion). 
 
There are several main problems related to the application of marginal cost based 
pricing (see for a discussion also Verhoef, 1996, Rothengatter, 2003 and Nash 2003). 





The measurement of some cost components mentioned above is not straightforward. 
In particular the valuation of external costs of transport is a field where still many 
uncertainties exist. In a number of fields such as transport safety and noise, considerable 
progress has been made during the past decades, but in other fields, such as the 
appropriate valuation of CO2 emissions, and the intrusion effects of transport there is 
still much uncertainty. 
 
                                                 
∗ Corresponding author: Piet Rietveld (prietveld@feweb.vu.nl) 




The use of marginal costs as a principle for pricing may well lead to financing 
problems for the public sector. For example, most transport infrastructures are 
uncongested, implying that charging users for the marginal costs would not be sufficient 
to cover the total costs. Hence other sources of finance would be needed. 
 
 
Imperfections in other markets 
 
Given the key role of transport as a link between economic sectors and also given the 
interdependencies between transport sectors, the simple use of marginal cost pricing in a 
transport sector is not necessarily efficient. For example, charging one transport mode 
for NOx emissions, while ignoring emissions in other modes may lead to a modal shift 
so that only a small part of the potential welfare gain is achieved. This is an example of 
market imperfections. These imperfections call for second best pricing strategies where 
behavioural responses in imperfect markets are anticipated. This obviously adds to the 
complexity of pricing strategies, since no longer is it sufficient that the marginal costs 
should be correctly estimated for one particular transport mode, but also the marginal 
costs in other transport modes should be estimated, and on top of that also the effects of 





Implementation costs of marginal social cost pricing may be high. This depends 
strongly on the type of cost considered. For example, fuel taxes are easy to implement 
and are an appropriate tool to address CO2 emissions. But on the other hand, congestion 
based charging strategies may lead to rather expensive charging systems. The good 
news is that with the present trends in information and communication technologies the 





Another problem with marginal social cost pricing would be that it may lead to equity 
problems. For example, when charging passengers the full social costs of transport this 
may reinforce problems of social exclusion. Important specific groups that are often 
considered concern the poor, and the physically handicapped. A broader discussion of 
equity is given below. 
 
 
Equity problems and pricing in transport 
 
As shown above, equity problems may be an unintended side effect of efficiency 
oriented policies to address transport problems such as congestion and environmental 
nuisance. A broader perspective is that equity may be the explicit aim of certain 
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transport policies such as the construction of infrastructure in lagging regions. In this 
case, equity is more than a side effect: it is the main motivation for a certain transport 
policy.  
As noted for example by Viegas (2001) and Rietveld (2003) the notion of equity is 
not unambiguous, however. Equity concepts that arise in the literature and in political 
debates are: 
 
1. Horizontal equity. Comparable individuals should be treated in a comparable 
way.  
2. Territorial equity. This results from the notion of individual equity when it is 
projected on relatively homogeneous regions. For example, comparable 
regions need to get similar funds for public transport. 
3. Level playing field. Transport sectors should be treated in similar ways 
according to taxation, payment for the use of infrastructure, etc.  
4. Vertical equity. This means that disadvantaged individuals deserve 
protection. People should be burdened according to their ability to 
contribute, and this may lead to schemes where taxes are more than 
proportional with income. 
5.  Transport users should pay their way. As indicated by Gomez Ibanez (1997) 
this concept is usually interpreted in terms of average costs implying that the 
collective of all transport users exactly pays for the aggregate costs. 
6. Individuals that are negatively affected by policies need to be compensated. 
This principle takes its starting point in the status-quo and says that winners 
have to compensate losers. 
 
This list of interpretations of the equity notion makes clear that it can be used in 
various ways by various interest groups. Hence, there is not only a potential conflict 
between efficiency and equity, but also between various equity interpretations. Consider 
for example a tax increase in a certain transport sector in order to reach level playing 
field conditions (equity concept 3). Such a policy may be opposed by the companies in 
this particular sector because of the abovementioned status quo arguments (equity 
concept 7). 
An important reason why equity considerations are important is that ignoring them 
may have serious acceptability implications. In democratic societies these implications 
may have a strong impact on the political feasibility of policies. They are among the 




Introduction to papers 
 
The present collection of papers in this special issue on pricing strategies in transport 
is in the heart of these debates between efficiency and equity. It is a selection of papers 
that were presented at the NECTAR Euroconference that took place in June 2005 in Las 
Palmas. An attractive feature of this collection is the multimodal perspective adopted. 
Three of them concern road pricing issues (Allen et al., Ieromonachu et al. and Ubbels 
and Verhoef), two concern pricing in public transport (Macharis et al., Goeverden et 
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al.), and one is on pricing related to noise near airports (Martin and Betancor). This 
multimodal perspective is important for at least three reasons. First, a tendency can be 
observed that policy makers treat various transport modes in very different ways, that 
may be explained by historical reasons, but that are difficult to defend on efficiency 
grounds. This comes close to the grandfathering theme. Examples are the very different 
treatments of air, water and land transport from the viewpoint of pricing policies. A 
multimodal perspective helps to avoid biases in transport policies. Second, a multimodal 
perspective will stimulate learning processes. For example, insights obtained in the 
domain of airports may be transferable to that of seaports. And third, in line with what is 
said above on second best pricing, interrelationships between transport modes should be 
considered.  
A second feature of the present collection of papers is the balanced attention that is 
paid to both equity and efficiency considerations. Efficiency effects are prominent in the 
contributions of Martin and Betancor, Goeverden et al., and Macharis et al.). On the 
other hand the three road pricing oriented contributions (Allen et al., Ieromonachu et al. 
and Ubbels and Verhoef) focus on equity and acceptability aspects. An interesting 
observation is that it is road oriented studies that focus on equity and acceptability. This 
may reveal the state of affairs in research and policy making. In the road sector 
researchers have for a very long time been exploring the efficiency implications of 
pricing policies. The major bottleneck nowadays seems to concern equity and 
acceptability. This is a nice illustration that a balanced treatment of both concerns is 
needed in research and policy in order to make further progress on this fascinating field 
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The pricing of public transport may range from charging the full price to supplying it for free. The 
present situation in most European countries is between the two extremes implying a partial cost 
recovery. In this paper we will explore both extremes on the axis of cost recovery: free public transport, 
and public transport without subsidies. 
We start with a discussion of free public transport, and give a short survey of the intentions 
governments may have with its introduction. After this short survey we discuss in more detail the 
experiences with free public transport in four real world cases, two from Belgium and two from the 
Netherlands: the city of Hasselt, the Brussels region (for students), the Leiden-The Hague bus corridor, 
and free public transport for students in The Netherlands. 
Then we discuss the other extreme: public transport without subsidies. We start with a short overview 
of the financial performance of the Dutch public transport systems and an analysis of the impacts of 
measures to improve the benefit-cost ratios. Then the effects of subsidy suspension in the Netherlands are 
estimated by developing two scenarios that describe opposite extremes in the hypothetical situation that 
no subsidies are granted to public transport operators and comparing the outcomes with a reference 
scenario where continuation of subsidies is assumed.  
The paper concludes with a discussion of the merits and problems of both pricing policies: free public 
transport and public transport without subsidies. 
 





The pricing of public transport may range from charging the full price to supplying it 
for free. The present situation in most European countries is between the two extremes 
implying a partial cost recovery. In this paper we will explore both extremes on the axis 
of cost recovery: free public transport, and public transport without subsidies. 
                                                 
• Corresponding author (c.d.vangoeverden@tudelft.nl) 
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Large scale public transport developed in the 19th century. At that time it was an 
economic activity that did not need subsidies. In most countries the subsidy issue only 
emerged during the second half of the 20th century, when ownership and use of the car 
grew rapidly and the cost of public transport developed in an unfavourable way due to 
the relative increase of labour costs. In most countries governments decided to cover the 
deficits by some kind of subsidy scheme. 
There are various motivations for such a policy (Button, 1993). First, subsidies may 
be motivated because of the ‘social function’ of public transport. Vulnerable groups 
such as low income households, persons without a driver licence, elderly and persons 
with a handicap, need public transport to avoid problems of social exclusion. Second, 
public transport subsidies may be motivated as a second best instrument to address 
urban transport problems caused by car use when the possibilities of directly addressing 
these problems are restricted. These problems relate to noise, pollution, parking 
externalities and congestion. By subsidising public transport it is expected that a modal 
shift will take place away from the private car. A third argument for subsidies may be 
that public transport is characterised by economies of scale, so that marginal costs are 
below average costs. Hence, marginal cost pricing –being welfare optimising– would 
lead to deficits to be covered by subsidies. A fourth argument would be that there are 
positive externalities in public transport: an increase in travel volumes leads to a supply 
response in terms of higher frequencies and this leads to a decrease of scheduling costs 
of new and existing travellers. 
These motivations for subsidies have been criticised for various reasons. For example, 
the ‘social function’ argument would call for selectivity in subsidisation so that only the 
groups that really need it pay reduced fares (see for example, Small, 1992). In stead, 
most countries have implemented subsidy schemes where all users benefit from the 
subsidy, even when they would not need it. The positioning of public transport subsidies 
as a second best tool depends to a considerable extent on their effectiveness to address 
the urban transport problems mentioned above. This effectiveness is questioned since 
the environmental performance of public transport is not as superior as is often thought, 
and besides, subsidies do not only lead to a modal shift away from the car, but will also 
generate ‘new’ demand that may aggravate the urban problems mentioned above 
(Rietveld, 2005). Further, whether or not subsidies are welfare improving depends on 
the question whether market distortions due to cost coverage reasons in transport are 
larger than market distortions due to taxation (McCarthy, 2001). Besides, it is argued 
that increasing returns to scale and density are not as large in public transport as is 
sometimes thought (Quinet and Vickerman, 2004). Finally, there is evidence that 
subsidies to public transport reduce its efficiency, so that the potential benefits do not 
materialise (De Borger and Kerstens, 2000). 
The present developments in the public transport sector are twofold. On the one hand 
there is a tendency to reduce subsidies and improve cost coverage in many countries. 
On the other hand, in several countries far going subsidy schemes, including entirely 
free public transport schemes have been introduced. Both extremes will be addressed in 
this paper. Next section starts with a review of free public transport cases in Belgium 
and The Netherlands. We try to be as explicit as possible to describe the consequences 
of these cases in order to give a fair judgement and avoid wishful thinking. Then we 
explore the consequences of the opposite case: public transport without subsidies. The 
final section concludes. 
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Experiences with free public transport 
 
Forms of free public transport 
 
When taking a closer look at the fares public transport providers charge for their 
service, in general three types of reduced fares can be distinguished. The first group is 
the most extreme one: it consists of public transport that is free for all the passengers 
during every time of the day. An example of this is ‘vertical traffic’, such as elevators 
and escalators. ‘Horizontal traffic’ can be free as well, for example the moving paths at 
Amsterdam Airport Schiphol (Van Hulten, 2004). Another example could be found in 
Leiden-The Hague region where in 2004 two bus lines were free for all passengers.  
The second group consists of public transport that is free for some passengers or that 
is free during certain periods of the day. This is the case in Belgium, where local and 
regional transport by bus, tram and metro is ‘free’ for all senior citizens, disabled 
persons and children. There is one constraint: passengers pay for their journey at 
working days before 09.00 a.m.  
The third and last group of reduced fares is dependent of place, time or category of 
passengers. Examples of these for train transport are the reduction card with which 
passengers can get a discount of 40% after 09.00 a.m. and the senior citizen’s pass. For 
bus transport an example can be found in Apeldoorn, The Netherlands. Passengers pay a 
special fare of €1 for their ticket, independent of the length of the trip. In the present 
paper we will focus on examples in the first and second category. 
There is a great variety in the motivations for different experiments with free or 
reduced public transport (whether they be short- or long-term).  
The following elements are mentioned in the book ‘Gratis Openbaar Vervoer’ by 
Michel van Hulten (2004), one of the advocates of free public transport: 
 
• Costs that are associated with the cashing and administration of the payments 
will disappear. The safety of the conductor or driver is enhanced because no 
longer cash is available. Another effect of the disappearance of payment is that 
passengers can get on and off quicker, which in turn will lead to a higher 
velocity of circulation of the public transport vehicles.  
• The attractiveness of a city will increase for tourists, because they do not have 
to pay for their journeys either. Free public transport can become a sales pitch 
to attract more tourists.  
• Some motorists will switch from using the car to using public transport. Even 
when these are a few people, less space for the car users is required. This 
change of travel mode can be expected when the free public transport is 
permanent, because it is then considered in the decision about where to live 
and work. Temporary experiments do not lead to such a structural change. 
 
Other positive consequences of free public transport can be found in social aspects. 
One striking outcome of the introduction of free public transport in Hasselt was that the 
number of visits to patients in the hospitals was reported to increase enormously. Free 
public transport might in this way be a means to prevent elderly people of becoming 
lonely.  
These arguments for free public transport are to a considerable extent in line with the 
motivations for subsidies given in chapter 1. Of a different nature is the tourist 
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promotion argument, which is debatable from an economic perspective, because it is not 
clear why in particular this industry should be supported by subsidies. The first point in 
favour of free public transport mentioned above is a valid point, however. When cost 
coverage is already very low and transaction costs of paying tickets are high, providing 
a service at zero price may indeed make sense. However, rebound effects have to be 
considered such as a large demand response leading to a higher tax burden when supply 
follows demand and quality is increased or a decline in the quality of the service when 
supply does not follow. 
After this short overview of the different forms of free public transport and the 
motivations for introducing it has been given, the discussion will go more in-depth. 
Four real-world cases will be analysed and compared to see what the effects of free 
public transport are under different circumstances. 
 
 
Four cases regarding free public transport 
 
In practice, numerous examples can be found regarding free public transport. For the 
purpose of this paper, four cases were selected to investigate the effects of free public 
transport. Two cases concern free public bus transport: one in The Netherlands and one 
in Belgium. The other two cases concern free public transport for students, also one in 
The Netherlands and one in Belgium. These cases will be analysed according to the 
following aspects: location, initiator, time span, size of experiment, time of day, effects 
on modal choice and congestion and so on. These points are shortly summarised in fact 
sheets. After this analysis, a comparison of the four cases will be made to find out in 
what situations free public transport contributes to the purposes that have been 
formulated. The four cases that will be discussed are:  
 
• Free public transport on the Leiden-The Hague bus corridor. 
• Free public transport in the city of Hasselt. 
• Free public transport for all students in the Netherlands. 
• Free public transport for students in the Brussels region. 
 
For each case some background information will be provided. This information will 
regard the aim and nature of the project, the effects on modal choice and congestion and 
possible other changes in the network. 
 
 
Free public transport on the Leiden-The Hague bus corridor 
 
In January 2004 an experiment was started with free public bus transport. This 
experiment took one year. The aim was to test in practice whether free public transport 
can contribute to a reduction in congestion (Egeter & Versteegt, 2004). Because the aim 
of the experiment was to offer an alternative mode of transport for commuters, the 
busses were free only on Mondays till Fridays. The total costs of the experiment were 
€1,000,000. The Province paid half of this amount to Connexxion as a compensation for 
missed income, €200,000 was reserved for extra busses and €300,000 was used for 
education and research about the results of the experiment. On average, six extra bus 
rides were made per workday. When taking holidays in account, this means that on 
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annual basis, 1150 extra bus rides were made 1. The results of this experiment were as 
follows: bus use on the free bus routes increased from 1,000 to 3,000 passengers a day. 
From this new passengers 45% made the transfer formerly by car, 10% used the moped 
or bike, 20-30% switched from other public transport services (other bus routes or train) 
and 16% did not make the transfer at all. The reduction in car use has probably led to a 
small reduction in congestion on the motorways between Leiden and The Hague, but 
this was so small that it could not be measured. Note that part of the traffic that shifted 
from car to bus took place outside the peak periods. In Table 1, a summary of the results 
can be found. 
Table 1: The case of free busses between Leiden and The Hague. 
Aspect Assessment 
Location The Hague, Katwijk, Noordwijk, Leiden. 
Initiator The Province of South Holland in co-operation with the public transport company 
Connexxion. 
Time span January – December 2004. 
Size of experiment Two existing bus lines: route 88 and 95 and one new one: route 89. 
Who can use the free 
bus? 
Everybody. 
Time of day Monday till Friday; entire day. 
Fare Zero. 
Aim Main objective: 
To test in practice the ability of free public transport to contribute to a reduction of 
congestion on the A44/N44. 
Sub objectives:  
• Increase in the use of public transport: at least 40%. 
• Former motorists should account for at least 20% of this increase. 
• Increase in occupancy rate transferium: at least 50%. 
Effects • Congestion did not decrease. 
• Bus use on the two routes has increased from 1000 to 3000 passengers per 
day. 
• 45% of the new passengers made the transfer formerly by car. 
• 10% of the increase in passengers consists of passengers who formerly 
travelled by moped or bike. 
• 20-30% of the new passengers switched from other public transport services 
(other bus routes or train). 
• About 16% of the new bus trips are made by passengers who formerly would 
not make such a trip. 
• The occupancy rate of ‘Transferium’ ‘t Schouw/ A44 near Leiden is more 
than doubled. 
Goal achieved? The beneficial effects on congestion could not be measured because of the small size 
of the pilot. Therefore it is difficult to say whether a larger scale pilot would have the 
desired result. The sub objectives are achieved. 
Costs Total costs are €1 million, all paid by the Province of South Holland. 
• €500.000 is paid to Connexxion as a compensation for lost incomes. 
• €200.000 is reserved for extra busses. 
• €300.000 is used for education and research on the results of the experiment. 
Other changes in 
transport network 
Number of daily bus rides increases (from 85 to 87). 





                                                 
1 Information provided electronically by drs.ing. Lars Jansen.  
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Free public bus transport in the city of Hasselt 
 
Information regarding the mobility policy of Hasselt can be found in Lambrechts 
(2004). Before free busses were introduced, public transport was badly available in 
Hasselt. The two main lines had an hour-frequency (both during peak- and off-peak 
periods), which implied that public transport was not very popular. After improving the 
network it consists of nine urban lines with a higher frequency. Making the bus free 
(next to the improvement of the network) was regarded as an extra measure to increase 
the number of bus passengers. With the introduction of the improved network, transport 
operator De Lijn aimed at multiplying the number of passengers times four in three 
years after the introduction.  
The urban busses are free for everybody (not only inhabitants of Hasselt). For the 
regional busses, only the rides within the boundaries of Hasselt for inhabitants of the 
city are free.  
In 1998 the costs for free public transport are €22.64 per household. 
Table 2: The case of Hasselt. 
Aspect Assessment 
Location Hasselt, Belgium. 
Initiator The Hasselt Municipality in co-operation with public transport company De Lijn. 
Time span Introduced in 1996 and still operational. 
Size of experiment The urban bus network consists of nine bus lines. 
Who can use the free 
bus? 
Urban bus: free for everybody (including non-inhabitants). 
Regional bus: free for every inhabitant of Hasselt, only for rides within the boundaries 
of Hasselt. 
Time of day Monday till Sunday; entire day. 
Fare Zero. 
Aim For the urban bus: to multiply the number of passengers times four after the 
introduction of the new system (within three years). 
Another aim was to increase the number of passengers who use the regional bus to go 
to Hasselt. 
Effects • The number of bus passengers increased tenfold. 
• Of all the bus users, 37% consists of new users and 63% of former users. 
Hence former bus users started to make much more intensive use of the bus 
system. 
• The origin of the 37% new bus users is: car: 16%, bicycle: 12%; pedestrian: 
9%. 
• 48.8% of the bus users lives in Hasselt, the other 52.2% does not live in 
Hasselt. 
• Visits to the hospital were more often made by public transport than before. 
Goal achieved? The number of passengers who use the urban bus increased tenfold (from 331,551 in 
the old situation to 3,200,000 in the new situation). 
The number of passengers who use the regional bus to travel to and from Hasselt has 
not increased. 
Costs The most recent numbers regarding the costs and benefits are those of 2001. In that 
year, the costs for the urban net were estimated at €526,296. The costs for the regional 
net in that year were €347,505. 
Other changes in 
transport network 
The urban bus network was strongly improved before it became free. 
The number of busses increased from 8 in the old situation to 40 in the new situation. 
The number of bus lines increased from four to nine and the frequency was increased 
to 15 minutes in the peak and 30 minutes off-peak. 
 
The number of bus passengers per year increased tenfold. This was however not the 
case for the regional network; here the number of passengers decreased. An explanation 
for this can be that the regional rides were not free, but only (marginally) cheaper and 
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that the network of the regional busses has not been improved (as was the case for the 
urban busses). Most of the additional trips (63%) are made by former bus users. About 
37% are made by passengers who switched from other modes of transport to the bus, 
16% used the car, 12% used the bicycle, 9% walked before. The results of the 
introduction of free busses in Hasselt are summarised in Table 2. 
 
 
Free public transport for all students in the Netherlands 
 
In January 1991, the ‘OV-Studentenkaart’ was introduced in The Netherlands. This 
card replaced the travel cost allowance for students, included in their scholarship, and 
entitles them to freely use public transport unlimitedly throughout the year (HCG, 
1995).  
Table 3: The case of free public transport for students in The Netherlands. 
Aspect Assessment 
Location The Netherlands. 
Initiator Ministry of education, in co-operation with public transport operators. 
Time span Free public transport for students was introduced on the 1st of January 1991 and is still 
applicable today. 
Size of experiment All forms of public transport: train, bus, metro and tram. 
Who can use the free 
bus? 
All students who receive student grants. 
Time of day Students were entitled to use of public transport throughout the year for free. 
Fare Zero. 
Aim The ‘OV-Studentenkaart’ was aimed at replacing the – in the study grant included – 
amount for travelling expenses between the living address and the study address. 
Effects • Share of public transport in total number of movements of students changed 
from 11% to 21% after the introduction of the OV-Studentenkaart. 
• Per day students use public transport 0.81 times, before the introduction of 
the card this was 0.45 times. 
• Average number of kilometres travelled by students increased with 15% to 
46 kilometres a day. 
• Car use of students decreased with 34%. 
• Bicycle use of students decreased with 52%. 
• Increase in the number of train movements of students is the largest on 
Sunday and Friday. 
• Increase in the number of bus/ tram/ metro movements of students is the 
largest on Tuesday and Wednesday. 
• Before the introduction of the OV-Studentenkaart in 1990 the number of 
passenger train kilometres in The Netherlands was 11,000 million. In 1991 
this increased to 15,000 million. 
Goal achieved? Not applicable. 
Costs Information not available. 
Other changes in 
transport network 
NS increased the supply of trains on important sections in response to the increase in 
total train kilometres. 
On the sections Arnhem-Den Haag and Zwolle-Eindhoven 40 intercity trains are 
added. 
In the peak periods of a number of sections the frequency of trains increased. 
 
From November 1994 onward, the pass was replaced by two different public transport 
passes. Students can choose one of these two passes. However, only the results of the 
initial OV-Studentenkaart will be taken in account. The ‘new’ situation will be left out 
of this analysis. The introduction of free public transport led to a large increase in public 
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transport use in The Netherlands. For example, the number of passenger kms on rail 
increased by almost 50% and the share of public transport in the trips of students 
increased from 11 to 21%. The average number of kilometres that students travelled 
increased with 15% to 46 kilometres a day. This growth is for 60% accountable to bus, 
tram and metro use. The largest change in the modal split was due to students switching 
from bicycle to public transport (52%). A smaller part of the students switched from car 
to public transport (34%). In table 3 an overview can be found. The introduction of free 
public transport for students had two main effects on the other travellers. First, it leads 
to crowding; second, on a number of lines frequencies increased. As a result of the last 
point, some of the other travellers benefited. 
 
 
Free public transport for students in the Brussels region 
 
The following information can be found in Witte et al. (2005). In 2003-2004 students 
from Dutch-speaking universities and colleges had the opportunity to obtain a free 
annual subscription on Brussels public transport (bus, tram and metro).  
Table 4: The case of free public transport for students in Brussels. 
Aspect Assessment 
Location Brussels, Belgium. 
Initiator Flemish government. 
Time span Introduced in the 2003-2004 academic year and continued next year. 
Size of experiment Bus, tram, metro. 
Who can use the free 
public transport? 
Students younger than 26 studying at Dutch speaking Flemish colleges or universities 
in Brussels. 
Time of day Public transport is free during a full year, 24 hours a day. 
Fare In the first year: Students buy a season ticket and then ask for repayment. In order to 
cover administrational costs, a fee of €10 was charged (normally a season ticket costs 
€200). 
In the second year: Fee has been raised to €25. Students pay for one month and travel 
for free during the other eleven months. 
In the third year the system of refunding has been abolished. Students just pay €25 at a 
special sales point. 
Aim Main objective: 
To promote the mobility of Dutch speaking students to and in Brussels and to stimulate 
inscriptions at colleges and universities in Brussels. 
Sub objectives:  
• Stimulate Flemish students to participate in social, cultural, sport and other 
activities in Brussels. 
• Attract Dutch-speaking students to Brussels. 
• Create a positive image towards public transport and induce habit forming, 
contributing to more sustainable transport. 
Effects • 47% of the students applied for the season ticket. 
• 89% regularly used the tram, bus or metro (at least once a week).  
• 11% applied for the free season ticket, without fully exploiting their free 
access to public transport. 
• Of the students that applied 13% were new public transport users, 35% used 
public transport before but became more intensive users. The rest had equal 
use (43%) or less use (6%). 
Goal achieved? Information not available. Students from Dutch speaking universities still use the train 
more often than bus, tram or metro, even after the introduction of free public transport. 
Costs The Commission of the Flemish Community (VGC) provided €1,200,000. An 
additional subsidy of €246,293 was needed to cover all costs. 
Other changes in public 
transport network 
No changes in the public transport network or frequencies. 
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The main objectives of the ‘free’ public transport initiative were to promote the mobility 
of Dutch speaking students to and in Brussels and to stimulate inscriptions at colleges 
and universities in Brussels. About 47% of the target group participated in the initiative. 
Within this group about 13% were new public transport users, 35% became more 
intensive public transport users. The rest had equal use (43%) or less use (6%). In Table 
4 the main results are summarized. 
 
 
Comparing the four ‘free public transport’ cases 
Table 5: The four cases compared. 
Aspect Den Haag Hasselt ‘OV-studentenkaart’ Students Brussels 
Time span January-December 
2004. 
Introduced in 1996, 
still operational. 
Introduced in 
January 1991, still 
operational. 
Introduced in the 
2003-2004 academic 
year and continued 
next year. 
Size Two existing bus 
lines: route 88 and 
95 and one new one: 
route 89. 
Nine urban bus 
lines. 
All forms of public 
transport: train, bus, 
metro and tram. 
Bus, tram, metro. 




Regional bus: free 
for every inhabitant 
of Hasselt, only for 
rides within the 
boundaries of 
Hasselt. 




than 26 studying at 
Dutch speaking 
Flemish colleges or 
universities in 
Brussels. 
Main objective To test in practice 
the ability of free 
public transport to 
contribute to a 
reduction of 
congestion on the 
A44/N44. 
To multiply the 
number of 
passengers times 
four after the 
introduction of the 
new system (within 
three years).  
The ‘OV-
Studentenkaart’ was 
aimed at replacing 
the – in the study 
grant included – 
amount for 
travelling expenses 
between the living 
address and the 
study address. 
To promote the 
mobility of Dutch 
speaking students to 






Increase in public 
transport use 
Bus use on the two 
routes has increased 
from 1000 to 3000 
passengers per day. 
The number of bus 
passengers increased 
tenfold. 
Share of public 




from 11% to 21% 
after the introduction 
of the OV-
Studentenkaart. 
Of the students that 
applied 13% were 
new public transport 
users, 35% used 
public transport 
before but became 
more intensive users. 
The rest had equal 




Modal shift and 
new or longer 
trips 
Modal shift: 























New trips: PM 
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The four cases can be compared according to their time span, size, type of passengers, 
increase in public transport use and modal shift. All of the four examples had different 
objectives. Whether a free public transport project can be regarded as a success or a 
failure depends on the way in which these objectives are formulated. When the main 
aim is to reduce congestion (like the The Hague experiment) but the scale of the pilot is 
small so that the reduction of congestion cannot be measured, the achievement of the 
main objective cannot be evaluated. However, the sub objectives (e.g. the increase in 
the use of public transport should be at least 40%) are achieved in this project. In some 
cases the introduction of free public transport goes with other changes in the public 
transport system, as is the case in Hasselt. Before free transport was introduced, the 
public transport system was improved, which could explain why more passengers use 
public transport. Making it free was only an extra measure to attract even more 
passengers. In all of the four examples, public transport use increased. This increase is 
caused mainly by passengers who switched from car to public transport. A brief 
summary of the comparison can be found in Table 5. 
 
 
Conclusions regarding free public transport 
 
We conclude that in some cases free public transport does contribute to the purposes 
that have been formulated, but in other cases the plan failed (see for example the 
Leiden-the Hague pilot). In the case of Hasselt there is a very large response from the 
demand side, but here the initial supply of transport services was poor. The effect 
observed is not only the consequence of free public transport, but also of the increase in 
frequency and network size. In the case of the Leiden-The Hague pilot on the other hand 
the supply remained almost stable and additional demand was limited. Thus, the issue 
whether free public transport will lead to a large increase in travel demand depends 
strongly on the context. The cases studied here demonstrate that for many persons the 
overall quality of public transport remains low compared with that of other modes, so 
that they will not shift transport mode even when public transport would become free. 
From the perspective of environmental effects it is important to consider the modal 
shift from the car to public transport. In the case of Leiden-The Hague the largest effect 
was indeed on car use. However, in the cases of the Dutch free public transport pass for 
students and of Hasselt the effect on non-motorised transport modes dominated the 
effect on car use. It is important to distinguish short distance and long distance public 
transport in this respect. Modal shift in the case of short distance public transport mainly 
takes place at the disadvantage of non-motorised transport modes and hence has adverse 
environmental effects.  
With longer distance transport the opposite occurs. Thus the spatial context is 
important: for example the Leiden-The Hague bus service takes place at distances where 
non-motorised transport modes are relatively unimportant. 
Transport models have their limitations when they are used to simulate the effects of 
free public transport. This would entail the use of model equations in a domain where 
they have not been tested. Therefore real world pilots with free public transport are 
useful in this context. When we try to infer from these case studies what would be the 
consequence of entirely free public transport in the whole country, we would conclude 
that  this will lead to a large increase in demand implying more trips in urban areas and 
longer trips, in particular in the rail sector. Given the response to the introduction of free 
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public transport for students in 1990 we expect substantial bottlenecks for rail transport. 
The quality and reliability would deteriorate unless massive investments would be made 
here. This obviously implies a large financial burden for the public sector. Where free 
public transport for targeted groups like students may be attractive since these can to a 
certain extent be accommodated on empty seats in trains and busses, this is no longer 
the case when all passengers will travel without paying. 
 
 
Public transport without subsidies 
 
Now we discuss the opposite: What would happen if subsidies for public transport are 
suspended and the user is charged the full price? This question is investigated for the 
Netherlands. The study is reported in Dutch by Peeters et al., 2000 and, into more detail, 
by van Goeverden and Schoemaker, 2000, Bruinsma and Rietveld, 2000 and Claassen 
and Katteler, 2000. The results are summarized in this paper. The study concerns only 
suspension of subsidies that are used to eliminate the operating deficits; infrastructure is 
assumed to be used for free. An exception is made for train operators who will be 
charged for usage of the railway infrastructure, thus reflecting political reality. It should 
be stressed that the current Dutch governmental policy does not aim at full suspension 
of subsidies, though it is directed at reducing these substantially (Ministry of Transport, 
2004). 
The main theoretical argument for withdrawing subsidies for public transport is that 
the sector would be fully subjected to the market forces. Assuming no market 
imperfections, the invisible hand of the market could produce the optimal public 
transport supply. In practice, the main reason for reducing subsidies in the Netherlands 
is political dissatisfaction with the high amount of subsidies. The annual subsidies 
amounted to 1.5 billion Euros in the early nineties, about 0.5% of GNP. 
The study starts with an evaluation of the financial performance of the Dutch public 
transport system. This uncovers the main financial weaknesses and gives some 
understanding about how to improve these. Then the effects of suspension of subsidies 
are investigated by adopting a scenario analysis. Two scenarios are developed that 
describe opposite extremes in the hypothetical situation that no subsidies are granted to 
public transport operators. Both scenarios are compared to a reference scenario where 
continuation of subsidies is assumed. 
 
 
Financial performance of public transport in the Netherlands 
 
The evaluation of the financial performance refers to the situation before the new 
policy to introduce tendering, decentralization and reduction of subsidies started 
(second half of the nineties). We define this as the base situation. The base situation will 
differ from the current situation in 2006, because the new policy had a significant 
impact on public transport supply. For reasons of data availability, the year 1993 is 
selected to represent the base situation. Due to the new policy the commercial 
consciousness of the transport companies increased and the power of governmental 
bodies reduced, effecting that (sensitive) financial data are no longer in the public 
domain. The 1993 data were gathered from the Ministry of Transport (1995), Central 
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Bureau of Statistics (1 and 2) and annual reports of the Dutch railways and the public 
transport companies of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague. Because there was no 
charge for railway infrastructure use in 1993, the cost figures in this section relate only 
to the operating costs. 
In 1993 the passenger revenues covered 59% of the operating costs of Dutch public 
transport. This was the result of the average cost of 2.9-3.4 eurocents per seat km (the 
range is caused by different assumptions on standing densities), the average revenue of 
5.6 eurocents per person kilometre (pkm) and the average occupancy of 31-34%. As can 
be seen in Table 6, these figures vary a lot over the different PT-systems. 
Table 6: Financial performance of Dutch public transport in 1993. 












Urban bus 4.6-5.8 7.9 0.29 0.17-0.21 1300 
Urban tram 4.2-5.6 7.9 0.33 0.18-0.24 710 
Underground 1.9-3.2 7.9 0.65 0.16-0.26 675 
Regional bus 2.7-3.3 6.0 0.42 0.19-0.23 3670 
Local train in 
rural areas 
3.3 5.1 0.38 0.25 560 
Local train in 
non-rural areas 
3.0 5.1 0.63 0.36 4875 
Express train 2.2 5.1 1.20 0.52 9330 
Total PT 2.9-3.3 5.6 0.59 0.31-0.34 21120 
1 including standing places in bus, tram and underground. 
 
The benefit-cost ratios range from nearly 30% (urban bus) to 120% (express train). 
Generally, fast systems perform better than slow systems. This gives rise to the 
assumption that slow local transport will be more affected by suspension of subsidies 
than fast long distance transport. 
The most important cost components are the costs of the vehicle crew and the costs of 
fleet ownership and maintenance. In the bus systems the driver’s wages count for 50-
60% of the operating costs, while another 20-25% relate to ownership and maintenance 
of the vehicles. In the rail systems vehicle costs are highest with shares between 30 and 
50%, those of vehicle crew range from 20 to 25% for heavy rail, going up to 40% for 
the urban tram. The heavy rail systems employ station staff, responsible for 10-15% of 
the costs. Energy and overhead still play a significant role, ranging from 10-20% and 5-
10% respectively. 
A demand-related factor that enlarges the operating deficits is the high fluctuation of 
demand over time and space. The morning peak shows the highest demand at about 
280,000 persons travelling at the same time by PT, which is 30% more than the evening 
peak and about 3 times the period between the peaks. It is interesting that the fluctuation 
over time is less articulated for the other modes. For these modes there is no difference 
between the two peaks, while the peak demand is about twice the off-peak demand. 
Therefore, measures that are directed to a large increase of the share of public transport 
may result in a more uniform distribution, so raising the average occupancies and 
increasing the cost coverage. 
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Estimation of the effects of subsidy suspension 
 
The estimation of the effects of suspension of subsidies is based on a scenario 
analysis. To find out which measures the public transport operators probably would take 
for eliminating the deficits, the effectiveness of both cost reducing and revenue 
increasing measures is analysed. The results are used for developing scenarios that are 
helpful in finding the effects of suspension of subsidies. 
 
 
Measures for improving the revenue-cost ratios 
 
Promising cost reducing measures are measures that tackle the costs of the two largest 
cost components: vehicle crew and fleet ownership + maintenance. Increasing revenues 
can be realised by raising the level of service or increasing the fares. 
Van Goeverden et al. (2005) found that the most effective cost reducing measure is 
lowering the wages. Halving the wages will reduce the operating costs by 30-40%. 
Second best is increasing stop spacing. This raises the operating speed of the vehicles, 
effecting a more efficient employment of vehicles and personnel. Doubling the distance 
between stops will reduce the costs by 20-30%. Producing cheaper vehicles is also 
effective for the rail modes. Halving the price of vehicles will reduce the operational 
costs by 10-20%. 
Measures that aim at raising the revenues by making public transport more attractive 
have only significant effect in non-urban transport. The most effective measure is 
increasing the operational speed. A speed increase by 50% will increase patronage by 
30-35%. However, if the speed increase is effectuated by increasing stop spacing, the 
longer access and egress distances will soften the increase in demand, approximately by 
50%. Doubling the frequency of the services will increase patronage by 10-30%, where 
the higher the initial frequency the smaller the effects. 
Fare increase is most effective in urban transport. Doubling the fares is expected to 
reduce patronage with about 25%. In regional transport the estimated fall in demand is 
40%, in long distance transport 50%. In the latter case total revenues will just remain 





Three scenarios are developed for 2010 based on the ‘Trend scenario’ defined in the 
Scenario Explorer (Heyma et al., 1999). One scenario is a reference scenario describing 
the situation that granting of subsidies to public transport companies will be continued. 
The two other scenarios define two extremes of the probable development of public 
transport supply and demand if subsidies are suspended. The scenarios differ only with 
respect to the designs of the public transport systems and related factors like modal 
travel volumes. 
The Reference scenario is a projection of the base situation to 2010. In this scenario it 
is assumed that a) operating losses will be covered by the government, b) public 
transport operators have to pay nothing for utilization of infrastructure, c) there is some 
political dissatisfaction regarding the large subsidies causing pressure from the 
government to operate cost efficient, and d) the real fares will not change. 
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Starting-point in the two subsidy-free scenarios is that a) subsidies for public transport 
operation are suspended and b) train operators have to pay an annual levy for utilization 
of the Dutch railway infrastructure. The main difference between the two scenarios is 
the basic attitude of the public transport operators that determines their main strategy for 
eliminating the deficits. 
Basically two strategies are available to increase the benefit/cost ratio: increasing 
revenues and reducing costs. In the first scenario, the strategy is primarily directed at 
attracting more customers and thus increasing the revenues. Therefore, measures are 
taken that raise the level of service. The operators do not aim at a profit and they have 
an open eye for social and community interests. The government supports their strategy 
by providing adequate infrastructure. This is the so-called ‘User scenario’. 
In the second scenario, the strategy of the operators is primarily focused on cost 
reduction to satisfy the investors by aiming at a high profit. The new independence of 
governmental rules that were connected with granting subsidies is used to cut the most 
uneconomic services without considering the social and community interests. There is 
no infrastructural support from the government. This is the so-called ‘Yield scenario’. 
The User and Yield scenarios are developed stepwise. After defining base variants 
that improve the financial performance of public transport but do not make it financially 
self-supporting, adapted variants are developed until a situation is found with zero loss 
for the User scenario and about 10% profit margin for the Yield scenario. The definition 
of the base variants is in full accordance with the respective strategies. The adaptations 
are strictly directed at improving the revenue/cost ratios and are sometimes contrary to 
the basic strategy of a scenario. 
 
 
The effects of subsidy suspension 
 
Impacts of subsidy suspension on the public transport system 
 
Table 7 demonstrates the financial performance of public transport in the scenarios. It 
shows the revenue-cost ratios for the three scenarios as well as costs per seat km and 
revenues per person km for the User and Yield scenarios relative to the Reference 
scenario.  
Table 7: Financial performance of public transport in the scenarios. 








 US YS RS US YS US YS US YS 
Urban bus 0.90 0.93 0.29 66 95 213 212 93 141 
Urban tram 0.91 1.01 0.37 65 98 213 212 75 125 
Underground 1.44 1.50 0.69 117 125 213 212 115 128 
Regional bus 0.92 1.22 0.42 73 88 170 170 93 149 
Local train in 
rural areas 
0.77 1.16 0.62 90 93 110 150 102 117 
Local train in 
non-rural 
areas 
0.72 1.03 0.61 93 90 110 150 99 101 
Express train 1.46 1.59 1.08 98 122 110 150 120 121 
High-speed 
train 
1.90 2.36 1.58 97 101 110 150 106 101 
Total PT 1.00 1.12 0.71 86 101 125 162 107 118 
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The latter are represented by index numbers. The charge for use of rail infrastructure in 
the two subsidy-free scenarios is included only in their revenue-cost ratios for total PT. 
The User, Yield and Reference scenarios are indicated by “US”, “YS” and “RS” 
respectively. 
In the User scenario the total revenues just cover the costs, while in the Yield scenario 
the operators gain a profit of 12%. The Reference scenario still shows a large deficit, 
though the revenue-cost ratio is higher than in the base year 1993. In the two subsidy-
free scenarios the separate PT-systems sometimes still have deficits, especially in the 
User scenario. In urban transport, in both scenarios the deficits of the bus are fully 
compensated by the profits of the rail modes, especially the underground. The deficits in 
regional transport in the User scenario demand some cross subsidy from the profitable 
long distance train services to the regional transport services. If long distance train 
services and regional bus/train services are operated by different companies, the 
national government could actualise cross subsidy by passing on tax revenues from long 
distance operators to regional operators. 
The relatively high costs per seat km for some rail services in the User and Yield 
scenarios can be explained by the deployment of relatively short trains. It is interesting 
to see that the overall cost-effectiveness in the Yield scenario is much lower than in the 
User scenario. 
The revenues per person km increase significantly in both the User and Yield 
scenarios, especially in urban transport and regional bus transport. The increase reflects 
the rise in fares. In the Yield scenario the occupancies also increase substantially, with 
the vehicles becoming more crowded. 
The impacts on some level of service variables are presented in Table 8. Again, the 
impacts are indicated by index numbers, where the Reference scenario values are fixed 
at 100. The frequency variable is the number of services per week, so it indicates 
changes in periods of operation and interval times simultaneously. Another relevant 
variable, crowding in vehicles, was indicated in Table 7 by the changes in occupancy 
rates. 
Table 8: Level of service impacts of the subsidy-free scenarios (RS=100). 
 Access/egress distance Frequency Operating speed 
 US YS US YS US YS 
Urban bus 184 223 132 62 138 101 
Urban tram 101 124 87 40 142 100 
Underground 104 107 82 48 100 100 
Regional bus 151 212 129 55 122 110 
Local train in 
rural areas 
100 170 104 50 100 110 







Express train 100 107 87 37 100 97 
High-speed train 98 100 93 58 107 100 
1 urbanized areas  2 non-urbanized areas. 
 
In the Yield scenario a large overall decline of the level of service will result from the 
measures. Bus and tram stops as well as the railway stations are at much larger distances 
and frequencies fall. The only positive changes are the moderate speed increases of the 
regional bus and train systems. 
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The results for the User scenario are less detrimental. It is true, that in urban transport 
the access distance to the bus stops greatly increases and the frequencies on the urban 
rail transport decrease, but there is a substantial increase in speed of the bus and tram 
systems. In regional bus transport again a larger access distance to the stops is 
accompanied by a higher operating speed. 
The impacts on the demand are shown in Figure 1. The figure indicates the estimated 























Figure 1: Demand for public transport in the scenarios. 
 
In the User scenario the overall public transport demand is slightly less than in the 
Reference scenario. The difference is mainly caused by a substantially lower demand 
for urban and regional transport. The demand for train travel is similar in both scenarios. 
In the Yield scenario the impact on demand is much larger. In each sub market the 
demand falls to about 40% of the Reference scenario demand. Even the introduction of 
the high-speed train does not prevent the demand for long distance trains being severely 
cut. 
A remarkable side result is a growth in demand of about 50% at the current subsidy 
level in the first (not self-supporting) variant that was defined in the stepwise 
development of the User scenario. Measures in this variant were all directed to increase 
both service level and efficiency in order to attract more passengers and reduce unit 




Impacts on other modes 
 
The estimated effects on the other modes are small. Car use will increase by 0.4% in 
the User scenario and by 1.1% in the Yield scenario. Still in some (congested) corridors 
the effects can be substantial. Bicycle use will increase by 1.7% and 4.0% in the User 
and Yield scenarios respectively. 
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Social and economic impacts 
 
The social impacts of both scenarios have been evaluated in a qualitative way. Four 
groups of PT-users have been distinguished: those who have a car available, temporal-
emergency users, consciously non-car users and forced car-less. In both scenarios 
mainly negative impacts are expected, though these are much more severe in YS than in 
US. For the first group the impacts will be limited and partly positive as these people 
have in principle an alternative, get a faster PT system and may often be able to pay the 
higher fares for it. The second group, using PT only in case of emergencies will have 
larger problems at those moments, but this happens only incidentally. The third group 
will theoretically be able to switch to alternatives though this may cause ethical distress. 
Nevertheless, people may be able to pay the higher prices and enjoy the higher speeds. 
The last group is the most affected one, as this group has no alternative and often people 
are unable to drive a car due to disabilities, high age or low income. On all these aspects 
the system is deteriorating in both scenarios because of increasing access and egress 
distances, more crowded vehicles and much higher fares. 
The main conclusion is that the social function, serving the fourth group of travellers, 
is deteriorating much stronger in the Yield scenario than in the User scenario. Notably 
in the Yield scenario less and less places will be accessible by PT and at less hours of 
day and night and less days of the week. 
From an economic perspective the complete suspension of subsidies would yield 
about 800 million Euro per year in the form of a tax reduction for the Dutch taxpayers. 
This is about 0.3% of GDP. Jobs in public transport would decrease with an estimated 
26% in the case of the User scenario and 63% in the Yield scenario. A countervailing 
effect is that the increase in disposable income owing to the tax reduction will lead to an 
increase in demand for goods and services produced in other sectors. Much depends on 
the flexibility of the labour markets so that persons who would loose their job in public 
transport can find a new job in another sector. 
 
 
Experiences in the UK after deregulation of bus services 
 
In the UK the 1985 Transport Act exposed local bus services outside London to 
market forces. The Act introduced deregulation for commercial services, competitive 
tendering for subsidised services and privatisation. One of the intents was subsidy 
reduction (Gwilliam, 1990). It would be interesting to compare the observed effects in 
the UK with the estimated effects of subsidy suspension in the Netherlands. One should 
keep in mind that the former were induced by deregulation and competitive tendering, 





The largest effects in the UK are observed for the metropolitan areas (except for 
London). In these areas the subsidy per passenger journey was reduced by 50-55% 
(Matthews et al., 2001). This is the result of a large decrease in operating costs per 
vehicle km and higher fares. On the cost side, productivity of personnel increased 
significantly. Based on staff input per vehicle km, in the metropolitan areas 16% 
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productivity increase of platform staff is estimated in 1987/88 and even 37% 
productivity increase of non-platform staff (Heseltine et al., 1990). Additionally, the 
wages of bus drivers lagged behind other wages; in 1998 the wage fall amounted to 
30% relative to the average wage rate (Matthews et al.). The fall in wages is partly the 
result of deployment of minibuses on lightly used routes. Drivers of minibuses earn 
much lower wages than their colleagues on the large buses. Replacing large buses by 
minibuses also reduces maintenance costs, because minibuses do not need heavy 
maintenance facilities (Heseltine et al.). Apart from cost reduction, a real fare increase 
was observed in the metropolitan areas. Directly after introduction of deregulation the 
fares increased by 20-25%, in the years after they continued to increase at a higher rate 
than they did before 1985 (Fairhurst et al., 1996). Outside the metropolitan areas fares 
increased only slightly. 
Generally, the British outcomes support the Dutch result that urban transport will be 
more affected than regional transport. However, in more detail, they show many 
differences from the Dutch estimates. Looking at the cost side, the differences can be 
explained by assumptions that are made in the Dutch study. First, in the latter a constant 
number of bus drivers per vehicle hour is assumed as well as a constant ratio between 
drivers and non-platform staff. Productivity can only be raised by increasing operating 
speed. Substantial speed increases have been achieved in particular in the User scenario. 
Second, a maximum real wage reduction of 10% was assumed. Third, no analyses are 
performed with varying bus capacity. One could wonder, whether minibuses would 
have been introduced in the assumed Dutch situation where a) a large wage cut cannot 
be achieved and b) there are no services subsidised by the government. Finally, the fare 
increase is much higher in the Dutch estimations. This can partly be explained by the 
assumed restraints for cost reduction and partly by a much lower initial fare level in the 
Netherlands (Commission for integrated transport, 2001). 
 
 
Level of service 
 
The new policy had different impacts on the service quality in the UK. Bus kilometres 
increased substantially. In 1988/89 the increase was 11% in the metropolitan areas and 
even 24% in the English shires (White, 1990). However, timetable co-ordination 
between companies serving the same route to even out frequencies stopped; this might 
have reduced the contribution of more bus kilometres to service quality. Similarly, the 
integration with rail was converted into competition. Bus companies refrained from 
performing a feeder role to the local rail network and started services parallel to the rail 
routes (Tyson, 1990). 
The observed increase in bus kilometres is opposite to the Dutch outcomes. In both 
scenarios substantial decreases in both urban and regional bus km are foreseen, ranging 
from 15% for the regional services in the User scenario to 70% for both bus systems in 
the Yield scenario. Presumably, the main explanation for the differences is that the 
observed increase in the UK is induced by on-road competition, not assumed in the 
Dutch analyses. Other possible explanations are the added services parallel to rail routes 
in the UK and the ignored deployment of minibuses in the Dutch case. Suspension of 
co-ordination between bus operators and integration with the rail network are not 
assumed in the Dutch analyses as well. They may also be related to the deregulation 
policy. 




The impact on demand in the UK seems to be negative. Demand for bus transport was 
declining in the 1970’s, but the decline was converted into a small increase in the early 
80’s. After introduction of the new policy again a long term decline of demand has been 
observed. In the metropolitan areas the reduction in bus patronage was 16% three years 
after deregulation, 25% five years after, 38% ten years after and 45% 16 years after. The 
figures for the English shires are a 7% fall in demand three years after deregulation and 
23% 16 years after (White, 1990, Matthews et al., 2001, Balcombe et al., 2004). 
Estimates of travel demand assuming continuation of the old policy produced 
substantial higher figures. White (1990) predicted a 6% higher demand outside London 
in 1988/89 (12% in the metropolitan areas), Fairhurst et al. (1996) predicted a 25% 
higher demand outside London in 1994/95. Taking into account the effect of increased 
bus mileage, assuming a positive contribution to service quality, the predicted demand 
by Fairhurst et al. exceeded the observed demand even by nearly 60%. 
Despite differences between results regarding fares and service level, the estimated 
impacts on demand are similar if the UK case is compared to the Dutch User scenario. 
The Yield scenario features a larger fall in demand. This is close to the UK outcome 
that includes the effect of increased bus mileage. 
 
 
Conclusions regarding subsidy suspension 
 
Suspension of subsidies for public transport operation would have strong negative 
effects on the urban and regional transport supply. The level of service would decline 
and the fares would increase substantially. As a consequence demand would decrease. 
The decline of the level of service is the result of much lower network and stop 
densities, lower frequencies, and more crowded vehicles. The extent of the effects 
depends on the strategy of the operators for eliminating the deficits. If they focus on 
offering a high level of service in order to attract more customers, the estimated fall in 
demand is about 30%. If they focus on cost reduction and earning the highest possible 
profit, the demand might fall up to 60%. The effects on long distance transport can 
either be negative or positive, depending on the strategy of the operators. Focusing on 
profits might lower the level of service seriously. The demand can fall up to 50%. On 
the other hand, focusing on the attractiveness of public transport might have small 
positive effects and result in an increase in demand that equals the estimated increase 
for the situation that granting of subsidies will be continued. The outcomes for the bus 
systems differ from British experiences after deregulation of local bus services, 
especially regarding the supply side. The British observations display considerably 
lower impacts on service level and fares. Nevertheless, the impacts on demand could be 










The choice for the level of subsidies in public transport is of course a political one and 
hence cannot be made on the basis of scientific research only. It is clear, that the 
introduction of entirely free public transport for everybody may score well according to 
the equity argument to prevent social exclusion, but that it has considerable 
disadvantages because of rebound effects that make the environmental effects less 
attractive than anticipated. Also the burden imposed on the tax payer obviously is a 
negative effect.  
There are, however, good arguments for free public transport (or strongly reduced 
fares) for specific groups such as students and the elderly, especially when this is 
restricted to off-peak periods when marginal costs are low.  
Full suspension of subsidies may have serious impacts on service quality of public 
transport. In particular in urban and regional transport a considerable decline of services 
may be expected. Moreover, fares will increase. Subsidy suspension contributes to the 
social exclusion of low income groups that have no car. 
In long distance transport the effects may be moderate. Operation of long distance 
services is already profitable. 
Generally, the impacts of subsidy suspension depend on the strategy of the PT-
operators in achieving full cost recovery. If they focus on cost reduction and earning a 
high profit, the negative consequences are expected to be significantly larger then if 
they focus on providing a high service level in order to attract more customers and so 
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The objective of the paper is to examine and to asses the effects of the introduction of a third payer 
system on the mobility behaviour from a multidisciplinary viewpoint. This approach allows an analysis of 
various effects that free public transport and, in general, price policies can entail. The concept of the 
“third payer system” implies that the cost of public transport is not paid by the user or provider, but 
partially or completely by a third party. Local authorities, other public organisations and private 
organisations can enter into such agreements and pay for public transport for a specific target group in a 
specific area. The analysis has been performed through a case study, namely the introduction of free 
urban public transport for students at Dutch-speaking universities and colleges in Brussels. In how far this 
measure contributes to a more sustainable mobility system has caused much debate. Also, not everyone is 
convinced that such a measure is beneficial for the society. Some people argue that there are better ways 
to spend the money, for instance on the quality of public transport. In order to assess whether this 
measure has societal benefits, a social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA) has been carried out. This analysis 
calculates the benefits and costs of the measure, in order to find out if the balance is positive or negative. 
 





Public transport subsidies play an important role in the present Belgian mobility 
policy. The introduction of “free” bus transport in Hasselt in 1997 was an important 
event. Over the years, more “free” public transport initiatives were taken. Since 2000, 
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seniors (65+) and children (-12) can benefit from the third payer system on the Flemish 
network. Later, it was also introduced in Brussels for seniors in January 2003. From 
July 2004 onwards, federal employees of federal administrations and autonomous 
public organisations are refunded for their train and Brussels’ public transport season 
ticket. Since March 2005, people with minimum wages have also been benefiting from 
this measure. 
 
2. The case study of Brussels 
 
A “free” public transport initiative started in Brussels in the 2003-2004 academic year 
for students at Dutch-speaking colleges and universities. The “free” public transport 
ticket is only valid on the public transport modes (tram, bus and metro) operated by the 
Brussels Public Transport Company (STIB). The public transport lines of the STIB 
cover the entire Brussels Capital Region. In order to benefit from the measure students 
need to be younger than 25 years (except for medical students) and need to be registered 
for a first degree – in other words – a first registration. The Flemish Government 
(“Vlaamse Gemeenschapscommissie”) took the initiative for the measure. The 
“Brusselsfonds” (Brussels fund) of the Flemish Government invested 1,2 million Euros 
in the project.  
At the start of the 2003-2004 academic year, an administrative fee of € 10 was asked. 
The next academic year, this fee was raised to € 25. During the first year more than 
8.000 students applied for a “free” public transport ticket. The second year 5.100 
students applied for the card. The third year the administrative fee of € 25 was retained 
but students got refunded immediately, resulting in a higher subscription rate. 
The main objective is to help students discovering Brussels by promoting their 
mobility. Other objectives are promoting subscriptions at Dutch-speaking institutions in 
Brussels, stimulating students to participate at various activities in Brussels, convincing 
Flemish students to come and live in Brussels and improving the city’s image among 
students and subsequently the entire Flemish population. The measure is also intended 
to contribute to a sustainable mobility by improving the image of public transport, 
inducing habit forming and ensuring access to mobility. 
 
 
3. Theoretical base 
 
Theories of mode choice are diverse. A broad distinction can be made between a 
rationalist approach, a psychological approach and a socio-geographical approach. An 
attempt to integration was made by Kaufmann. Kaufmann (2002) analyses mobility as a 
broad phenomenon, in which making trips depends on the fulfilment of several factors, 
considered as potential factors allowing understanding why a particular journey has or 
hasn’t been undertaken. These factors constitute the individual’s “motility”, i.e. the 
travel potential of an individual. The factors included in an individual’s motility can be 
grouped into three types: access, skills and appropriation (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: Mobility and motility concept (Kaufmann, 2002). 
 
This analysis grid has the advantage not to focus on one explanatory factor of travel 
behaviour. In this research the analysis was focused on the factors listed in Table 1. 
Table 1: Motility scheme of Kaufmann, with factors analysed in this research. 
Access Skills Appropriation 
Modes’ availability City image 
Residential situation 
Knowledge of the city 






There is a wide range of factors that influence the demand for public transport. There 
is plenty of empirical evidence as to what the relevant factors are, and which of them 
may be more important than others, in different circumstances (Balcombe et al., 2004). 





Access factors are linked to the disposal of different “options”, or means of travel. 
Access is “conditioned” by the location and accessibility of the various origins and 
destination points to transportation networks (Flamm, 2004). Also, the price and 
schedule offered by transportation networks and the budget and time available for users 
are access factors. The supply of transport comprises the availability of personal travel 
means and of loyalties to public travel modes, as well as the quality of the travel 
networks. 
Prices of travel modes and consequently the budget that has to be spent for travel, is 
difficult to assess at a theoretical level (Frenay, 1994; Flamm, 2004). The price of 
transport services consists of several components. Empirical research confirms that 








  Appropriation 
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factors, like the purpose of the trip (Dijst & Van Wee, 2002; Balcombe et al., 2004) and 
the time horizon (Button, 1993). Studies also indicate that the cost of transport, assessed 
by individuals, is often biased: car costs are minimized compared to the price of public 





Individuals develop skills relative to mobility and to different travel means. These 
skills can be physical, acquired or organizational. Acquired skills are linked to the 
knowledge people have developed of the various means of travel at their disposal and of 
the space in which mobility takes place. Skills may also result from organizational 
abilities developed by an individual with regard to time and space arrangements and 
budget management. An example is the ability to collect and use travel information. 
 
 
3.2.1 The Activity Space 
 
In order to grasp time and space skills of the students we have used the activity space 
concept. The concept was developed in the late 1960s and aims to represent the space 
which contains the places frequented by an individual over a period of time.  
An activity space can be defined as a two-dimensional form which is constituted by the 
spatial distribution of those locations a traveller has personal experience with (Figure 2) 
(Schönfelder & Axhausen, 2002). Mental maps are defined in a broader sense and 
comprise also those locations of which a person has second hand experience. 
 
 
Figure 2: Representation of the activity space (Schönfelder & Axhausen, 2003). 
 
3.2.2 Mental maps 
 
In order to grasp knowledge (skills) and appreciation (appropriation) of the city by 
students the concept of “mental maps” was used. This concept was developed in the 
1960s by Lynch (1960) within the behaviourist movement. Behaviourism no longer 
considered people as objective units but as individuals who receive environmental 
messages and process information individually, resulting in a transformed mental image 
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of the spatial environment. The image of the environment consists of a transformation 
of distances, times, areas, a selective knowledge of points, lines and surfaces and an 
appreciation of connections, modes etc. (Figure 3) (Golledge & Stimson, 1997; Gould 
& White, 1986). A broad definition of mental maps comes from Downs and Stea 
(1973), who defined a mental map as the organized representation by a person of a part 
of his spatial environment. A history of the research in spatial cognition can be found in 
Mark et al. (1999) and Foreman and Gillet (1997). 
Mental maps are currently embedded in the research field of spatial cognition, which 
studies the knowledge, experience and perception of the environment. It is a research 
area in the periphery of various disciplines, notably geography, urban planning, 
psychology and computer science. 
 
 
Figure 3 The formation of images (Golledge & Stimson, 1997) 
 
The notion that people’s everyday spatial behaviour is based on the world as they 
believe it to be is central in understanding mental maps. This implies a mutual relation 
between a person’s mental map and his mobility behaviour. People use their mental map 
of an area to estimate the distance, travel time and to appreciate the different travel 
modes. Trip decisions are wholly or partially based on the information stored in their 
mental map. Conversely, the mode someone uses influences the notion of the spatial 
environment a person has, since people observe the environment during their trip and 
new elements from the environment are ordered and related to each other (Van Beynen 





Appropriation comprises the user’s experiences, habits, perceptions and values linked 
to travel modes and space. This affects the way individuals appreciate their own access 
and skills to travel modes (Fujii & Kitamura, 2003; Heath & Gifford, 2002). For 
example, users often contrast car and public transport; car is often seen quite positively, 
so that a dependence on the car and a car-oriented mind seems to arise. Public transport 
is then more negatively assessed (Flamm, 2004; Kaufmann, 2000; Petit, 2002; Bassand 
& Kaufmann, 1996). The way users have experienced travel modes will lead them to 
appreciate a particular travel means. This is why some studies proposed to give users 
experiences of a real-life situation, an experience that could potentially lead to modify 
mode decisions (Brown et al. 2003; Fujii et al., 2001; Fujii & Kitamura, 2003; Heath & 
Gifford, 2002). 
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4. Research questions 
 
“Free” public transport policies are expected to have an impact on different aspects of 
the mobility system. Besides mobility effects, this type of measure also has psycho-
social, economic and spatio-temporal consequences.  
Several ex-ante studies were conducted to examine the effect of the pricing measure 
(a.o. Ubillos & Sainz, 2004; Proost et al., 2002). Because the introduction of “free” 
public transport is usually combined with changes in the supply and/or with an 
evolution of the demand, these studies raise much debate about the real impact of the 
pricing measure. The problem is to assess the effect of “free” use of public transport on 
travel behaviour independently of other changes in the environment. 
The introduction of the measure in Brussels created a situation where one group 
benefits from the measure and a similar group in the same area does not. The price of 
public transport is in fact the only difference in the transport supply between the two 
groups. Using this “laboratory” situation, it is analysed how this free access causes 
changes in the mobility behaviour of students. The general objectives of this study are 
thus the analysis and the assessment of the effect of the third payer system from a 
psycho-sociological, geographical and economical viewpoint. The assessment will be 
performed by means of a social cost-benefit analysis.  
 
 




A survey has been conducted in order to examine differences in travel behaviour 
before and after the introduction of “free” public transport, asking for the number of 
trips students make, their travel motives, travel costs, spread in time, origins and 
destinations, etc. The population for the representative survey consisted of students 
from Dutch- and French-speaking universities and colleges. 3162 surveys were 
collected: 1618 (51%) from students at Dutch-speaking and 1544 (49%) from students 
at French-speaking institutions. The number of surveys was determined proportionally 
to school size. The sample was selected according to the principle of the quota sample 
(De Pelsmacker & Van Kenhove, 2002). The survey was first tested among around fifty 
students of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel by means of pilot testing. 
The survey also served as data collection for the construction of activity spaces. All 
locations regularly visited by the respondents are input for this. People were asked 
which locations they frequently visited. There are various techniques for measuring 
activity spaces, such as confidence ellipse, kernel density and minimum spanning tree 
(Schönfelder & Axhausen, 2002).  
Each of these captures different aspects of the activity space. In this research 
confidence ellipses were used (Figure 4). The confidence ellipse represents the smallest 
possible area in which a specified proportion of all visited places is located. The size of 
the ellipse is an indicator for the dispersion of the locations visited. 
 
 




Figure 4: Confidence ellipse method to construct activity spaces. 
 
5.2 Mental map interviews 
 
5.2.1 Interview construction 
 
300 students filled in a questionnaire on mental maps, additional to the survey. 
Students were selected ad random proportionally to the school size. Different methods 
were tested and four questions were withheld. The questions provided more information 
on the students’ preferences and verified some of the information on activity patterns. 
They provided information on the students’ knowledge and perception of Brussels and 
the elements they consider significant in Brussels. A number of criteria have been 
developed to assess the quality of a mental map (Lynch, 1960; Dorling and Fairbairn, 
1997). Combined, these questions provide a wide range of information on the students’ 
knowledge and appreciation of places in Brussels. 
 
 
5.2.2 Ranking place preferences 
 
Students were asked to evaluate each neighbourhood on a seven-point scale, running 
from +3 to -3. Mental maps can be constructed from ordinal measurements using 
principal components analysis. This method is described in detail in Gould & White 
(1986). This method allows finding the overall structure in the student’s responses, 




5.2.3 Processing of mental map information 
 
A relational database was built containing for each student the place names listed 
and/or drawn. Only features that were drawn more or less on the right location were 
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included. A set of geocoding operations were then carried out to georeference the 
information. After geocoding place names on the most detailed level possible, all 
information was reclassified to statistical sector level. This means that each building, 
street or commune was assigned to the statistical sector(s) it lied within or contained. 
The results are mental maps on statistical sector level, indicating for each student or 
group of students the familiar places. For further processing the maps were converted to 























Drawn streets/neighbourhoods/communities 0 2 41
Kilometers
 


















Figure 5 Processing of mental maps. Top left: example of a manually drawn mental map. Top right: geo-
coding of the drawn and labelled map elements. Bottom left: number of map elements drawn per 
neighbourhood. Bottom right: raster map of the number of map elements per neighbourhood. 
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5.2.4 Comparing individual mental maps 
 
By starting with the individual mental maps and by comparing them based on their 
spatial characteristics, groups of similar mental maps can be formed.  
Automated procedures for map comparison have been applied. The Map Comparison 
Kit (MCK) is a software tool for the comparison of raster maps, developed by the 
Research Institute for Knowledge Systems (RISK). The method used is Fuzzy Set Map 
Comparison, which is a combination of Kappa statistic and Fuzzy Set theory. It takes 
proximity relations and similarity between legend categories into account in order to 
obtain a nuanced view on map similarity. A detailed specification of the method is 
given in Hagen (2003a and 2003b). 
The raster files of the individual mental maps were converted to ASCII files and 
automatically entered and processed in the MCK (batch mode). The processing 
consisted of a two-by-two comparison of all maps, resulting in a 288*288 cells matrix 
for each indicator (Klocation, Khisto and Kappa) which was automatically written to a 
Statistica (Access) database. 
 
 
5.2.5 Cluster analysis 
 
The purpose of this step is to define groups of mental maps based on their spatial 
characteristics. To achieve this, the Kappa values were used. A K-means clustering 
technique was applied to define a set of clusters of greatest possible distinction. Best 
results were obtained with 7 clusters. Euclidean distances from each case to the cluster 
centre were used to identify representative cluster members. 
 
 
5.2.6 General Discriminant Analysis 
 
Finally, a general discriminant analysis helped to find which socio-economical and 
mobility variables influence a student’s mental map. Discriminant analysis is used to 
determine which variables discriminate between two or more groups. A model is built to 
predict as well as possible to which group a case belongs. A stepwise model approach 
allows selecting those variables that discriminate most between the cluster groups. Each 
step, the model is evaluated and variables can be added or removed. Only main effects 
were taken into account, so not combinations (products) of different variables. 
 
 
5.3 Analysis of the public transport supply 
 
Insight in well and less well served areas in Brussels Capital Region is needed in 
order to ease the interpretation of the activity patterns and mental maps. Perhaps certain 
places are not visited because the transport supply is insufficient. Secondly, the analysis 
of the transport supply is important to balance the effect of price measures versus 
investments in the transport supply. 
Data sources readily available at the MIVB/STIB have been used, such as the Vision 
2020 document, which contains information on the public transport offer. Secondly, for 
all public transport stops the number of passing vehicles (bus, tram, metro) per hour has 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 32 (2006): 26-48 
 35
been calculated for a selected time frame (morning and late evening). The result is a 
map with isolines that indicates the number of passing vehicles per hour.  
 
 
5.4 In-depth interviews 
 
Hypotheses which could highlight the mode choices made by individuals were 
defined. The understanding of those choices would allow us to get the importance of 
financial type factors in the reasoning held by individuals. The interview guide has thus 
been built to take these hypotheses into account. A first proposed hypothesis was that of 
lived experiences – as potentially carrying sense and so participating in a privileged way 
in the mode choices made by individuals. The second hypothesis suggested that 
«mobility diaries» could influence mode choice. Finally socialization – as it would 
create mode use habits – appeared also as a factor influencing the attraction and/or the 
use of some means of transport. 
The methodology could be defined as an inductive and comprehensive one. Inductive 
methodologies start from particular elements to come to generalization. The 
comprehensive approach (Kaufmann, 1997; Petit, 2002) focuses on the justifications 
used, rather than on the description of behaviour. The comprehensive approach is aimed 
at understanding the elements that influence logics of action followed in the everyday 
mobility and to understand the significance that an actor gives them. 
Qualitative methods are consequently those that correspond in a more obvious way 
with such a comprehensive approach, as these data collecting methods allow the 
individuals to freely express themselves relatively to their logics of action. It becomes 
then possible to avoid immediate answers and to go deeper in the attitudes, 
representations, perceptions and feelings of a person (Hay, 2000). Since the point is 
rather to look for diversity of profiles, reaching a representative sample is not 
considered a relevant epistemological criterion. Data collecting is stopped when no new 
information is found with additional interviews. Qualitative interviews are carried out in 
a semi-structured way. This means that open questions are asked to respondents who 
answer freely. 
A complete transcription of the interviews was implemented. With the transcriptions, 
we have sketched an analysis of the materials, based on the structural method. This kind 
of method considers the talk of the respondent as being structured in a particular and 
systematic way. The main goal is then to identify and to analyse sets of themes and lines 
of arguments followed by students (Hiernaux, 1995; Piret et al., 1996). This work has 
allowed us to examine whether different types of respondents – which arise from quite 
close lines of arguments – could be distinguished. Finally, encoding of the qualitative 
data has been carried out, using Nvivo software, allowing analysing the whole dataset. 
 
 
5.5 Social cost-benefit analysis  
 
The Social Cost-Benefit Analysis (SCBA) model is based on the theory of welfare 
economics, according to which the welfare of a society depends on the aggregate 
individual utility levels of all members of that society. The aim of the SCBA is to 
produce an evaluation in terms of a general objective, which takes into account the 
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interests of all actors who will be affected by the decision. Therefore it is a suitable 
method for evaluating government investments.  
The SCBA has three main characteristics. First, it adopts the position of the society as 
a whole. It does not only take financial costs and benefits into account, but it also tries 
to capture the societal effects. Secondly, it converts all the effects into a common unit, 
namely the monetary unit. Thirdly, it calculates the balance of the monetarized effects. 
A positive balance means that the society as a whole benefits from the project. A 
negative balance means that the costs for the society are higher than the benefits 
(Immers & Stada, 2004; De Brucker et al., 1998). 
The costs of the measure can be divided into direct costs and external costs. Direct 
costs in this project are directly related to the introduction of the “free” public transport 
measure. If additional public transport kilometres are made, then external costs related 
to congestion, pollution, accidents and noise are generated. The benefits taken into 
account for the SCBA, are direct benefits, indirect benefits and external benefits. Direct 
benefits are the positive effects the users of public transport experience as a result of the 
measure. Indirect benefits result from the direct benefits and are for instance effects on 
employment, economical growth and on the image of a city or region. These benefits 
are difficult to monetarize and are taken into account pro memory (Spit et al., 2004). 
Finally, the measure reduces external negative effects, such as fewer private vehicle 
kilometres. These are external benefits. 
 
 
6. Results of the quantitative survey 
 
47% of the students of Dutch-speaking institutions have requested a refund of their 
season ticket at Quartier Latin. 89% of these students have been regularly using it. 
“Free” travelling Dutch-speaking students use public transport more frequently than 
their paying equivalents. However, compared to French-speaking students, the 
frequencies are rather low. Even though French-speaking students in Brussels have to 
pay for their public transport use, they use it more often and frequently. Compared with 
the previous academic year the majority of students indicate that they use Brussels 
public transport more. An analysis of generation and substitution effects showed that 
generation effects occurred with 25% of the students, who made on average 1,7 
additional trips per week. Limited substitution effects were encountered between car 
and public transport (66% of students with car available), between train and MIVB 
public transport (14%) and between walking and public transport (21%).  
Differences in mobility behaviour between Dutch- and French-speaking students can 
be partially explained by differences in the proportion of students living outside and 
inside Brussels. 63% of the French-speaking students are living in Brussels compared to 
only 9% of the Dutch-speaking students. Dutch-speaking students tend to be more 
positive in their overall appreciation for public transport than French-speaking students. 
A possible explanation is that French-speaking students, having to pay for their trips, 
are more critical because they expect a certain service in return.  
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7. Spatial analysis 
 
7.1 Analysis of mental maps 
 
Considerable differences exist among students in the knowledge and appreciation of 
neighbourhoods in Brussels. Important factors that determine the composition and 
quality of the mental map are the location of the school, having or not a student 
residence in Brussels and the appreciation of the city. The language and the number of 
years in Brussels were not significant. There is a strong mutual relation between the 
mental map and mobility behaviour. Public transport stops and stations or arterial roads 
are important structural elements. 
In general the mental map of many students at Dutch-speaking institutions is very 
small. It is limited to the school, the station of entrance and exit in Brussels and a few 
landmarks (Atomium, Grote Markt). In some cases locations related to going out 
(Beurs, Cimetière, Kinepolis), shopping (Louisa Avenue, Woluwe Shopping Centre, 
Nieuwstraat) and sports (Sportopolis, Ter Kameren Bos) are included in the mental 
map. However, for many students Brussels is only associated with studies and other 
activities are fulfilled outside Brussels. 
In general the appreciation of Brussels is significantly lower among Dutch-speaking 
students. They only have a positive image of the centre and a few neighbourhoods 
(around school). The image is more positive among French-speaking students. The 
difference in residential situation – a smaller percentage of Dutch-speaking students 
lives in Brussels – only partly explains the difference. A more unattractive image 




7.2 Analysis of activity patterns 
 
In general activity patterns of students are characterized by a few isolated locations. 
This means that the area between the attraction points is not part of the activity pattern. 
For going out the activity pattern is a north-south axis, with the Kinepolis complex in 
the north, the city centre and the VUB-campus in the south. For shopping the activity 
pattern is an east-west axis formed by the Westland Shopping centre (west), 
Naamsepoort and the Woluwe Shopping Centre. For sports the activity pattern is 
characterised by a spread-out locations and some concentration points (Sportopolis, 
ADEPS, VUB Sport, Ter Kameren bos). The location of the school is determining for 
the activity pattern. For each school the activity pattern is mainly shaped by the three 
poles Kinepolis, the city centre and the school. 
The activity pattern of commuting students is strongly related to the pattern of the 
Flemish students: very limited and oriented towards a few isolated poles. Interesting is 
the difference within the Flemish group between users and non-users of the free public 
transport tickets, with the latter having a wider activity space.  
Students benefiting from the free public transport measure visit the same set of 
locations but visit those 30% to 45% more frequently than their paying equivalents. 
These figures suggest that the effect of the introduction, if any, is an increase in the 
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number of trips, but to the same locations. Longitudinal analysis would be needed to 
confirm this observation. 
 
 
7.3 Analysis of transport supply 
 
Analysis of the public transport supply learns that: 
- Only a small proportion of the built area in the Brussels Capital Region is not 
within a 400m distance of a public transport stop. 
- Areas in the urban periphery where important developments are happening are 
well less served by public transport, particularly by metro. Especially for 
students, the evening and night offer is limited. The night bus is assessed very 
positively. 
- 12 of the 18 institutions for higher education have a good accessibility by public 
transport. The other schools are still located close to the centre (Erasmus 
Hogeschool), are located eccentrically but near a metro node (KUB and 
HONIM) or near the terminus of a metro line (HeldB, HeldV, Ephec). 
 
 
8. Psycho-social analysis 
 
8.1 The role of price concerns 
 
Assessment of the costs of a car is often based on variable costs, such as fuel and 
sometimes insurance. For public transport, evaluation of price is based on the type of 
ticket used, the perceived service quality and the user’s financial situation. Price is 
perceived in a different way according to the fact of travelling with a season ticket – 
perceived as expensive at the beginning but profitable if regularly used – or a travel 
ticket – often perceived as expensive.  
The perceived quality of service also plays an important role, as this perception works 
as a justification of the price asked. Price of tickets is also often compared with the price 
of other services. The perception of prices appears to be very practical and relative. 
Sometimes identical criteria lead to different evaluations and judgements of prices. The 
way students reason about prices of means of travel depends strongly on the context in 
which the journey takes place. Moreover, the assessed prices do generally not include 
all real costs (Hine & Scott, 2000; Frenay, 1994).  
As far as the transport budget is concerned, negotiations with the parents seem to 
result in a greater financial involvement of the students in case of possession of a car. 
This choice is indeed less usual, as students are often in a constrained and dependant 
financial situation. This particular financial situation can also contribute to exacerbate a 
sensitivity of students to the price factor, which plays probably a more important role in 
their travel decisions and behaviour than other fringes of the population (Hine & 
Mitchell, 2001; Jemelin, 2004). This observation results notably by referring to their 
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fare-dodging conduct. The way of reasoning about prices proves thus to be complex and 
has to do with representations, experiences and situations in which users are involved. 
 
 
8.2 Impact of environmental values 
 
Students were also surveyed about their environmental values in order to examine 
whether sensitivity to these concerns existed. 
? Environmental values could not be observed as relevant in the sociological 
interviews. About a half of the interviewed students mentioned environmental 
arguments, but only few showed a real concern (by opposition to the observation of 
other authors: e.g. Büttner & Grübler, 1995; Sandqvist, 2002). 
? An awareness seems to exist, but is maybe considered as “standing to reason”, 
obvious and not really appropriated so that behaviour would be adapted to these 
considerations. Environmental problems in Brussels are associated with health and 
noise problems and traffic pollution.  
? The relative absence of environmental concern among respondents seems thus to 
justify a measure, such as the free public transport one, to be implemented if 
sustainable aims are to be reached. 
 
 
8.3 Students’ social experience of travelling 
 
It is important to understand the qualitative elements or social experience (Flamm, 
2004; Petit, 2002) guiding daily mobility behaviour and attitudes of students. 
? Senses (smell, hearing, sight and especially touch) are often used and sometimes, 
perturbed when travelling. The sensitivity to the sensorial perturbations appears 
however to vary from student to student. Senses are often referred to when assessing 
the attraction towards a travel mode. 
? Senses also participate in the development of sensations. Five different kinds of 
sensations have here been differentiated: physio-psychological, social, time, security 
and cleanliness sensations. The latter are often argued by the students using 
oppositions. Physio-psychological sensations are those of pleasure of driving versus 
displeasure of driving and being careful versus letting oneself go. Social dimensions 
often oppose travel modes as social or individual places, whereas the question of 
good citizenship, altruism versus rudeness, self-centredness using travel modes is 
also asked. Time considerations reveal diverse ways of considering and of using 
travel times. Sensations of rapidity or slowness of travel modes are mentioned. 
However few respondents have really calculated and compared travel times using 
different travel modes and those sensations vary according to the quality of (travel) 
times (busy versus having time; efficiently used versus annoying travel times). 
Security and insecurity feelings are linked to various criteria, but especially to the 
morality versus immorality of the persons frequenting the considered place. Finally, 
the cleanliness (clean versus dirty) sensation has also to do with several other senses 
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and sensations. All these sensations experienced when travelling contribute to direct 
mobility attitudes and behaviour. 
? Representations of travel modes appeared actually as socially shared, as the images 
evoked were quite close in the interviews (Bassand & Kaufmann, 1996; Kaufmann, 
2002). Car has been described as a cocoon, an extension of the house, which is 
owned, intimate and protected, but also as a symbol of the social status of the owner. 
This latter dimension has also been reported for soft travel modes, even if the 
significance varies. However, the use of some soft travel modes can also be 
associated with convictions of the user. Besides, values are also referred to when 
travelling. The usual ones are the independence and autonomy, the responsibility and 
control and finally freedom, values which can be attributed to each travel mode, 
following the valuation of the considered student. These representations and values 
are however more easily positively associated to the car. This is why we could 
conclude that a cultural predisposition to the use of the car seems to exist. 
? The student also refers to a biographical reference frame (past and abroad 
experiences and socialization to mobility), as it influences the respondent’s decisions 
and behaviour. The first mobility experiences indeed contribute to a learning and 
appropriation process which can turn to be determinant in future behaviour. 
Socialization to mobility through the family and the circle of friends also seems to 
lead to learn and valorise some travel attitudes. Habits can thus also be partly linked 
to that biographical reference frame. A perturbation in those habits because of a 
major biographical event (e.g. moving, and especially for the students, renting a 
student room) or an alternative experience (e.g. abroad experience) can also question 
the respondents’ travel behaviour and attitudes. This reference frame appears as a 
kind of resource from which students get their attitudes and behaviour. 
 
 
8.4 Free public transport policy in Brussels and its assessment by students 
 
Some observations have been made with regard to the assessment of the free public 
transport measure 
First, the “free” public transport measure is quite positively seen among students, in 
particular at first sight. The main negative element is group favouritism (as the measure 
is in fact aimed at a very specific population). The social equity the measure can provide 
and the improvements of traffic conditions are considered as advantages. 
Second, students who are not benefiting from free season tickets look at the 
behavioural effects of the measure quite variously: some students are not expecting any 
change due to this kind of measure as their habits suit their own way of life and/or as 
they consider that the price of public transport is not its main drawback (the quality of 
service is here highlighted), whereas other expect very positive consequences, because 
of the attraction to public transport such a measure could create. 
Another important observation was that students who benefit from the measure 
observe changes according to their former way of travelling within Brussels. Students 
who travelled previously occasionally with the Brussels’ public transport network assess 
the measure positively and report personal behavioural changes (especially concerning 
the frequency of travel to the centre of Brussels). This is not the case, whereas the 
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opposite situation appears for students who regularly used the network and already 
possessed a STIB/MIVB season ticket, before the measure was introduced. 
It can also be noticed that the increase in the frequentation rate of the STIB/MIVB 
network observed among the beneficiary students can be understood as an effect of the 
school season ticket (made more accessible due to the reimbursement mechanism), 
rather than as an effect of the free aspect. Possessing a season ticket has indeed been 
highlighted as a practical way of travelling because of the easiness and immediacy it 
provides. 
Finally, several expected negative consequences have also been mentioned by the 
interviewed students, such as the loss of the customer status (allowing exerting one’s 
power on the provider) and the loss of respect of users. A bad or under-use of the season 
ticket has also been observed. Finally, the trend to shift from soft travel modes to public 
transport has also been pointed out. 
 
 
8.5 Typology of students’ mobility behaviour and attitudes 
 
In order to provide a global insight on the qualitative data, a typology of students’ 
attitudes and behaviour concerning mobility and travel modes has been proposed 
(inspired by Kaufmann, 2000). The ideal types described allow grasping the diversity of 
profiles of students, corresponding to different kinds of rationales concerning mobility 
decisions and behaviour. 
Two axis of analysis have been differentiated: the sensitivity to public transport 
supply and the student’s effective modal commitment. First, students are likely to take 
or not the supply into account when having to travel. The student’s attitudes towards 
travel modes can be open (taking all available travel modes into account) or closed 
(valorising one means of travel, in this case the car). Secondly, the student’s effective 
modal commitment or not has more to do with behaviour, which results from a choice 
rationale towards some kinds of travel means (car versus soft modes) or not. Behaviour 
can be open (because it depends on the mobility context or because it does not suit the 
user) or closed (a choice that suits the user has been made and behaviour is guided by 
this choice; these students reveal then to be more committed in their choices). 
Table 2: Typology of students’ mobility attitudes and behaviour. 
Sensitivity to public transport supply 
(attitudes) 
 




City oriented T4 
Favourable to public transport 
and «soft» modes  
Exclusive motorists T1 
Favourable to car 
No 
Plastic T3 
Favourable to public transport 
and to car 
Constrained public transport 
users T2 
Unfavourable to public 
transport; favourable to car 
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The typology allows then to link some types of students to particular concerns, 
experiences or assessment of the free public transport measure. The “exclusive 
motorists” (T1) often share a dissuasive past experience of public transport, together 
with family surrounding rather car-oriented. Car corresponds for them to time efficiency 
(time is often reported to be quite busy) and to a pleasant way of travelling. Students 
from this type don’t expect their personal behaviour to change if a free public transport 
policy is introduced, since using a car fits their current way of life and since they do not 
conceive other ways of travelling.  
The students who feel “constrained to the use of public transport” (T2) report to 
appreciate travelling by public transport to the city centre, but their global attitude is 
still car-oriented. Experiences of public transport have thus proved to be dissuasive, or 
at least not convincing enough to change the car-oriented attitude of those students. The 
residential and familial context often explains partly why car is valorised. The social 
representation of the car seems here to be quite strong in the mind of this type. No 
association with the assessment of a free public transport policy could be found. 
The more numerous type were “plastic” (T3) students. They were called “plastic” 
students because they have not so clear-cut attitudes towards travel means and appeared 
to behave according to the best alternative for the travel. These students have thus not so 
strongly opted for one particular means of travel. Sensitivity to practical considerations, 
comfort and security feelings have been observed. Positively invested travel times and 
sometimes displeasure to drive also characterise students from this type. A free public 
transport measure is variously assessed among these students but the fact that the 
greatest majority of beneficiary students were ranked in this type shows that benefiting 
from the measure widens the scope of mobility decisions and behaviour. 
The last type (“city oriented” – T4) groups older students who valorise and are 
sensitive to the urban environment and its quality of life, and so environmental concerns 
are here often developed. This is why residential strategies and travel attitudes and 
behaviour are oriented towards city favourable options (as for mobility, public transport 
and soft travel modes are valorised and chosen). Car is depreciated in the urban context. 
The concerns of those students are more collective. They invest positively travel times. 
Finally, their attitude towards a free public transport policy is rather favourable. 
These types are seen as attitudinal and behavioural trends, which can vary according 
to stages of life, spatial localisations, financial situations etc. They help to conceive the 
complex nature of mobility decisions and behaviour, and grasping some rationales 
which could be observed among this population.  
Mobility behaviour and especially modal choice appear thus as being inseparable 
from the general social experience of the users that we have tried to give an overview 
on. It also shows that the price “attraction” reveals to lead to more or less important 
behavioural changes, according to the mobility profile of the student. Reactions to a free 
public transport measure is thus not homogeneous among a similar population. 
 
 
9. Social cost-benefit analysis 
 
The reference scenario reflects the situation before the introduction of the “free” 
public transport for students. The project alternative describes the situation after the 
initiation of the “free” STIB subscription (academic year 2003-2004). The differences 
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between both alternatives represent the effects of the introduction of “free” public 
transport. These effects can be positive (net-benefits) or negative (net-costs) for the 
society. Table 3 gives an overview of the dimensions taken into account for the 
evaluation of the “free” public transport project.  
Table 3: The SCBA Model. 
Costs Benefits 
1. Direct costs 
-  Government Subsidy 
-  Operating Costs 
-  Costs related to capacity and punctuality problems 
1. Direct benefits 
Increase Consumer Surplus 
 
 
2. Indirect benefits (Pro Memory) 
- Improvement city image and attractiveness 
- Basic mobility access 
- Familiarisation of public transport  
2. External costs 
-  Congestion 
-  Pollution 
-  Accidents 
-  Noise 
3. External benefits 
-  Congestion 
-  Pollution 
-  Accidents 
-  Noise 
 
 
9.1 Calculation of the costs 
 
Since the public transport company did not provide additional supply, the marginal 
costs in public transport are zero. Thus the only societal cost that needs to be taken into 
account is the subsidy from the government. In total, the government granted a budget 




9.2 Calculation of the benefits 
 
The two types of benefits to be monetarized are the direct and the external benefits. 
The indirect benefits are not included into the SCBA and are taken into account pro 
memory. The direct benefits are reflected by the increase in consumer surplus as a result 
of the “free” public transport measure. A demand function has been constructed from 
the number of students applying for the ticket before and after introduction of the free 
public transport measure. From the demand curve the increase of consumer surplus as a 
result of the measure can be calculated and turns out to be 707,000 Euro. 
The external benefit results from the mode shift from car to public transport. Using an 
additional telephone survey as data source, we were able to extrapolate the substitution 
effects mentioned in section 6. The number of substituted kilometres turned out to be 
76.26 km per student per week: 47.64 km during peak hours and 28.62 km in the off-
peak period. This value needs to be multiplied with the number of weeks in the 
academic year (40) and the number of students who made a mode shift (1048) in order 
to calculate the total number of reduced vehicle kilometres. A first external benefit is 
the likely reduction in the number of accidents. The marginal external accident costs for 
cars on urban roads in Belgium are estimated on 122.6€/1000vkm during low traffic 
flows and 130.2€/1000vkm during high traffic flows (INFRAS/IWW, 2004). Multiplied 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 32 (2006): 26-48 
 44
with the average amount of substituted kilometres, this results in a reduction of external 
accident costs of 407,000€. A second external benefit is the reduction of noise. 
According to INFRAS/IWW (2004) the marginal external noise cost is 7.63€/1000vkm 
during high traffic flows and 18.49€/1000vkm during low traffic flows. Subsequently, 
the diminution of external noise costs is 37,500€. Another important external benefit is 
the reduction of atmospheric pollution (NOx emissions, CO2, lead, CO). INFRAS/IWW 
(2004) differentiated the marginal external pollution costs for gasoline on 
9.54€/1000vkm and for diesel on 74.74€/1000vkm. Using a distribution of 52% 
gasoline cars and 48% diesel cars (NIS, 2005) the reduction in external air pollution 
costs is 131,000€ (table 8.7). Finally, there is an external benefit due to the reduced 
congestion. Mayeres et al. (1997) determined the marginal external congestion cost in 
urban areas by passenger cars on 1462.57€/1000vkm during peak hours and 
4.21€/1000vkm in off-peak periods. This results in a total external congestion cost 
saving of 2,900,000€. 
The actual external benefit of the measure is however lower. Blauwens et al. (2002) 
indicate that in high congested areas the space made available on the road system will 
attract new car users. As a result, the external benefits of the substitution are partly 
undermined. The question is how much of the newly available road space will be filled 
up with new car users. We presume that this phenomenon occurs mainly during peak 
hours. We found that 62% of the mode shift occurred during peak hours and 38% in the 
off-peak period.  
We first consider a 50% reduction in external cost during peak hours. Adding up the 
reductions in peak and off-peak hours results in an overall actual external cost saving of 
1,927,000€ for the 2003-2004 academic year. 
 
 
9.3 Impact assessment 
 
The welfare implications of the project become apparent when we make up the 
balance of the benefits and costs induced by the “free” public transport. The total costs 
amount to 1,446,000€ and the total benefits are 2,634,000€. The benefits exceed the 
costs, mainly as a result of the encouraged modal shift from car use towards public 
transport use which leads to a significant reduction of external costs. When we deduct 
the costs from the benefits, we obtain a positive welfare result for the society as a whole 
of 1,188,000€ for the 2003-2004 academic year (Table 4).  
Table 4: Social cost-benefit analysis: synthesis. 
Costs  Subsidy 
 
- 1,446,000 € 
Benefits 
 
∆ Consumer surplus 
External benefits 
+ 707,000 € 
+ 1,927,000 € 
Balance  + 1,188,000 € 
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However, this result assumes that 50% of the space made available was filled up 
again. A sensitivity analysis showed that the project remains beneficial as long as no 
more than 86% of the space made available on the road is filled up by new car users.  
Taking into account difficult to quantify indirect benefits such as improvement of the 
city image, induce habit forming and a more students establishing themselves in 
Brussels, we can conclude that the “free” public transport project is a beneficial measure 
for the society as a whole. It does not only increase the welfare of the benefiting 
students, but it also has positive welfare implications for the other society members.  
 
 
10. Conclusions and recommendations 
 
Introducing free public transport is ‘hot’ in Belgium. Third payer systems in which 
the government or an other partner pays for the public transport trips of a target 
population group have been introduced widely for various reasons: reducing congestion, 
generating a mode shift or promoting public transport. In Brussels the circumstances are 
somewhat particular. The measure is limited to the students of Dutch-speaking colleges 
and universities, their counterparts from French-speaking institutions do not benefit 
from the measure. The aim of the introduction has in fact been to stimulate students to 
discover Brussels, participate in city life and to improve the city’s image with students 
and subsequently the whole Flemish population. The limitation of the beneficiary group 
to the Dutch-speaking group has created a laboratory situation that allows analyzing the 
effect of the measure. 
The first year of its implementation the measure has caused an increase in public 
transport use, 47% of the students use the card. However, an increase in the number of 
public transport trips alone is not sufficient. Survey information reveals significant 
differences in mobility behaviour between Dutch- and French-speaking students. 
French-speaking students use public transport more frequently than the Dutch-speaking 
ones. More factors than the price of a ticket determine public transport use. 
The distribution between the two student groups of commuters, students with a 
student residence and those living permanently in Brussels, is strongly different between 
the groups. Only 36% of the Flemish students live permanently or rent a room in 
Brussels, compared to 81% from the French-speaking students. The much higher share 
of commuters with the Flemish group causes a lower average knowledge of place names 
in Brussels. Differences in knowledge and appreciation of the city are important factors 
to explain differences in mobility behaviour between Dutch- and French-speaking 
students. Dutch-speaking students in general have a more negative image of Brussels, 
except for a few neighbourhoods such as the city centre (Beurs), Louisa and Etterbeek. 
Their activity pattern consists for each motive of a few isolated locations. The routes 
and attractions between these locations are virtually unknown. Often a large part of their 
activity pattern is situated outside Brussels and they return home as soon as lessons have 
finished, leading a kind of “double life” in a “double space”, which does not correspond 
to the same space appropriation. When the activity pattern is limited and the 
appreciation of the city in general negative, the objective of the measure to explore the 
city won’t be fulfilled. The increasing number of public transport trips consists of more 
trips to the same locations. Public transport is used more frequently, but this doesn’t 
result in a higher number of stops that are used.  
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The analysis of the accessibility of the Brussels Capital Region by public transport 
shows a good overall accessibility of most places in the region, except for a few 
attraction points that are difficult to access in the evening. Frequency and the evening 
and night supply are perceived very important by students. Psychological barriers are 
more important for students than physical barriers. Analysis of the students’ mental 
maps shows that the school and the possession of a student residence have the strongest 
impact on the perception of the city.  
The social experience of interviewed students learns that behaviours and in particular 
attitudes towards mobility and travel modes are underlain by qualitative factors that are 
not always likely to be modified. The weight given to the price factor enters in 
interaction with other factors (the assessment of prices is thus relative), and so 
according to the situation is likely or not to lead to behavioural and attitudinal change. 
This observation highlights thus that the students’ behaviours are not homogeneous and 
so that some categories of students (cf. typology described) may be more likely to 
modify their behaviours due to a free public transport measure. An interesting 
observation made was that beneficiary students who were not used to travel regularly 
with the Brussels’ public transport network before the measure had a good perception of 
the measure and reported to travel more regularly using public transport, even if this 
increase is probably a slight one. This could mean that an easier financial and practical 
access to public transport, by means of a season ticket, contributes to modify their 
behaviours, and possibly also their attitudes towards this mode. In these cases, free 
public transport seemed thus to open the scope of travel possibilities. 
The social cost-benefit analysis shows that the “free” public transport project is a 
beneficial measure, not only for the students being able to travel for “free”, but also for 
the society as a whole. The benefits generated by the project exceed the costs. There is a 
positive welfare result or gain for the society as a whole. This gain is mainly a result of 
the encouraged modal shift from car use towards public transport use which leads to a 
significant reduction of external accident, noise, pollution and congestion costs.  
With regard to the generalisability of the results, it is expected that the measure would 
have a bigger impact on the group of French-speaking students. Secondly, students are a 
particular population segment. They often have a limited budget, implying that their 
price elasticity is higher. Car availability is low in this group resulting in a high share of 
public transport captive travellers. Another typical element for students is that part of 
their activity pattern is located outside Brussels. 
Determinants and constraints of these social experiences have to be subtly analysed in 
order to properly forecast and assess the impact of measures, such as free public 
transport, on the evolution of the problems raised by mobility. This understanding 
constitutes an important scientific stake and demands a deep treatment that such an 
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This paper is based upon detailed research that has taken place in the UK and Italy, on the 
implementation strategies for urban road pricing schemes. In the UK, both in London and Durham, the 
Road User Charging schemes required new legislation, and were implemented rapidly. The time from 
announcement to implementation took three years and the schemes were introduced after short periods of 
intensive planning, consultations and stakeholder networking. In Italy, the situation has been very 
different. The road pricing schemes in Rome and Genoa were not introduced under specific legislation 
but rather evolved from access control zones originally implemented in historic urban centres. The 
incremental introduction of the Italian road pricing experiments has taken approximately ten years. 
The paper undertakes a comparison of these different strategies to introduce urban road pricing and the 
lessons they contain for the development of similar measures elsewhere. The comparison of the different 
implementing experiences is undertaken using Strategic Policy Niche Management, a method designed to 
explore, among other factors, the dynamics of the stakeholder networks involved in planning, introducing, 
marketing and managing radical urban Travel Demand Management policies. 
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1. Congestion and road pricing 
 
The car has evolved from an expensive luxury for a few to become an important tool 
for the everyday lives and employment for the majority of people, a status symbol and a 
leisure pursuit. Increased use of private vehicles has not only brought benefits. For 
many years congestion was little more than a localised problem. Today it has become 
endemic, not just for major cities but even in many rural regions. Associated with traffic 
congestion, are the related problems of air pollution, emissions of CO2, together with 
more subtle lifestyle effects, such as contributing to less healthy lifestyles and transport 
poverty. 
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As early as the 1920’s economists (Knight, 1924; Pigou, 1920) recognised road 
pricing as a simple way for taxing the external costs of transportation – congestion, 
accident risks, noise and emissions of pollutants (Maddison et al., 1996; Rietveld, 
2001). Ramjerdi (1996) argued that road pricing requires road users to pay for their 
marginal social costs. Santos and Newbery (2001) suggested that “the traditional 
approach to the economies of congestion rests on the standard welfare economic 
argument that the market failure of congestion requires a corrective charge to 
internalise the externality”. Paulley (2002) identified that fiscal restraints, whether by 
road pricing or tax on environmental pollution, offer a method of clearly identifying to 
users the external costs of their actions. A wide literature has developed advocating that 
road access be subject to some form of marginal cost pricing (Button, 2004; Ison, 2004; 
Ramjerdi, 1996; Smeed, 1964; Vickrey, 1963). The urban road user charging examples 
presented in this paper have been more pragmatic in practice, by seeking to achieve 
urban and transport goals rather than an idealised pricing system. 
Although road user charges for motorways, bridges and tunnels are common in some 
countries, urban road pricing schemes are rare and have been the subject of much 
controversy. Despite the use of a variety of names, most urban road pricing examples 
operate as either cordon or area charge schemes. Cordon charging involves charging 
drivers for entering a specific area – usually the historical city centre or central business 
district. The charge can be levied using manual methods – either by manned toll booths 
or coin operated machines, and automatic methods – simple read/write tags or smart 
card technology. Successful examples of cordon charging (urban toll rings) are found 
mainly in Norway where seven cities have adopted the measure to date (Ieromonachou 
et al., 2004, Wærsted, 2005). Some Italian cities have adopted the cordon system that 
evolved from previously introduced access control schemes. Rome is also 
experimenting with smart card technology that would allow enforcement throughout the 
charged area not only for access but also for parking. Area-based schemes charge 
vehicles for being within a specified area. The first area-based charged scheme in the 
world began in Singapore in 1975. This scheme was based on a license system that 
allowed permit holders to access or travel within the charged area. The London 
‘congestion charging’ scheme begun in 2003 operates as an area-based charging 
scheme. 
This paper forms part of a wider project comparing the organisation and 
implementation of urban road pricing schemes. As examples, two UK and two Italian 
cities are presented and then analysed. The analysis is conducted using Strategic Policy 
Niche Management, an evolving method, developed to identify and evaluate key factors 
in the introduction of complex and radical transport policies. 
 
 
2. Strategic Policy Niche Management 
 
Strategic Policy Niche Management has been developed from Strategic Niche 
Management (SNM), an organisational innovation diffusion theory that explores the 
processes and actors needed in shaping, and the application of, new technologies 
(Weber et al, 1999; Hoogma et al, 2002). SNM analyses experiments with new 
technology solutions within a dominant technological regime (e.g. an electric vehicle 
demonstration project). Such projects constitute a ‘protected space’ for technology 
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shaping, which is called a ‘niche’, with niche protection usually involving financial and 
organisational support. Learning occurs within the protected niche and the goal is to 
eventually expose the new technology to real-world conditions where it will, or will not, 
survive (Schot et al., 1994). SNM analysis structures the processes, roles and 
relationships between partners involved in such experiments. 
Strategic Niche Management was developed in the context of transport technology 
projects. However, behind these specific technologies there has been some form of 
policy initiative (Hoogma et al., 2002, p 202). Experiments with new urban transport 
policy instruments do occur, but they are not used to systematically learn about possible 
new linkages between technology, information needs and issues of social and political 
acceptability. For example, Parkhurst (2000) noted the way in which lessons for Park 
and Ride schemes were not transferred and each new project repeated mistakes of 
earlier schemes. A policy adaptation of SNM called Strategic Policy Niche Management 
(SPNM) has been used to analyse more radical policies that are difficult to implement or 
to transfer between situations as they challenge the dominant regime (Ieromonachou et 
al. 2004; 2005). Examples of these policies include urban road pricing, workplace 
parking charging mechanisms as well as employer-level Travel Demand Management 
(TDM), like travel plans. 
SPNM helps in identifying critical information, processes and actors in the planning, 
introduction and implementation of the policies, the barriers that planners face during 
implementation (social, political, institutional, financial), and the different information 
needs for each step in the process. Use of SPNM can help transport planners understand 
how various 'regimes' change from one set of local conditions to another. It can also 
find ways of expressing strong similarities for niches which seem to have striking 




3. United Kingdom 
 
The following two cases provide information on two existing road user charging 
schemes in the UK, namely London and Durham. The concept of road pricing was 
‘revived’ in the early 1960s both by British and American transport academics (Smeed, 
1964; Vickrey, 1963) that saw it as one of the few solutions left to deal with the ever-
growing problems associated with road congestion. Road user charging (RUC) had been 
proposed in the UK several times since the Smeed report, but there were no serious 
attempts to practically introduce the policy, with exception a trial in the city of 
Cambridge in the early 1990s. For a number of reasons, most notably the lack of 
political support, the Cambridge scheme failed to progress beyond the field trial (Ison, 
2004). Legislation for road pricing measures in the UK has been encouraged in recent 
years through the UK Transport White paper ‘A New Deal for Transport: Better for 
Everyone’ (DETR, 1998a) and the following daughter document – ‘Breaking the 
Logjam’ (DETR, 1998b). The 2000 Transport Act (HMG, 2000) contains powers for 
local authorities to introduce ‘road user charging’ schemes provided they form part of 
an integrated transport plan. The legislation allowing for the implementation of 
congestion charging in Central London was made available earlier under the Greater 
London Act (HMG, 1999). 
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3.1 London’s congestion charge 
 
Central London had long established and serious traffic congestion. Over the years, a 
number of measures had been implemented to tackle the problem but none managed to 
do so effectively. The Congestion Charge scheme was introduced in February  2003, 
following an intense planning and advertising campaign led by Mayor Ken Livingstone. 
A fee of £5 GBP (€7.3)1 was initially2 charged to motorists entering a central zone of a 
5km radius between the hours of 7 a.m. and 6.30 p.m. on weekdays (TfL, 2003). The £5 
charge was expected to deter 10-15% of vehicles entering the zone and reduce journey 
times by 25% but in practice reduced cars by around 20% and congestion by 30% 
compared with the last few weeks before charging (TfL, 2004). This better than 
expected impact upon traffic reduced the revenue generated from an expected £130m 
(€190m) to around £90m (€131m) (Ison, 2004). 
The charged area represents only 1.3% of the total Greater London area but around 
200,000 vehicles drive into the charging zone every day. From these, the charge applies 
to about 110,000. The remaining are exempt vehicles: 100% reduction to taxis, 
emergency vehicles, disabled badge holders as well as other groups and 90% reduction 
to residents of the zone (TfL, 2004). A network of 700 video cameras in 230 positions 
throughout the charging zone, 174 of which are on the inner ring road, enforce the 
scheme (TfL, 2003). There are also a number of mobile units with cameras that patrol 
within the zone (see Figure 1). Payment can be made to any of the 9,500 UK-wide Pay 
Points, at various petrol stations and shops throughout the UK. Payments can also be 
made by phone, SMS text, or the internet (TfL, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 1: A mobile camera unit. (Photo: S. Potter). 
 
The traffic impact outside the congestion charging zone has, contrary to expectations, 
been minimal. To accommodate modal transfer, 300 additional buses, offering 11,000 
places were added to the already extensive bus network of London increasing bus usage 
by more than 7%. Making radical improvements in bus services was one of the Mayor’s 
ten priorities for transport in London (TfL, 2004). The scheme also generated net 
                                                 
1 Exchange rate at time of writing £1 GBP ≈ €1.46 Euro. 
2 The charge was increased to £8 (€11.7) in July 2005. 
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revenues to generally improve transport in London. Plans for an extension of the 
charging zone westwards have been approved by the Mayor of London and are expected 
to become operational in February 2007 (TfL, 2005). 
 
 
3.2 Durham’s Road Access Charge 
 
As with the majority of transport projects, the background to the Durham scheme was 
very important to the outcome of the implementation process. Durham is in the North 
East of England and here the council had being trying to restrict city centre traffic to the 
‘Peninsula’ area since 1949. This area has been designated as a UNESCO World 
Heritage Site3 because of its religious and architectural significance (see Figure 2) and 
protecting it from traffic pollution was important.  
The area had particularly acute traffic problems. Of the 3000 vehicles that entered the 
area each day prior to the scheme being adopted, 50% used the road as a mobile parking 
area thus contributing short-term to congestion by slowing down traffic. Congestion was 
high because of the sheer number of vehicles and pedestrians concentrated in a small 
street – around 13,000 pedestrians accessed the area each weekday and 17,000 on 
Saturdays (DCC, 2000). The situation in the area was untenable, threatening the 
viability of local businesses and damaging the appeal of the Durham Peninsula as a 
World Heritage Site. 
Various measures had been proposed and tried over some 20 years, but failed to solve 
the problem. With the ineffectiveness of the conventional parking and traffic 
management scheme, 1997 saw the creation of Durham’s Transport Steering Group. 
This consisted of members of the City and County Council members and various 
representatives of the major stakeholders on the Peninsula, businesses and other 
establishments as well as the police and the Chamber of Trade. The agreed aim for the 
Peninsula was to significantly reduce the pedestrian and vehicular conflict by removing 
a substantial proportion of the existing traffic through a road user charge. 
 
 
Figure 2: A panoramic view of the Durham Peninsula, bounded by the river Wear. (DCC, 2002b). 
                                                 
3 There are 26 World Heritage Sites in the UK. For more details visit: http://www.culture.gov.uk/ 
historic_ environment/World_ Heritage.htm. 
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A key part of introducing the congestion charge was the provision of alternative 
means of access to the Peninsula, and discussions with public transport users resulted in 
the launch of a new minibus service that began operating some two months before the 
congestion charge was introduced (DCC, 2002a). Part-funded by the congestion charge, 
the ‘Cathedral Bus’ provides access to the Cathedral and Market Square with the Rail, 
Coach Stations and a Park and Ride car park. Overall, the cost of the project to 
implementation including the operating systems, buses and pedestrian improvements 
was £250,000 (€365,000), and was funded entirely through the Council’s Local 
Transport Plan (LTP) settlement. 
The Durham Road Access Charge Scheme began operating in October 2002, the first 
to take advantage of road user charging powers granted in the Transport Act 2000 
(HMG, 2000). The charging zone included the Cathedral and Castle, the University of 
Durham, the Chorister school, the market place area, other trading and servicing 
establishments and a small number of private dwellings. Motorists pay a £2 (€2.95) 
charge to exit the area on Monday to Saturday between 10am and 4pm (the busiest time 
for both car and pedestrian traffic) via Saddler Street, the Peninsula’s only access 
thoroughfare (DCC, 2003). The exit (see Figure 3) is controlled during the charging 
period by an automatic rising bollard that is dropped upon payment (the machine 
accepts coins and cards, while annual permit holders can lower the bollard by using a 
transponder). The exit charge allows free flow of vehicles into the area, preventing 
traffic queues back to a nearby major road. 
It was estimated before the implementation that there would be a 50% reduction in 
vehicle access to the area. For the remaining traffic, a very generous 70% would have 
permits and 30% would be liable to pay. The first evaluation of the scheme (DCC, 
2003) showed the reduction of vehicles to be around 85% so the permit allocation, 








Contrary to the UK, Italy has a long tradition of toll roads (motorways, tunnels and 
bridges) even though this did not extent to the urban road network. Among growing 
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efforts to reduce the serious pollution caused by congested traffic, some Italian 
municipalities explored access control in Limited Traffic Zones (LTZ)4. These controlled 
zones usually cover the historic city centres. Only residents of the area and a limited 
number of permit holders are allowed to access the zones. The city of Bologna 
pioneered the policy in the mid/late 1980’s, and despite initial difficulties, this prompted 
a widespread adoption of the measure. In other towns and cities, the policy is gradually 
evolving to a hybrid form of road pricing by requesting LTZ permit holders to pay an 
annual fee. To achieve this, a directive (known as “D.L. 285/92” in Italy) was 
introduced, that allows Municipalities to charge motor vehicles a fee when entering or 
circulating inside the LTZ. A presidential decree 250/99 approved the installation and 
operation of automatic access control systems in historic centres and LTZs. The 
following cases of Rome and Genoa record the experiments carried out in these two 
cities in order to establish the political and public acceptability required to implement a 
full-scale scheme and the technological advances from the early manual access control 





High car growth rates and unbearable levels of atmospheric pollution that endangered 
not only residents but also the cultural heritage of historic buildings in the city centre, 
has forced Rome to revise its transport strategy. For years, development was centred on 
accommodating the private car but in the mid 1980s, the municipality decided on a 
series of measures to reduce the negative externalities of car use (Comune di Roma, 
2000). The measures focused on increasing the sustainable modes of transport and on 
raising awareness of the negative impacts of the car among citizens. Among the most 
important measures were: 
? Access restrictions and integrated pricing strategies, 
? Collective passenger transport, new forms of vehicle use, 
? New concepts for the distribution of goods, 
? Innovative soft measures, and 
? Integration of transport management systems and clean technology public and 
private fleets. 
The most radical and difficult to implement were the first two, which concerned the 
implementation of an Access Control system followed by experiments for a Road 
Pricing scheme. To address acceptability issues and provide a fall back, the 
municipality proceeded to implement the scheme in incremental steps. The historic 
centre of Rome was classified as a Limited Traffic Zone (LTZ) in 1989. A manual 
system was implemented at that time that would only allow residents and permit holders 
to enter. The measures were not enforced very strictly for a number of years, and there 
were many violations with no action taken against offenders (Forestieri and Tomassini, 
1999). In some way, both users and the police knew that the restrictions were not 
followed in a systematic way. This dramatically changed in 1994 when concrete blocks 
were used to prevent entry into the LTZ, physically and visually reinforcing the policy 
of access control. Permission for entry was given to residents and a few other 
exceptions such as emergency services. 
                                                 
4 In Italian: ZTL (Zona a Traffico Limitato) 
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Evolution from access control to road pricing was seen as a natural progression 
(€UROPRICE, 2001). The introduction of automated enforcement in 1998, paved the 
way for a road pricing scheme. After some years of planning and consultations, an 
experiment began in 2001 in the LTZ (Musso and Corazza, 2003). The period 1998 to 
2001 also served to develop and install the electronic system of on-board charging units 
and gantries. The system in Rome, based on existing motorway tolling technology 
(Pasquali, 2001), became operational in August 2001 but enforcement started later, in 
October 2001. The system initially targeted specific categories (e.g. commercial 
vehicles) and gradually was applied to all road users. From Monday through Friday 
(6.30 am to 6 pm) and Saturday (2 pm to 6 pm) only permit holders are allowed to enter 
the restricted zone in Rome. There are a total of 135,000 permit holders that include 
residents, disabled people, taxi drivers and city services, which can access the zone free 
of charge. In addition to these are the 20,000 authorised individuals allowed to pay the 
fee to enter the zone (€UROPRICE, 2000). The price  of an annual permit is the 
equivalent cost of a 12-month public transport card which costs €3405 (£233). 
Electronic access detection equipment records illegal access of vehicles at 23 ‘gates’ 
leading to the restricted zone. The electronic system ‘reads’ the vehicles number plates 
and reports offenders who are then fined. The total number of plates permitted to access 
the LTZ represents about 8.5% of the total vehicles in the city (€UROPRICE, 2002b). 
Research is underway by STA into reading the small-sized number plates of 
motorcycles; this could lead to including them in future access restrictions. 
Between 2003 and 2004, two other smaller restricted access experiments took place in 
areas adjacent to the central LTZ in Rome. The difference was that they operated at 
night (see Figure 4). The first ‘nocturnal’ LTZ concerned San Lorenzo, an area nearby 
the University of Rome associated with student clubs and other youth oriented 
entertainment – activities that resulted in atmospheric and noise pollution from misuse 
and overcrowding of vehicles. The San Lorenzo experiment took place between 4 June 
and 31 October of 2003, excluding August6, for five nights a week from Wednesday 
until Sunday, from 8 pm until 3 am (Comune di Roma, 2003). The other experiment 
concerned the ‘gastronomic’ area of Rome, Trastevere, a favourite area for dining, 
where from 7 May until 9 October 2004, for two nights of the week – Friday and 
Saturday, entrance to cars was forbidden from 9 pm until 3 am (Comune di Roma, 
2004). 
The main objectives of both experiments were to provide a more enjoyable and safer 
environment for pedestrians accessing the two areas and test if the traffic limiting 
measures had a positive effect on business. Access to the areas was complemented with 
extra night bus and tram services. In addition, Rome linked parking to the road pricing 
scheme. This involved parking charge zones, with charges rising the closer the parking 
is to the city centre. The idea is to encourage parking at the periphery in order to reduce 
inner city congestion. 
 
                                                 
5 2004 prices 
6 August is traditionally considered a month reserved for holidays and as such was not included. Traffic 
levels were expected to be lower. 
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Figure 4: An overhead VMS (Variable Message Sign) warning of the ‘nocturnal’ access control scheme 





The city of Genoa is situated in a narrow strip of land between the Apennine 
Mountains in the north and the Ligurian Sea. The city extends along 30km of coast and 
two valleys spreading northwards. Genoa’s distinctive geographical characteristics 
resulted in the way in which the urban structure of the city developed. Average 
population density is 2,600/km2 but rises to 10,150/km2 within the city centre (Comune 
di Genova, 2003). Combined with a perception of inadequate road infrastructure, these 
factors can be greatly held responsible for the existing environmental problems caused 
from traffic congestion. One of the worst affected areas in Genoa is the centre of the 
city, which includes the main retail and historic areas. The municipality of Genoa 
responded to the growing traffic related environmental problems with proposals for 
various measures that included the introduction of road pricing measures in the centre 
(€UROPRICE, 2000). 
A new Urban Traffic Plan (Comune di Genova, 2000) formed part of a civic 
regeneration that included plans to limit traffic related pollution and annoyance in the 
historic city centre and to revitalise the commercial centre of the city. Various measures 
proposed by the municipality of Genoa in their plan included: 
? Optimising parking zones according to the surrounding land use, 
? Constructing an elevated relief road (“supraelevata”) that bypasses the centre to 
improve the main Traffic flow from the harbour, 
? Favouring public transport, 
? Improving the connections between different travel modes, 
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? Regulating and reducing traffic in the centre through the creation of a series of one-
way roads, and 
? Introducing an area-based pricing scheme. 
The municipality of Genoa intended to implement a full scale road pricing scheme in 
the historic and retail areas in the centre mainly to reduce transit traffic. But difficulties 
relating to the general management of the project, the political and public acceptability 
as well as resistance from some stakeholders made it necessary to perform a 
demonstration beforehand (€UROPRICE, 2002a). An experimental road pricing scheme 
was tested in 2003 in part of the existing LTZ (Limited Traffic Zone) that covers the 
historic centre of Genoa. The full cordon was planned to be 2.5 km2 whereas the trial 
zone was about 1 km2. This ‘trial’ scheme was designed to evaluate the effectiveness of 
a road pricing scheme in the area including traffic volume reduction, the use of 
alternative modes in accessing the area and the general environmental benefits. Another 
important aim was to test the technological equipment. Genoa, like Rome, favoured a 
system of gates based on plate recognition and central software data processing. 
The six month road pricing trial, using 200 volunteer drivers, took place in two three-
month phases (Mastretta, 2003). The first phase between March and May 2003 was 
conducted with a €2 charge and the second (June – August 2003) with a €1 (£0.7) 
charge. Genoa installed optical character recognition (OCR) equipment at seven entry 
gates. The gates were also equipped with video cameras (see Figure 5) that linked each 
gate with the traffic control centre. The volunteers were assigned a ‘virtual budget’ to 
use during the trial. From the initial sample of volunteers, 159 completed the 
demonstration. From the statistical analysis of the trial results and a modelling study, a 
38% reduction of entrances to the zone was found to correspond to a €1.5 (£1.03) 
charge (Contursi, 2004). A lower charge resulted in more crossings and vice versa. 
Overall, the road pricing trials attempted to make the system easy to understand for all 
involved. It also addressed all the social, economical, environmental, technological and 
organisational issues for the stakeholders in the network. 
 
Figure 5: One of the entry gates in Genoa with similar type cameras and OCR equipment enlarged on the 
right. (Photo: P. Ieromonachou). 
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Whether Genoa’s Access Control scheme evolves to road pricing depends on a 
number of objectives and new work packages associated with achieving the overall 
aims. The following, constitute a brief summary of the objectives set by the 
Municipality of Genoa (Comune di Genova, 2004) in their projected activities towards a 
system of tariff-based access control. The report also includes a detailed list of complex 
and interrelated work packages (approximately 23) covering all aspects of the system. 
These issues are broken down into the major work themes which are to: encompass the 
public and political acceptability, allow for a good level of mobility, aim to reduce 
private traffic, address parking, account for the cost and structure of public transport, 
support integrated transport modes, explore innovative and alternative forms of 
transport, conduct a study of potential infrastructure work (such as the gantries shown in 
Figure 5), analyse different charging scenarios and investigate user payment options. It 
was evident that the road pricing trials were more than just an ‘experiment’. The depth 
of consideration shows that the municipality is earnest about advancing the policy to a 




5. Case comparisons and SPNM analysis 
 
The four case studies discussed in this paper include the two capital cities from each 
country as well as two smaller cities. All the examples have been introduced in a 
roughly similar timeline and demonstrate the shift in European policy in the last few 
years towards stronger traffic demand management than has been evident in the past. 
Table 1 summarises the key aspects of the road pricing schemes in the four cities. 
The comparison of the design of the schemes, although useful, says little about the 
processes involved in how the designs evolved and became implemented. The main 
challenge faced by demand management policies, and road pricing schemes in 
particular, is not in their design, but their effective implementation and support. It is 
these aspects that are the focus of the SPNM framework. This maps the factors such as 
the network of stakeholders involved, their motivations and expectations of a scheme, 
how they provided support and ‘protection’ for the scheme and how learning occurs.  
 
Table 1: Summary of main characteristics of the study cities. 
 
 London Durham Rome Genoa 
City population 7 500 000 85 000 2 800 000 622 000 
Percentage living inside 
charging area (%) 
2 < 0.1 1.5 - 
Charging Area (km2) 21 0.35 5.5 1 (test area) 
Number of charge 
points 
174 1 22 6 
Average daily crossings 
during toll hours 
205 000 239 70 000 47 000 




















Charging period Mon - Fri 
7am – 6.30 pm 
Mon – Sat 
10 am – 4 pm 
Mon – Fri 
6.30 am – 6 pm 
Sat 2 pm – 6 pm 
Mon – Fri 
6.30 am – 6 pm 
Starting/Trial date Feb 2003 Oct 2002 Oct 2001 March-August  2003 
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The following represent a short version of the SPNM framework that lists and 
explores the critical factors identified in the four cases of this paper that relate to the 
success of the road pricing schemes. SPNM is used for analysing the cases and at the 
same time uses the results to further develop its analytical capability, as SPNM is still a 





The first stage of SPNM analysis is to identify the Partner-Actor network for 
developing and implementing a policy initiative. In SPNM, a distinction is made 
between two groups: (a) those actively involved in the planning, implementation and 
operation of a scheme, the partners and (b) users and other groups that were indirectly 
involved in the decision making process, the actors. Thus partners are those who 
together implement the road pricing scheme, whereas the actors are those affected by it 
and whose support is needed to win acceptance. A network of partners and actors was 
apparent in all the investigated cases, but the level of involvement of each group 
differed in each project. SPNM examines how these networks are formed and how they 
hold together. 
 
Figure 6: Combined diagram of Network of Partners and Actors in the Durham Road Access Charge 
scheme (Ieromonachou, 2005). 
 
All cities required a wide partner network to implement their respective schemes and 
this involved a complex project planning system. The Italian schemes had an initial 
network in place. The networks were partly established since the introduction of the 
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anew. Durham did try initially to introduce Access Control using a very restricted 
network but that failed (DCC, 2000). Later, Durham identified and empowered a wide 
range of community stakeholders by developing relationships with actors and drawing 
them in to become partners (see Figure 6, Adapted from Ieromonachou et al., 2004.). 
London had all vital partners grouped under the aegis of one ‘lead player’, Transport for 





Where projects involve complex systems of partners and actors, the management 
process usually needs a mechanism to provide focus and drive. This is particularly so 
for innovative projects involving the creation of new networks. This role is one that can 
be filled by project champions - charismatic individuals that spearhead projects. A 
project champion can stimulate the learning and acceptance process. Support of 
politicians is vital to the introduction of any road-pricing scheme whether a charismatic 
project champion exists or not. The project champion emerges as a critical part of the 
process of getting the charging system into place. All projects examined had some type 
of champion figure but this varied, with the role being an individual (London) or a 
coalition (Rome, Genoa) or community group (Durham). In some places (like London) 
the champions held special places (such as a government office) and their personal 
motivation could have linked to motives beyond the scope of transport policy. 
 
 
Expectations – Motivations 
 
The next stage in SPNM analysis is to explore the motivations and the extent to which 
the different expectations of partners and actors come together. Many of the parties 
taking part bring their own notions, values and beliefs with them. These may be 
summarised as their motivations. When examined, motivations help explain why each 
group originally became involved in a road pricing scheme and the amount of 
commitment they have towards it. Sometimes motivations are very obvious and in some 
cases they develop or evolve as the scheme progresses. Motivations are intrinsically 
linked to the expected outcome of the scheme. These expectations of partners and actors 
are useful to analyse for many reasons. It is critical to find out how the expectations of 
different partners and actors gradually become aligned and, for this to happen, a shift in 
expectations would have occurred. A potential danger sign is where a scheme involves 
partner and actors who have very different expectations and conflicting motivations. 
It is notable that behind the transport reasons for the road pricing schemes, there were 
deeper motivations. For example, protection of historical buildings was of great 
importance in Rome, and Genoa as well as Durham. Historical heritage is a sensitive 
issue for many cities in Italy, more so in Rome where the LTZ covers most of the 
ancient city and therefore protection of the built environment from pollution becomes 
necessary. In London, although the transport policies of which road pricing was part, 
did produce some benefits to historical areas (e.g. in Trafalgar Square), the main 
motivation was the economic cost of congestion and the direct transport benefits. 
Tapping into the core motivation of key actor groups is therefore important. In Durham, 
groups that would otherwise be seen as actors in the scheme were brought in the 
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network as partners. They were given responsibilities and thus were able to voice their 
concerns and have more input into the scheme by working through their motivations 





These are complementary actions benefiting users to support road pricing policies. 
These can take two forms: (a) Enhancement Protection, which are actions that 
complement the effect of road pricing (like the provision of extra public transport 
capacity to facilitate modal shift from car, subsidies to reduce public transport ticket 
prices, reallocating road space for pedestrians and bicycles etc.); (b) Compensation 
Protection, where there are full or part exemptions from charges for certain groups of 
users, for social or transport policy reasons. Typically the latter include buses, taxis, 
disabled drivers and local residents. 
Both types of protection measures are particularly needed for innovative or unfamiliar 
policy measures and link into the level of acceptance achieved (considered below). 
Enhancement Protection measures featured strongly in the London and Durham 
schemes. A major part of protection in London was enhancing public transport services 
and the London experience shows how much can be accomplished in a relatively short 
amount of time and with relatively low capital (i.e. an extra 300 buses). Durham also 
introduced the ‘Cathedral Bus’ service to provide alternative access to the charging 
area. Subsidy and service improvement was more important in the UK because there 
was little alternative available or the capacity was not adequate and fares were high. 
One contrast with the Italian road pricing schemes is a lesser emphasis on Enhancement 
Protection measures. This seems to be because they did not have to further enhance 
their public transport system as it was already highly developed and under heavy 
subsidy. They did, however, introduce electric scooter hire. For Compensation 
Protection, actions were more similar. In both Italy and the UK there were exemptions 





From SPNM theory, niche development depends on the local level of innovation 
processes and stakeholders behaviour. If the innovations (in this paper concerning road 
pricing policies) are successful, then the niche they create will become known and may 
be adopted more widely. Niche development can be evaluated by the level of learning 
and the level of institutional embedding. Hoogma et al. (2002, p.28) appreciate the 
learning that occurs through a range of processes of articulating “relevant technology, 
market and other properties” but enhance this notion by suggesting that a second-order 
learning is required for niche development to result in a regime shift. This form of 
learning will involve a co-evolutionary learning (Wynne, 1995) that will draw in the 
partners and actors involved in the scheme but also third parties like governments that 
can help in the institutional and societal embedding. Learning processes need to extend 
beyond the immediate local network of stakeholders. This is where the wider issue 
arises of what contributes to acceptance of a policy measure. 
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Each of the four cities presented in the paper used incremental processes but in 
different ways. As noted in the above case study, Durham had a long history of 
attempted solutions (that generally failed) until it reached the successful access charge 
system. London had also tried various traffic management options but as these were not 
deemed effective, the congestion charge emerged as the only solution. The congestion 
charging scheme itself is incremental, in that it uses a basic technology that can be 
upgraded once the scheme is established. Radical policies with eventually large scale 
changes can be planned and introduced incrementally. Genoa has experimented with 
road pricing to facilitate learning. It was felt that this pre-implementation stage was 
needed as there was insufficient political support to go for immediate implementation. 
A key point that SPNM analysis seeks to identify is that experimentation, adaptation 
and even failure are inherent in learning. An SPNM approach cannot be about the 
mechanistic implementation of a pre-defined solution, but about experimentation and 
learning. The lessons might be that a policy is wrong or unacceptable and a different 
measure is needed. At this point, Genoa is still debating whether to go ahead with a full-
scale road pricing scheme or not. 
All the successful schemes have used an incremental approach with flexibility to 
experiment and adapt. As noted above, this is consistent with SPNM theory that 
identifies the need for experimentation and adaptation. As the process unfolds, many of 
the barriers would be (or in effect seen) as less dramatic. Radical policies require a 
relatively un-complicated start and a pre-defined ‘test’ phase that would allow for 
problems like political and public acceptability to gradually normalise. An important 
part of learning by the network of partners and actors involves understanding user needs 
and attitudes towards policy measures such as road pricing. The actor/partner network’s 
assessment of user attitudes has, of course, already influenced them through the factors 
of expectations/motivations and has been reflected in the design of protection measures. 
However, this is indirect and therefore a separate category is viewed as necessary taking 




The social and political acceptance of road pricing by users plays a central role in the 
feasibility of implementing a road-pricing programme. A number of studies took place 
in order to establish the social aspects and acceptability of transport pricing policies in 
the UK (Jones, 1998; Preston et al, 2000; Rajé, 2003; Verhoef et al., 1997). In the UK, 
Ison (2000) found that approximately 80% of surveyed people viewed urban road 
pricing as being publicly unacceptable. Other studies showed the acceptability of road 
pricing depends upon perceived benefits and the justification given for the development 
of such a programme in the selected area (Jones, 1998, Schade & Schlag 2003). This 
links in to the SPNM factors of motivation/expectation and protection measures. 
It is clearly important to take into consideration both in the design and 
implementation of the scheme the views that arise within the general public. 
Acceptability needs to be considered seriously by implementers and government 
officials. Empirical literature shows that the public still has little knowledge of the 
possibilities of pricing policies as solutions to traffic congestion over other policies. 
Incremental approaches permit learning and enhance understanding and acceptance. 
The UK and Italian schemes started from different user experiences. In Italy, road 
pricing existed in the form of tolled motorways and urban road pricing is an extension 
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of an accepted practice, city centre access control. In the UK there was little experience 
of road charges or even city centre access control zones, which meant that the London 
and Durham schemes involved something entirely new. In all cases, acceptance of road 
pricing required a widespread acceptance that it was needed to address an accepted 
problem. In London and Durham it was congestion; in Italy, this was linked with the 
protection of the architectural heritage of the historical centres and other environmental 
improvements. It is essential that the charging scheme is seen as a solution to an 
accepted problem. A road pricing policy needs to be introduced incrementally to 
facilitate learning, with complementary protection measures that support the learning 




6. Concluding discussion 
 
Using the SPNM framework helps to identify key factors that contributed to the 
success, or were a weakness, in the road pricing cases covered in this paper. The SPNM 
framework also helps to show where there are common lessons, despite the clear 
differences in the scale and context of the four UK and Italian schemes discussed in this 
paper. 
The small Durham congestion-charging scheme appears remarkably successful in that 
it reduced traffic levels in the Peninsula area while satisfying the concerns of all major 
stakeholders. Although it is a modest project, how this has been achieved, contains 
lessons that could apply elsewhere. Perhaps most importantly were the presence of 
strong political leadership from both the elected representatives and the officials of the 
County Council who campaigned many years for the scheme. Secondly, the traffic 
problem in the area was well recognised by most people in the city, who were thus easy 
to convince that serious action was needed. This was helped by the nature of the site 
(with the World Heritage site of the Cathedral and Castle) which provided an added 
incentive for action to restrict traffic. Thirdly, the access charge was proposed as an 
alternative to a total ban on vehicular access, and can thus be seen as a relatively benign 
measure in comparison. Milder measures had been attempted and had clearly not 
worked (Ieromonachou et al. 2004). The access charge ended up being just the latest in 
a whole series of measures aimed at gradually restricting traffic access to the Peninsula. 
The small size and scope of the scheme (with the charge only applying to a single road) 
made the scheme technically simple to introduce with relatively few people directly 
affected. Overall there were strong motivations and learning and acceptance of road 
pricing was well advanced before the scheme went into place. Fourthly, the charging 
policy was preceded by improvements to public transport access, coupled with 
extensive compensation protection measures. Finally, there was the active involvement 
and empowerment, not only of partners but also of actor groups which ultimately helped 
the County Council achieve consensus in expectations and support for charging. 
In the case of London there were several elements necessary for success already in 
place, not least a very committed political champion, an almost unanimous acceptance 
of the transport problem, and a list of well-known and suitable objectives. In addition, 
there was also a relatively broad coalition of support for the scheme itself from some of 
the key actor stakeholders – in particular from business. However, there remained 
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strong opposition to Congestion Charging in London from some groups, and the local 
media adopted a very negative stance (LTT, 2004; 2005) – as it does to almost any 
transport issue (Ryley, 2005). This suggests that learning processes are incomplete.  
Providing alternative public transport in London with buses (enhancement protection) 
proved a more successful solution than possibly expected. The boost in bus use helped 
the scheme’s acceptance levels and kept costs down. A similar issue arose with the 
charging system. The camera system was criticised as expensive and not 100% accurate 
as well as being visually obtrusive. But it constituted tested technology that could easily 
and quickly be put in place in time for the proposed start date. In the end it proved 
remarkably versatile and relatively trouble free. At the early implementation stages, the 
technology was not critical. An incremental evolution in the technology path could 
easily follow a successful scheme. 
One of the main factors emerging from the Rome case is the importance of the 
community and the protection of the cities’ architectural heritage, and there are 
examples of this force working for or against the transport policy of ‘access control’. 
For example although the control of traffic through the access control schemes was 
important to protect the ancient city structures in both Roma and Genoa, there was the 
opposing motivation of the negative impact of the roadside hardware (posts, concrete 
curbs, cameras). This might be thought of as a ‘tactical’ problem compared to the 
‘strategic’-level of the traffic restraint policy as a whole. However, such tactical details 
can seriously affect acceptance and support for a policy measure such as road pricing. 
This presented a serious dilemma for planners who had to work with expert groups to 
ensure the entry gate system was appropriate for Rome. Models were created using 
computer generated images (Forestieri and Tomassini, 1999) to ensure conservation of 
the urban fabric. In Durham too, architectural heritage was an important motivation 
(being an UNESCO World Heritage Site), but here the much simpler scheme meant that 
there was just a small barrier at the exit point from the site. In London, visual intrusion 
has been less of an issue – maybe because there already is an overload of street 
furniture in the capital city, or maybe perhaps London’s architecture is not viewed in 
the same way as the other locations. 
Overall, the use of the SPNM framework to analyse the UK and Italian road pricing 
schemes has helped highlight a number of key issues in the process leading up to and 
implementing this radical traffic control measure. Where there have been differences, 
the SPNM framework has helped to identify why they have occurred and how they have 
contributed to the outcome of each city’s scheme. Particular insights that emerged from 
this research, and which could be useful in implementing road pricing elsewhere, were: 
? Managing the partner network for implementing a road pricing scheme can be a 
complex task. This can involve new skills and tasks than are normally involved in more 
traditional local transport measures; 
? Identifying and understanding core motivations of actors that the measure could 
support - these may only be indirectly related to transport (e.g. cultural image, economic 
impacts, prestige, well being etc.; 
? Extending beyond the partner network to the actor network that provides support for 
a road pricing scheme. Understanding, informing and empowering actor groups is 
important for winning widespread acceptability; 
? Radical policies need a ‘champion’ to spearhead their implementation, but 
champions can take many forms; 
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? Learning occurs at many levels and in many ways. However, it is important for a 
new scheme to build on existing processes and measures to promote learning. If 
possible, build on what you know already, in terms of understanding, motivations and 
experience, rather than trying to get people and organisations to do something totally 
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This paper presents the empirical results of a questionnaire among Dutch commuters regularly 
experiencing congestion, asking for their opinion (in terms of acceptance) on road pricing measures and 
revenue use targets. We find that road pricing is in general not very acceptable and that revenue use is 
important for the explanation of the level of acceptance. Road pricing is more acceptable when revenues 
are used to replace existing car taxation or to lower fuel taxes. Moreover, personal characteristics of the 
respondent have an impact on support levels. Higher educated people, as well as respondents with a 
higher value of time and with higher perceived effectiveness of the measure, seem to find road pricing 
measures more acceptable than other people. When we ask directly for the acceptability of different types 
of revenue use (not part of a road pricing measure), again abolition of existing car (ownership) taxes 
receives most support whereas the general budget is not acceptable. 
 






Road transport is known to generate considerable external costs, in particular in the 
form of congestion, accidents and noise. Governments may use different types of 
measures to deal with these problems, pricing being one of them. Most countries use a 
number of coarse pricing mechanisms, such as fuel duties, registration fees and parking 
charges. This current charging regime, however, is not very efficient. Economists have 
advocated the use of more targeted pricing tools for a long time, and have demonstrated 
the welfare gains. Nevertheless, these more efficient road pricing measures have up till 
now only seldom been implemented in practice. The low level of implementation is 
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nowadays not so much caused by technical or administrative problems. It is generally 
acknowledged that pricing measures meet public resistance and that acceptability is one 
of the major barriers to successful implementation of new and more efficient pricing 
measures (MC-ICAM, 2003).  
Transport pricing schemes have the double consequence of discouraging transport 
use, at least at certain times on certain parts of the network, and of transferring cash 
from private persons to other (often public) funds. The fact that road pricing – at least 
before recycling of revenues – involves such a transfer of cash from private travelers to 
public institutions, is likely to be a major impediment to its public acceptability. 
Furthermore, the implementation of efficient road pricing policies typically affects 
equity in a way that policy makers and/or the general population are likely to disapprove 
of.  
The Netherlands has a long experience in developing new road pricing proposals to 
reduce the increasing levels of congestion. None of these plans has ever been 
implemented mainly due to low levels of public acceptance. It is therefore interesting to 
investigate the issue of acceptance of road pricing and use of revenues in this country. 
This paper reports on the acceptability of new road pricing measures among Dutch 
commuters experiencing congestion on a regular basis. The aim is to identify 
explanatory factors for acceptance levels, especially among a group that relatively often 
uses road space.  
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the previous literature on the 
acceptance of road pricing and the role of revenue use in this. Many public concerns can 
be identified which policy makers should take into account when thinking about 
implementation of road pricing. Section 3 outlines the empirical survey conducted, and 
presents the results from our data analysis. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. Acceptability and revenue use in literature 
 
A regulator may face different types of constraints ranging from practical (and 
technical) ones to institutional and acceptability constraints (see for an overview on 
barriers, Ubbels and Verhoef, 2004) that may prevent him designing and implementing 
the desired pricing scheme. At present the major barriers to the successful 
implementation of transport pricing strategies relate largely to lack of stakeholder and 
political acceptability, rather than to technical or administrative problems. Since raising 
prices is generally disliked by the respective user group, the acceptance of pricing 
policies is often low. But pricing also generates revenues, which one can use for many 
purposes, including influencing the public acceptability of pricing. In this section we 
discuss literature results on the acceptance of road pricing and revenue use.  
 
 
2.1 Acceptability and road pricing 
 
Public acceptability of transport pricing measures is generally low when compared 
with other type of transport measures such as an improvement of public transport (e.g. 
Bartley, 1995; Jones, 1998). Least accepted are generally all kinds of road user fees 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 32 (2006): 69-94 
 71
(Schade, 2003). The level of acceptance is related to the perception of road pricing. 
Public concerns often mentioned include (Jones, 1998): 
 
• It is difficult for drivers to accept the notion that they should pay for congestion, it 
seems irrational and inappropriate; 
• Car users feel that urban road pricing is not needed, roads are a publicly provided 
good that should be free at the point of use; 
• Pricing will not lessen congestion, it is an ineffective measure because drivers will 
be inelastic to road charges; 
• The measure will result in unacceptable privacy issues; 
• Road pricing will face implementation problems such as unreliable technology and 
boundary issues; 
• Road pricing is considered to be unfair. 
 
This list of concerns suggests that acceptance is not necessarily very negative; it 
depends on various aspects that can be influenced by policy makers. Verhoef (1996), for 
instance, asked morning peak road users about their opinion on road pricing. An 
overwhelming majority (83%) stated that his or her opinion depends on the allocation of 
revenues. Revenue use will be addressed in the next subsection. The level of acceptance 
may also be explained by charge levels; higher charges are generally less acceptable. 
Other factors, not directly linked to the measure itself, may also be important. Steg 
(2003) identifies several factors that affect the acceptability of transport pricing. 
People’s problem awareness, the attitude towards car driving, mobility-related social 
norms and the perceived effectiveness of the measure are identified as important in 
explaining the level of support. In addition, Rienstra et al. (1999) find that the 
acceptance of policy measures increases if people are more convinced about the 
effectiveness of such measures.  
Acceptability of road pricing also depends on personal features such as age and 
income. Following economic theory, it is to be expected that high income earners may 
be less opposed to price measures to reduce congestion than people with lower incomes, 
because their value of time is higher. Verhoef et al. (1997) do indeed find that income as 
well as the willingness to pay for time gains has a significant and positive impact on the 
opinion on road pricing. Other factors, such as the expectation to be compensated, the 
perception of congestion as a problem and trip length, are also important in explaining 
the public’s opinion. Rienstra et al. (1999) have analysed the support (together with 
perceived effectiveness and problem perception) for transport policy measures in 
general (not in particular for road pricing). They find that several personal features and 
the perceived effectiveness have a significant impact on the respondent’s support for 
policy measures in transport. While gender and type of household do not seem to have 
an impact on support levels for transport measures, these tend to be higher when the 
educational level and age becomes higher. Car and driving licence owners support 
transport measures significantly less. Of all measures, car drivers have the least support 
for price measures. The authors find no significant impact of the level of income on the 
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2.2 Acceptability and the use of revenues 
 
The Verhoef (1996) study already indicated the importance of revenue use for the 
level of acceptance. There are various options how to use the revenues. Revenues may 
remain in the road sector by highway investment or road maintenance. Funds may also 
be used for broader objectives such as the improvement of public transport or a 
reduction of income taxes. Research has addressed the popularity of revenue spending 
objectives. Verhoef (1996) found that the allocation objectives that are in the direct 
interest of the road users received most support, as may be expected. Road investments, 
together with lower fuel and vehicle taxes (‘variabilisation’) received the highest 
average score. General purposes, such as general tax reductions and the government 
budget in general, obtained least support from morning peak road users. In between 
were transport purposes other than road, notably public transport.  
The importance of the use of the funds in gaining or losing public acceptance for a 
pricing measure has also been shown by a survey in the UK (Jones, 1998). The attitudes 
of people to a series of measures that would reduce urban traffic problems were asked. 
When asked independently (road pricing as a stand alone measure), only 30% 
responded in support of charging road users to enter highly congested urban areas 
(Jones, 1998). The respondents were then offered a package that includes a charge on 
entering a zone that was then used to fund better public transport, traffic calming and 
better facilities for walking and cycling. This resulted in a support of 57% for the 
package. A similar result was found in particular for London. A single measure was 
supported by 43% of the public, whereas 63% accepted the scheme when revenues were 
used for purposes approved by respondents. Hypothecating revenues thus increases 
public support. 
The AFFORD study conducted an empirical survey on the public acceptability of 
different pricing strategies in four European cities: Athens, Como, Dresden and Oslo 
(Schade and Schlag, 2000). They investigated the attitudes of the respondents regarding 
how to use the revenues arising from road pricing. It was found that common purposes 
of money use like traffic flow and public transport improvements are favoured by the 
vast majority of respondents. Lowering vehicle taxes is also supported by the people, 
whereas lower income taxes is not acceptable as a revenue spending target. This is the 
way revenues should be used according to the public. The expectations concerning how 
revenues actually will be used are rather different, however. About 70% of the 
respondents expect that the money will be used for state or municipal purposes, which 
are not wanted by the public (Schade and Schlag, 2000). This study has also analysed 
factors that influence the degree of acceptability of pricing measures. In particular, 
variables such as ‘social norm’, ‘perceived effectiveness’ and ‘approval of societal 
important aims’ are positively connected with the acceptability of pricing strategies 
(Schade and Schlag, 2003).  
An interesting study by Small (1992) suggests that public and political support can be 
reached for road pricing, even without using all revenues to compensate travelers since 
higher user charges are accompanied by reduced travel times. He searched for a strategy 
that funds programs with such a variety of distributions of impacts that nearly everyone 
affected will find at least some offsetting benefits, and a majority will perceive the 
entire package as an improvement. Seven interest groups were distinguished ranging 
from traveling public and public transport users to low tax advocates. It was suggested 
to keep money in the transportation sector. Funds should be allocated about equally 
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between monetary subsidies to travelers, substitutions of general taxes now used to pay 
for transportation services, and new transportation services. Small illustrates this by 
designing a politically feasible (in terms of support from the earlier identified interest 
groups) congestion pricing package for Southern California. His equity analysis 
indicates that this program makes every class of traveler better off (combination of 
travel time saved, financial improvements and transportation improvement), with the 
greatest gains for higher income drivers and public transport users. 
However, there is a downside to using revenues solely to improve acceptability. From 
a broader perspective, it becomes important also to consider explicitly the interaction 
(or trade off) between public acceptability and efficiency. Clearly, when too easily a 
scheme were adopted so as to meet public acceptability requirements, its efficient 
properties may be undermined – even by so much that the efficiency considerations 
motivating the scheme in the first place would then call for its cancellation.  
 
3. Acceptance and revenue use in the Netherlands: results from a survey among 
car commuters 
 
3.1 Aims and data collection 
 
This paper analyses the acceptance of road pricing measures (including the use of 
revenues) by Dutch commuters who experience congestion. It is important to know 
which factors influence acceptability of road pricing. Our analysis probably comes 
closest to that of Rienstra et al. (1999) and Verhoef et al. (1997). We also identify 
factors explaining the level of acceptance of road pricing and revenue use and include 
the perceived effectiveness and the value of time of respondents into the analysis. This 
study extends on the previous work by considering multiple variants of pricing 
measures, systematically varied over dimensions such as price levels, differentiation and 
revenue use. Moreover, the individual value of time estimates are now based on a 
choice experiment, while in the Verhoef et al. questionnaire these were based on open-
ended WTP questions. We also include the value of schedule delay and uncertainty into 
the analysis. The work of Rienstra analysed the support for transport measures in 
general, we focus more specifically on road pricing measures. For that reason, our 
sample consists only of car drivers who experience congestion on a regular basis.  
The data used in this paper have been obtained by conducting an (interactive) internet 
survey among Dutch commuters. The full questionnaire can roughly be divided into 
three parts. First, we asked for some socio-economic characteristics of the respondent 
(such as education and income). In order to analyse the behavioural responses to road 
pricing we developed a stated choice experiment, which is the second part of the survey. 
And finally we asked for the opinion of the respondents on several carefully explained 
road pricing measures. The first and the second part was answered by 1115 respondents, 
whereas the latter sample (opinion questions) consisted of 564 respondents. This paper 
will present outcomes of the analysis of this latter part of the survey.  
The data collection was executed by a specialised firm (NIPO), which has a panel of 
over 50.000 respondents. Since the survey was aimed at respondents that use a car for 
their home to work journey and also face congestion on a regular basis, we selected 
working respondents, who drive to work by car two or more times per week, and who 
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experience congestion of 10 or more minutes for at least two times a week. This resulted 
in a total of about 6800 possible respondents. An initial analysis revealed that a random 
sample would result in a relatively low number of women and lower income groups. 
Because income differences are important to analyse, it was decided to ‘over sample’ 
the lower income groups and create an equal number of respondents over the various 
income classes. The data were collected during three weeks in June 2004 (before 





As previously explained, the survey started with some general questions asking for 
important explanatory variables of the respondent. These variables may help explain the 
differences in acceptance levels. Most variables are explained in Appendix 1. 
Additional variables included in our analysis are not socio-economic in nature. We have 
information on the perceived effectiveness of the measures, and have an estimate of the 
value of time (VOT) of the respondent. It is worthwhile to analyse the effects of these 
variables on acceptance1.  
Appendix 1 shows the profile of our sample. Apparently Dutch commuters 
experiencing congestion are in most cases men and relatively highly educated. A 
majority of the respondents are between 26 and 45 years old and do not have children. 
These characteristics of our data base have been compared with the general profile of 
the Dutch car driver experiencing congestion, in order to check representativeness. 
Research by Goudappel Coffeng (1997) suggests that about 75% of all drivers in 
congestion are men (equal to our sample). Our sample includes more respondents 
between the age of 26 and 35 (about 10% more), whereas the share of persons older 
than 45 years is lower than the 1997 profile. Moreover, drivers in congestion tend to be 
higher educated (our sample consists of 44.1% Bachelor’s and Master’s, whereas the 
general profile has 36%) and have a higher income. The effect of the ‘over sampling’ of 
lower income is clearly present. About 25% of the drivers in this sample have an 
income below €28,500 (modal income), whereas the 1997 profile predicts that only 8% 
of the drivers fall in this category. 
The respondent was confronted with three different types of road pricing measures. 
After a concise description of each measure, the respondents’ opinion on various issues 
was asked. People could indicate the acceptability of a specific measure on a 7-point 
scale, ranging from ‘very unacceptable’ to ‘very acceptable’. We also asked how 
effective they thought that the measure would be, both individually (i.e. would you 
drive less?) and in general terms (would there be less congestion and will there be 
smaller environmental problems?). The answers to these latter questions (also on a 7-






                                                 
1 We do not only have an estimate of the VOT of the respondent, also the value of schedule delay (early 
and late) and the value of uncertainty are available. We refer to Appendix 3 for more information on the 
derivation of these values. 
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Table 1: Short description of the transport pricing measures presented to the respondents. 
Measure Variant 
1: Bottleneck passage 1A: flat toll throughout the week 
1B: coarse toll (flat within peak hours on working days) 
1C: multi-step toll during peak hours only 
1D: toll depends on actual traffic conditions 
 
2: Kilometre charge differentiated by vehicle type 2A: Revenues to general budget 
2B: Revenues to traffic system 
2C: Lower car taxation and new roads 
2D: Revenues to public transport 
2E: Abolition of car ownership taxes 
2F: Lower fuel taxes 
2G: Revenues to improve and construct new roads 
 
3: Kilometre charge with different charge levels 
and different revenue use 
3A: 2.5 €cents, unclear revenue use 
3B: 5 €cents, unclear revenue use 
3C: 7.5 €cents, unclear revenue use 
3D: 2.5 €cents, improvement of road network 
3E: 5 €cents, improvement of road network 
3F: 7.5 €cents, improvement of road network 
3G: 2.5 €cents, abolish existing car taxation 
3H: 5 €cents, abolish existing car taxation 
3I: 7.5 €cents, abolish existing car taxation 
 
Within each type of measure, we have developed a number of variants differing on: 
type of charge (measure 1), type of revenue use (measure 2) and level of charge plus 
revenue use (measure 3) (see Table 1). This resulted in 4 different variants for measure 
1, 7 for measure 2, and 9 for measure 3 (a detailed description can be found in 
Appendix 2).  
All variants were randomly distributed over the respondents. This means that we 
obtained about 140 observations for each variant of measure 1, 80 for each variant of 
measure 2, and 60 for each variant of measure 3. A short introduction preceded the 
explanation of the measures. This was to explain that the respondent had to imagine the 
implementation of the measures in the Netherlands. It was also to be assumed that the 
privacy of car users is guaranteed, electronic equipment registers the toll and the driver 
can freely choose the payment method (e.g. credit card, bank transfer, etc.). The 
introduction to measure 2 and 3 (time-independent charges) also included an estimation 
of the financial consequences for an average driver (driving 16,000 km in a year), 
irrespective of type of revenue use. 
In addition, we asked the respondents to evaluate the acceptance of different revenue 
uses separately (without specifying the road pricing measure). Six different revenue use 
options were presented to the respondent: the treasury of the government (and hence be 
used for purposes other than transport); new roads; improvement of public transport 
(e.g. increase of frequencies); a removal of existing car ownership taxes; a decrease in 
fuel taxation; and a decrease of income taxes. Again, for each option, a 7-point 
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3.3 Methodology and results 
 
Before investigating the distribution of the levels of acceptance we start with an 
overview of the average acceptance levels for each single measure. Figure 1 shows the 
mean acceptance outcomes and its confidence intervals2.  
 
Figure 1: Mean and 95% confidence intervals of acceptance scores on each single measure (level 1 = very 
unacceptable; level 7 = very acceptable). 
 
The mean level of acceptance differs considerably between the various types of 
measures. Where all types of measure 1 (bottleneck passage tolls) can be classified as 
somewhat unacceptable, this is not always the case for the other measures. In particular 
measures 2C (revenue use: new roads and less car taxation), 2E (abandoning of road 
taxation) and 2F (lower fuel taxes) have higher acceptance levels. But, a score of 4 still 
means that the respondents are neutral. The patterns of outcomes for measure 3 can be 
easily explained by the structure of the measure (a combination of 3 different charge 
levels with 3 different revenue use options). Apparently the respondents prefer revenues 
to be used for abolition of car taxation over that of new road and an unclear destination. 
A charge of 2.5 €cents is more acceptable than higher charges of 5 and 7.5 €cents, as 
may be expected. Measure 3G has the highest mean (4.7) which comes close to an 
average score of 5 (‘somewhat acceptable’).  
These findings suggest the following interesting issues. First, given the results for 
measure 1 it seems that the level of acceptability does not depend on the complexity of 
the measure. Hence, acceptability is not necessarily a reason for starting simple. Second, 
measure 3 suggests that revenue use has more effect on the level of acceptance than the 
charge level (for the chosen range). People prefer a charge of 7.5 €cents with 
abolishment of car taxation over a charge of 2.5 €cents with revenues hypothecated to 
the general treasury. This underlines the importance of the allocation of the revenues. 
                                                 
2 We present ‘unweighted’ results. When we correct the outcomes for representativeness (on age, 
education and income) to obtain a good match with the profile of Goudappel Coffeng and create a 
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Appendix 4A shows the percentages of respondents that find the various measures 
‘unaccaptable’ or ‘very unacceptable’. These outcomes confirm the previous described 
‘mean’ pattern. For instance, measure 3C is least acceptable, not only on average but 
also in terms of number of respondents.  
 
 
Methodology for assessing differences between groups 
 
Various econometric techniques are of course available that can be used to investigate 
the relation between various variables. The methodology to be applied depends to a 
large extent on the structure of the data. Here, the aim is first to explain the level of 
acceptance for the various measures, where the dependent variable consists of a choice 
out of an ordered set of acceptance alternatives. Given this framework, the ordered 
probit (OP) technique seems to be most appropriate (see for discussion of OP Maddala 
(1983)). Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), which assumes an unbounded continuous 
dependent variable, is less appropriate, although it would have had the advantage of 
more easily interpretable coefficients.  
The underlying response model for an OP estimation is of the following form (see 
Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993): 
 
.'* εβ += iXACC   
 
The underlying continuous response variable ACC* is unobserved, X is the vector of 
explanatory variables, β gives the vector of coefficients, and ε is the residual. The 
observed discrete response variable ACC is related to ACC* as follows: 
 
  1=ACC  if 1* µ≤ACC ,  
  2=ACC  if 21 * µµ <≤ ACC , 
3=ACC  if 32 * µµ <≤ ACC , 
: 
  7=ACC  if *6 ACC≤µ . 
 
The µ’s (threshold values in the model output) are unknown parameters to be 
estimated jointly with β, and the model assumes that ε is normally distributed across 
observations. The constants µ therefore divide the domain of ACC* into 7 segments, 
which corresponds with observations of the discrete response variable. The model 
estimates probability intervals for the seven possible answers: 
 
Prob )'()'()( 1 ijijij XXJZ βµβµ −Φ−−Φ== −  
 
where Φ is the cumulative standard normal, and Zij=J represents each acceptability 
score. The interpretation of the estimated coefficients is not straightforward. The 
estimated coefficients for the included explanatory variables can be interpreted as 
indications of shifting the distribution to the left or the right depending on the sign of 
the β’s. Assuming that β is positive, this means that that the probability of the leftmost 
category (in this case ACC=1) must decline. At the same time we are shifting some 
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probability into the rightmost cell (ACC=7). But what happens to the middle cells is 
ambiguous and is dependent on the local densities. Hence, we must be very careful in 
interpreting the coefficients in this model (see Greene, 1993). The values of the 
coefficients can more easily be interpreted in a relative sense: a larger value denotes a 
larger marginal impact.  
Various specifications of the model for all measures (by including variables that may 
be expected to have some explanatory power) have been tried. The following tables 
present our preferred specifications. The estimations for each type of measure have been 




Measure 1: Electronic toll on daily bottlenecks with fixed revenue use (new roads) 
 
Appendix 6A presents the estimation results for measure 1. The first row presents the 
estimates for the threshold values (µ’s). The second row presents all the explanatory 
variables that have been included in the estimation. It appears that the individual’s value 
of time, level of education, and compensation of costs by the employer all have a 
significant and positive impact on acceptance. Most signs of the coefficients are as 
expected. For example, respondents with higher value of time tend to have higher 
acceptance levels of an electronic toll on daily bottlenecks. Interestingly, inclusion of 
the individual’s value of schedule delay (early and late) and the value of uncertainty did 
not lead to significant results. This suggests that people find it hard to predict whether or 
not uncertainty will reduce under congestion pricing, and whether or not advantages in 
terms of schedule delay costs can be realized. Alternatively, people may have ignored 
these matters. 
As expected, commuters who have to pay the toll themselves (no compensation) and 
drive many kilometres tend to find the measure less acceptable than drivers who receive 
full compensation and use the car less often. Income is not significant; one explanation 
may be that VOT and education (both correlated with income) take up the expected 
effect. Income indeed becomes significant (at the 5% level) when VOT and education 
are not included in the estimation. On the other hand, the type of measure, living in one 
of the three larger cities (loc1, included to compare the opinions of people located in 
densely urbanised areas with those in the rest of the Netherlands) and the weight of the 
car do not seem to have an important impact.  
As already apparent from Figure 1, the different types of bottleneck charging 
measures have no significant effect on the acceptance of the respondent. It makes no 
difference whether it is a charge at all times (1A), a peak time charge (1B), a 
differentiated peak charge (1C) or a charge based on actual traffic conditions (1D), 
although the latter seems somewhat less acceptable than the other three (although not 
significantly). This suggests that the structure of measure (ranging from a flat and 
certain charge to a highly uncertain charge depending on traffic density) may not 
necessarily have an impact on the level of acceptance. 
The perceived level of ‘general effectiveness’ in terms of (less) congestion (i.e. in 
Appendix 6A general effectiveness (less congestion)) has an important impact on 
acceptance3. The results suggest that respondents who think that the measure will be 
                                                 
3 The type of measure that has been proposed has no significant impact on the level of general 
effectiveness (in terms of less congestion). 
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effective also tend to find it more acceptable. The effectiveness in terms of less 
environmental problems is not included in the model as this variable was highly 
correlated with ‘effectiveness (less congestion)’. The ‘personal effectiveness’ 
(indicating whether people tend to use their car less when the measure is implemented) 
shows a somewhat irregular pattern. Compared with people who indicate that they do 
not change their behaviour (peff=1), respondents who find a personal change more 
likely have a higher level of acceptance. This may be explained by the ‘protest voters’ 
in group 1: “the measure is not acceptable because I will not change behaviour” or “I 
say I will not change behaviour because I don’t want this measure implemented”. An 
explanation of the low score of peff=7 may be that these respondents (who indicate that 
they will most likely drive less) find the measure not that acceptable because they 
perceive the consequences of changing behaviour as (very) negative.  
The results suggest that acceptance need not depend on the complexity of the road 
pricing measure. This gives possibilities to policy makers to consider time-differentiated 
charges that tend to be more effective in reducing congestion. The perception of 
effectiveness also seems very important for the level of acceptance. Clearly explaining 
the objectives and expected effects may therefore be an important aspect of the 
communication strategy of the government. 
 
 
Measure 2: Kilometre charge dependent on vehicle weight with different revenue use  
 
Appendix 6B shows the estimation results for the second measure. Again, we see the 
importance of the VOT and compensation of costs by the employer. Education is not as 
important as for measure 1. One explanation may be that measure 2 (like 3) is more 
easily accepted on the basis of equity arguments, which require less intellectual effort 
than effectiveness or efficiency. A striking difference with the previous estimation is the 
difference between the (sub-) types of measure. Measures C, E and F received 
significantly more support than measure G, but also than the other 3 variants of this 
measure. This suggests that when revenues from the charge are used to lower or 
abandon existing car taxation (2B and 2E) or fuel taxes (2F), more public support is 
obtained. The weight of the car (and also the number of kilometres driven yearly) does 
not have a significant impact, despite the fact that this measure differentiates on this 
characteristic. Again, perceived general effectiveness in terms of congestion and 
personal effectiveness have a significant impact on the level of acceptance. We have 
included the effectiveness in terms of less congestion into the estimation and not the 
effectiveness on the environment despite its possible relevance here. These two 
variables are again strongly correlated and have equal results in terms of significance. 
The mean score on environmental effectiveness is only slightly higher than the 
perceived effectiveness on congestion (it is not “very probable” that congestion will 
decrease or that the environment will benefit from this measure). Given the nature of 
this measure, a greater difference might have been expected. Personal effectiveness 
shows almost the same (irregular) pattern that we found for measure 1, and again the 
same hypothesis applies here. 
The analysis indicates that (as expected) revenue use is an important explanatory 
variable for the acceptance level. Revenue allocations that are in the direct interest of 
the individual are more popular. This confirms the findings of other studies such as 
Verhoef (1996). Characteristics of individual specific (mobility) behaviour tend to be of 
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less relevance, except for the value of time. The perceived level of effectiveness of the 




Measure 3: Kilometre charge with different toll levels and revenue uses  
 
The third measure that we have analysed consists of 9 sub-measures that combine one 
out of three types of revenue use with one out of three levels of a charge. Two sets of 
dummy variables thus define the type of measure: one for the type of revenue use and 
one for the level of the charge. Appendix 6C shows the results for this estimation. It is 
interesting to see that the level of acceptance very much depends on the way revenues 
are redistributed, and (but less so, for the values considered) the level of the charge (as 
may be expected). Higher charges are relatively less acceptable, and the abolition of 
existing car taxes is far more acceptable than an unclear revenue use (note the high 
coefficient), and somewhat more acceptable than the construction of new roads. This is 
consistent with finding that measure 3G (combination of low charge and abandoning of 
existing car taxes) is relatively most acceptable (confirmed by the results shown in 
Figure 1). It is remarkable that the weight of the vehicle has an explanatory impact here. 
This may have something to do with the fact that the previous measure 2 was 
differentiated according to weight. In indicating acceptance respondents may have 
compared measure 3 with that measure; and therefore people with smaller cars now find 
this measure less acceptable. Expected effectiveness again has a very significant impact 
on the level of acceptance. Commuters who indicate that the measure will be effective 
are less opposed to this measure. The respondents’ value of time, education and 
personal effectiveness seem to lose importance compared with the other measures. In 
contrast to the previous measures, personal effectiveness is no longer significant. It is 
not clear what causes these differences with the previous cases. 
The predictability of the charge level and the complexity of the measure may not be 
important (see measure 1), but the level of the charge and the revenue use is relevant. 
Individual characteristics are less important in explaining the level of acceptance. The 
differences between groups are small, which makes it difficult for governments to 
specify certain groups that may be compensated to increase acceptance.  
 
 
Revenue use only 
 
Finally, we asked the respondents for their opinion on the allocation categories of the 
revenues per se, so without defining the road pricing measure. Six different possibilities 
were evaluated on acceptance by the respondents (general budget, new roads, improve 
public transport, abandon existing car taxation, lower fuel taxes, and lower income 
taxes). The findings presented in Figure 2 are largely in line with the previous findings 
of revenue use as part of a road pricing measure. An abolition of existing car taxes is 
most preferred (a mean score of 5.85, a 6 is ‘acceptable’), whereas the general budget is 
‘unacceptable’. The construction of new roads is valued rather positively here, while the 
acceptability of measure 2G (kilometre charge with the same type of revenue use) is 
considerably lower (see Figure 1). More than 74% of the respondents indicated that the 
general budget is ‘unacceptable’ or ‘very unacceptable’ (see Appendix 4a). The 
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confidence intervals are smaller than those of the road pricing measures (see Figure 1), 
indicating less variance in the answers.  
Figure 2: Mean and 95% confidence intervals of acceptance scores on each type of revenue use (level 1 = 
very unacceptable; level 7 = very acceptable). 
 
We have carried out a similar type of (ordered probit) analysis as we did for the road 
pricing measures, in order to explain the acceptance levels for these types of revenue 
use. When policy makers want to compensate certain groups, it is useful for them to 
know the preferences of these groups. The estimations of the preferred results can be 
found in Appendix 5. Again, for each type of revenue use the same explanatory 
variables have been included after having tried various specifications of the model (by 
including and excluding variables that may be expected to have some explanatory 
power).  
The results differ greatly over the various types of revenue use. Income is only 
significant when revenues are used to lower income taxes or to construct new roads. 
Lower income groups dislike revenues to be used for new roads more than people with 
a higher income, whereas the opposite holds when revenues are used to lower income 
taxes. The explanation for the first finding could be that lower income people drive less. 
For the second finding, the higher marginal utility could be an explanation. Hence, 
when policy makers propose to compensate the lowest income groups by lowering 
income taxes they obtain most support from this category (although overall support 
levels for this type of measure are rather modest). Another interesting variable is the 
compensation of costs by the employer. As may be expected, respondents who are not 
or only partly compensated have in general more support for abolition of existing car 
taxation than people who do not have to pay these taxes. This may also explain the 
disapproval of revenues being used for the general budget by people without full 
compensation; personal compensation is a better objective for this group. The weight of 
the vehicle seems important for two targets: lower fuel taxes and improvement of public 
transport. Owners of smaller vehicles (with lower weights) find lower fuel taxes less 
acceptable than others, this may be explained by the fact that this group drives relatively 
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cars. The importance of the VOT for certain allocation categories (i.e. general budget 
and improvement of public transport) seems somewhat strange and inexplicable. 
The findings on acceptance for revenue use targets are similar to earlier reported 
results in the literature. The allocation objectives that are in the direct interest of the 
road users receive most support. Improvement of public transport is less acceptable in 
comparison with the findings of Schade and Schlag (2000). Revenues may theoretically 
ideally be used to reduce distortive income taxes (which is beneficial from a welfare 
perspective), but support for this option from Dutch commuters is low.  
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
Despite the fact that politicians and the public regard transport problems as very 
urgent and important, people do have concerns about road pricing, often resulting in low 
acceptance levels. The outcomes from a survey among Dutch commuters analysed in 
this paper confirm this scepticism. The first measure that has been evaluated by the 
respondents (electronic toll differing according to place and/or time without changing 
revenue use) is in general (for all alternatives) perceived as somewhat unacceptable, 
irrespective of the type (or alternative) of measure. The acceptance of second measure 
(a kilometre charge depending on vehicle weight combined with different allocation of 
revenues) does depend on the type of measure. This indicates that the respondents’ 
opinions on road pricing are very sensitive to the way tax revenues are allocated. The 
measure is more acceptable when revenues are used for a decrease in fuel taxes, an 
abolishment of existing car taxation or to lower existing car ownership taxes together 
with the construction of new roads; indeed those targets that are in the direct interest of 
the respondent (car driver). These findings correspond with results from the third 
measure. It is also found that higher charges are less acceptable.  
Most of our findings are in line with results of previous literature. For the first two 
measures (and to a lesser extent also for measure 3) it was found that education, the 
VOT of the respondents and financial compensation (partly or full) by the employer are 
important explanatory variables. Higher educated people, as well as respondents with a 
higher VOT, seem to find road pricing measures more acceptable than others. The same 
holds for people that receive financial support for their commuting costs. The perceived 
effectiveness of the measure (in terms of less congestion) does have an important 
(positive) impact on the support levels. Finally, we found a weaker relationship, an 
inverted U, between personal effectiveness and support levels.  
The analysis of measure 1 showed that the complexity of a measure does not affect 
the levels of acceptance. The structure of this measure was varied (with different toll 
structures when passing a bottleneck), while revenue allocation was kept constant. This 
may suggest that policy makers can consider more efficient differentiated pricing 
schemes instead of a rather simple flat fee in dealing with bottleneck congestion, 
without loosing acceptance. We have also included the value of schedule delay (early 
and late) and the value of uncertainty of respondents into the analysis of these measures. 
The results do not confirm that these individual indicators are important in explaining 
acceptance. Despite the hypothesised impact of variables such as income, the driven 
number of kilometers and weight of the car (with measure 2), we haven’t found 
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evidence on this. The effect of income seems to be fully captured by education and the 
value of time.  
The above findings on revenue use targets are largely confirmed when we do not 
present the type of measure, and ask directly for the acceptance of various ways to 
redistribute the revenues. Dutch car commuters find it almost acceptable when policy 
makers decide to use the revenues to compensate the car drivers by abandoning current 
car taxation. This option outperforms all other destinations in terms of acceptance. 
Lower fuel taxes and new roads are slightly less acceptable. By far the least attractive 
option is the public treasury. The analysis towards explaining variables of these revenue 
use targets showed a very diverse pattern. For some allocation categories (lower income 
taxes and new roads) income was important, whereas for other spending targets 
compensation of costs by the employer (e.g. abandoning existing car taxation) and the 
weight of the vehicle (e.g. lower fuel taxes) appeared to have impact on acceptance. 
Income seems the most relevant variable in this case because equity is often an issue 
when it comes to implementation of pricing measures and policy makers may want to 
compensate the lower income groups. It appears that lower income groups have a 
stronger preference to lower existing income taxes with revenues from road pricing 
compared with higher income people. The opposite holds when revenues are used to 
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Appendix 1: Explanation and population share of explanatory (dummy) variables 





Gender Dummy Male (75,2%); Female (24,8%) 
Age Dummies Age1: 18-25 (7,3%), Age2: 26-35 (39,7%), 
Age3: 36-45 (28,2%), Age4: 46-55 (18,1%), 
Age5: 56+ (6,7%)  
Education Dummies Edu1: primary (15,6%), Edu2: junior general 
secondary (MAVO) (6,0%), edu3: 
intermediate vocational (MBO) (24,8%), 
edu4: senior general secondary 
(HAVO/VWO) (9,4%), edu5: Bachelor 
(31,9%), edu6: Master (12,2%) 
Income (gross yearly) Continuous  
Place of residence (region) Dummies Loc1: 3 large cities* (17,9%), loc2: rest west 
(33,9), loc3: north (3,7%), loc4: east (23,9), 
loc5: south (20,6%) 
Family size Dummies Fam1: 1 person (23%), fam2: 2 (31,6%), 
fam3: 3 (18,3%), fam4: 4 (18,3%), fam5: 5 
(7,6%), fam6: 6 (1,2%)  
Number of children younger than 
11 
Dummies Childno: 0 (72,5%), childyes: 1 or more 
(27,5%) 
Type of measure  Dummies Measure 1A to 1D, 2A to 2G (see app. 2) 
Measure 3: charge level Dummies Charge=2.5 €cent, charge=5 €cent, 
charge=7.5 €cent 
Measure 3: revenue use Dummies Revenue use is unclear, revenue use is new 
roads, revenue use is abandon car taxes 
VOT Continuous  
Weight of the car Dummies Weight1: low weight (22,7%), weight2: 
middle class (67,2%), weight3: heavy (10,1%) 
Yearly number of kilometers 
driven 
Continuous  
Compensation of costs by 
employer 
Dummies Comp1: none (11,9%), comp2: partly 
(43,8%), comp3: completely (44,3) 
Travel time with congestion/free 
flow travel time 
Continuous  
General effectiveness (will this 
measure lead to less congestion)  
Dummies Geff1: very unlikely (20.4%), geff2: unlikely 
(37.4%), geff3: a little unlikely (14.4%), 
geff4: not likely, not unlikely (6.0%), geff5: a 
little likely (16.3%), geff6: likely (4.4%), 
geff7: very likely (1.1%)  
Personal effectiveness (will this 
measure make you drive less 
kilometers)  
Dummies Peff1: very unlikely (31.7%), peff2: unlikely 
(34.9%), peff3: a little unlikely (8.2%), peff4: 
not likely, not unlikely (8.3%), peff5: a little 
likely (10.1%), peff6: likely (5.3%), peff7: 
very likely (1.4%)  
* Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague 
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Appendix 2: Description of measures 
 
Measure Variants 
1. Electronic toll on daily bottlenecks 
(independent of bad weather);  revenues 
hypothecated to construct new roads and 
improve existing roads 
A) charge of € 1.00 at all times 
B) charge of € 2.00 on working days, during peak 
hours: 7.00-9.00 and 17.00-19.00, no charge on 
other times 
C) peak-time charge: 6:00- 7:00 € 0.50, 
7:00-7:30 € 1.00; 7:30-8:00 € 1.75; 8:00-8:30 € 
2.50; 8:30-9:00 € 1.75; 9:00-9:30 € 1.00, 9:30-
10:00 € 0.50. The same structure for the evening 
peak (16.00-20.00)  
D) charge depends on traffic density, more congestion 
means a higher charge with a maximum of € 5,00 
 
2. Kilometre charge depending on weight of 
the car (heavy cars are less 
environmentally friendly). Light cars pay 
4 €cents per kilometre; middle weight 
cars pay 5 €cents per kilometre; heavy 
cars pay 6 €cents per kilometre. Monthly 
(extra) costs for the various types of cars 
based on average kilometrage were 
presented to respondent. 
A) Revenues hypothecated to general budget of the 
government 
B) Revenues hypothecated to the traffic system in 
general, this may include new roads or 
improvement of public transport 
C) Revenues used to lower existing car taxes and 
improve or construct new roads 
D) Revenues hypothecated to public transport 
E) Revenues used to abolish existing car ownership 
taxes 
F) Revenues used to lower existing fuel taxes 
G) Revenues used to improve roads and construct 
new road infrastructure 
 
3. Kilometre charge with different 
allocations of revenues 
A) charge of 2.5 €cents per kilometre; revenue use 
unclear 
B) charge of 5 €cents per kilometre; revenue use 
unclear 
C) charge of 7.5 €cents per kilometre; revenue use 
unclear 
D) charge of 2.5 €cents per kilometre; revenues used 
for new and better roads 
E) charge of 5 €cents per kilometre; revenues used for 
new and better roads 
F) charge of 7.5 €cents per kilometre; revenues used 
for new and better roads 
G) charge of 2.5 €cents per kilometre; revenues used 
to abolish existing car taxes (ownership and 
purchase) 
H) charge of 5 €cents per kilometre; revenues used to 
abolish existing car taxes (ownership and 
purchase) 
I) charge of 7,5 €cents per kilometre; revenues used 
to abolish existing car taxes (ownership and 
purchase) 
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Appendix 3: Calculation of VOT, VSDL, VSDE and VUNC point estimates 
 
The value of time (VOT), value of schedule delay late (VSDL) and early (VSDE) and 
value of uncertainty (VUNC) were derived from questions posed in the stated choice 
experiment, aimed at establishing estimates at the individual level. Four different 
screens were designed fo this purpose (one for each variable), each offering four 
alternatives that differ in tolls, travel time, departure time and uncertainty (only in the 
screen for VUNC). The respondents were then asked to allocate ten (commuting) trips 
over these four different alternatives. The design of the alternatives for VOT, VSDE, 
VSDL and VUNC respectively has been created as follows.  
The VOT for commuting trips in the Netherlands, as used by the Dutch government 
for 2004, was about € 8.3 per hour (see AVV, 2006). Given this value, we have 
identified the following four intervals: 
1. € 0 – 4  
2. € 4 – 8 
3. € 8 – 12 
4. > € 12 
 
In order to allocate responses to one of the above categories, the following choice was 










Departure time TD TD – 15 min. TD – 30 min. TD – 45 min. 
Travel time Tf Tf + 15 min. Tf + 30 min. Tf + 45 min. 
Arrival time TA TA TA TA 
Toll € 6 € 3 € 1 € 0 
 
The respondent was then asked to allocate ten trips over these four alternatives. If the 
respondent chooses alternative C over D, we can infer that he is willing to pay € 1 to 
save 15 minutes of travel time (implying a VOT of at least € 4 per hour). In order to 
calculate a point estimate for an individual we do need a mean interval value. It is not 
plausible to assume that the exact values are the middle points of its interval (and this is 
not possible for the fourth interval). Therefore we hypothesize that there is an 
underlying statistical distribution that can be fitted to the actual aggregated trip 
allocation of the point estimate questions and approximate the mean interval values 
based on this presumed distribution. We have chosen to use the Gamma distribution. In 
order to find the parameters of the best fitting Gamma distribution, we have applied the 
least square method (minimum difference between actual and simulated distribution). 
When the parameters have been estimated, it is possible to determine the mean interval 
values. Furthermore, it appeared that the distributions were (slightly) different for 
income; the mean interval value depends on the income of the respondent. The table 
below presents the mean average values for VOT, VSDE, VSDL and VUNC for the 
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VOT VSDE Income (gross yearly) 
0-4 4-8 8-12 >12 0-2 2-4 4-6 >6 
<28.500 € 2.4 5.9 9.8 18.5 1.1 2.9 4.9 9.6 
28.500-45.000 € 2.4 5.9 9.8 18.1 1.1 2.9 4.9 9.5 
45.000-68.000 € 2.7 6.0 9.9 17.6 1.1 2.9 4.9 9.5 
>68.000 € 2.7 6.0 9.9 17.9 1.1 2.9 4.9 9.5 
 
VSDL VUNC Income (gross yearly) 
0-8 0-3 3-6 6-9 >9 8-16 16-24 >24 
<28.500 € 3.5 1.6 4.4 7.3 13.4 11.7 19.7 44.1 
28.500-45.000 € 3.4 1.6 4.4 7.3 13.1 11.6 19.6 40.2 
45.000-68.000 € 3.5 1.6 4.4 7.3 13.3 11.6 19.7 40.2 
>68.000 € 3.2 1.6 4.4 7.3 12.9 11.6 19.6 38.9 
 
It is now possible to calculate a point estimate for an individual’s value of time as the 
weighted average of the intervals’ expected values, where the weights are determined 
by the trips allocated to that interval by the respondent. For instance, when a respondent 
with an income of less than 28.500€ allocates 5 trips to B and 5 trips to C a VOT point 
estimate of 7.8 results ((5*5.9+5*9.8)/10). 
Below we show the alternatives that have been presented to the respondents in order 
to derive VSDE, VSDL and VUNC. 
Literature suggests that the VSDE is about half of the VOT. Therefore, we defined the 
following 4 intervals: 
1. € 0 – 2 
2. € 2 – 4 
3. € 4 – 6 










Departure time TD TD – 15 min. TD – 30 min. TD – 45 min. 
Travel time Tf Tf Tf Tf 
Arrival time TA TA – 15 min. TA – 30 min. TA – 45 min. 
Toll € 3 € 1.50 € 0.50 € 0 
 
According to the literature VSDL is about twice the VOT. Therefore, we defined the 
following 4 intervals: 
1. € 0 – 8 
2. € 8 – 16 
3. € 16 – 24 










Departure time TD TD + 10 min. TD + 20 min. TD + 30 min. 
Travel time Tf Tf Tf Tf 
Arrival time TA TA + 10 min. TA + 20 min. TA + 30 min. 
Toll € 8 € 4 € 1.33 € 0 
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We have defined, rather arbitrarily, the following intervals for the VUNC: 
1. € 0 – 3 
2. € 3 – 6 
3. € 6 – 9 










Departure time TD – 30 min. TD – 30 min. TD – 30 min. TD – 30 min. 
Min. travel time Tf + 30 min. Tf + 5 min. Tf   + 0 min. Tf 
Max. travel time Tf + 30 min. Tf + 35 min. Tf + 40 min. Tf + 55 min. 
Min. arrival time TA TA – 15 min. TA – 30 min. TA – 45 min. 
Max. arrival time TA TA + 5 min. TA + 10 min. TA + 15 min. 
Tol € 6 € 3 € 1 € 0 
 
 
The resulting average values for the VOT, the VSDE, the VSDL, and the VUNC for 
the different income groups are shown in the following Table. 
 
 VOT VSDE VSDL VUNC 
<28.500 € 9.9 4.6 18.6 5.8 
28.500-45.000 € 9.2 4.3 14.9 5.0 
45.000-68.000 € 9.8 4.7 13.6 5.3 
>68.000 € 10.5 5.0 12.6 5.2 
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Appendix 4A: Percentage of respondents ranking measures and revenue use as 
‘unacceptable’ or ‘very unacceptable’  
 












































Improve public transport 
Abandon existing car taxation 
Lower fuel taxes 









Appendix 4B: Mean of acceptance scores on each type of revenue use for four 











General budget 2.27 2.11 2.11 2.09 
New roads 4.97 5.11 5.26 5.62 
Improve public transport 4.08 3.88 4.11 3.86 
Abandon existing car 
taxation 
5.84 5.77 5.97 5.79 
Lower fuel taxes 5.66 5.57 5.67 5.36 
Lower income taxes 4.22 3.85 3.75 3.50 
 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 32 (2006): 69-94 
 91
Appendix 5: Ordered probit analysis with revenue use only as a dependent 
variable 
Variable Revenue use: general budget Revenue use: new roads 



















































Income (gross yearly) 
  Income 1 (less than €28.500) 
  Income 2 (€28.500-€45.000) 




  Age1 (18-25) 
  Age2 (26-35) 
  Age3 (36-45) 
  Age4 (46-55) 
Yearly driven number of kilometers 
Comp1 (no transport costs paid by 
employer) 
Comp2 (transport costs partly 
compensated) 
Weight1 (low weight) 








































































































N  564  564  564  
Log-likelihood -795.618 ** -899.676 ** -1054.943 ** 




















Revenue use: abandon 
existing car taxation 
Revenue use: lower 
 fuel taxes 



















































Income (gross yearly) 
  Income 1 (less than €28.500) 
  Income 2 (€28.500-€45.000) 




  Age1 (18-25) 
  Age2 (26-35) 
  Age3 (36-45) 
  Age4 (46-55) 
Yearly driven number of kilometers 
Comp1 (no transport costs paid by employer) 
Comp2 (transport costs partly compensated) 
Weight1 (low weight) 







































































































N  564  564  564  
Log-likelihood -777.800 * -830.182 ** -1041.136 *** 
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Appendix 6A: Results of ordered probit analysis with the acceptance of measure 1 
as the dependent variable 






















Gross yearly income 
VOT 
Gender  (female) 
Education (Edu1 (primary school) = base) 
  Edu2 (junior general sec.) 
  Edu3 (intermediate vocational) 
  Edu4 (senior general sec.) 
  Edu5 (Bachelor) 
  Edu6 (Master) 
Loc1 (3 large cities) 
Childyes 
Age (age5 (56+) = base) 
  Age1 (18-25) 
  Age2 (26-35) 
  Age3 (36-45) 
  Age4 (46-55) 
Travel time in congestion/free flow tt 
Type of measure (measure 1D = base) 
  M1A (charge of € 1)  
  M1B (charge of € 2 during peak) 
  M1C (peak time charge) 
Number of kilometres driven yearly 
Compensation of costs by employer (full compensation = base) 
  Comp1 (no transport costs paid by employer) 
  Comp2 (transport costs partly compensated) 
Vehicle weight (Weight3 (heavy weight) = base) 
  Weight1 (low weight) 
  Weight2 (middle weight) 
General effectiveness (less congestion) (Geff1 = base) 
  Geff2 
  Geff3  
  Geff4 
  Geff5 
  Geff6 
  Geff7 
Personal effectiveness (drive less yourself) (peff1 = base) 
  Peff2 
  Peff3 
  Peff4 
  Peff5 
  Peff6 
  Peff7 
8.58 E-03 (.019) 



















































































N  564  
Log-likelihood -815.555 *** 






Notes: The standard errors are shown in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively, (two-sided t-test). 
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Appendix 6B: Results of ordered probit analysis with the acceptance of measure 2 
as the dependent variable 






















Gross yearly income 
Gender (female) 
Education (Edu1 (primary school) = base) 
  Edu2 (junior general sec.) 
  Edu3 (intermediate vocational) 
  Edu4 (senior general sec.) 
  Edu5 (Bachelor) 
  Edu6 (Baster) 
Loc1 (3 large cities) 
Childyes 
Age (Age5 (56+) = base) 
  Age1 (18-25) 
  Age2 (26-35) 
  Age3 (36-45) 
  Age4 (46-55) 
Travel time in congestion/free flow tt 
Type of measure (measure 2G = base) 
  M2A (revenues to general budget) 
  M2B (traffic system in general) 
  M2C (lower car taxes and new roads) 
  M2D (public transport) 
  M2E (abandon existing ownership tax) 
  M2F (lower existing fuel taxes) 
Number of kilometres driven yearly 
Compensation of costs by employer (full compensation = base) 
  Comp1 (no transport costs paid by employer) 
  Comp2 (transport costs partly compensated) 
Vehicle weight (Weight3 (heavy weight) = base) 
  Weight1 (low weight) 
  Weight2 (middle weight) 
VOT 
General effectiveness (less congestion) (Geff1 = base) 
  Geff2 
  Geff3  
  Geff4 
  Geff5 
  Geff6 
  Geff7 
Personal effectiveness (drive less yourself) (Peff1 = base) 
  Peff2 
  Peff3 
  Peff4 
  Peff5 
  Peff6 



























































































N  564  
Log-likelihood -935.406 *** 






Notes: The standard errors are shown in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively, (two-sided t-test). 
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Appendix 6C: Results of ordered probit analysis with the acceptance of measure 3 
as the dependent variable 






















Gross yearly income 
Gender (female) 
Education (Edu1 (primary school) = base) 
  Edu2 (junior general sec.) 
  Edu3 (intermediate vocational) 
  Edu4 (senior general sec.) 
  Edu5 (Bachelor) 
  Edu6 (Master) 
Loc1 (3 large cities) 
Childyes 
Age (Age5 (56+) = base) 
  Age1 (18-25) 
  Age2 (26-35) 
  Age3 (36-45) 
  Age4 (46-55) 
Travel time in congestion/free flow tt 
Charge level for measure 3 (2.5 €cents = base) 
  Charge=5 €cents (dummy) 
  Charge=7.5 €cents (dummy) 
Revenue use for measure 3 (unclear = base) 
  Revenue use is new roads (dummy) 
  Revenue use is abandon car taxes (dummy) 
Number of kilometres driven yearly 
Compensation of costs by employer (full compensation = base) 
  Comp1 (no transport costs paid by employer) 
  Comp2 (transport costs partly compensated) 
Vehicle weight (Weight3 (heavy weight) = base) 
  Weight1 (low weight) 
  Weight2 (middle weight) 
VOT 
General effectiveness (less congestion) (Geff1 = base) 
  Geff2 
  Geff3  
  Geff4 
  Geff5 
  Geff6 
  Geff7 
Personal effectiveness (drive less yourself) (Peff1 = base) 
  Peff2 
  Peff3 
  Peff4 
  Peff5 
  Peff6 

























































































N  564  
Log-likelihood -873.327 *** 






Notes: The standard errors are shown in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively, (two-sided t-test). 
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In February 2005, residents of Edinburgh, a medium-sized city in the United Kingdom, were given the 
opportunity to vote in a referendum on the introduction of a road user charging scheme, which had been 
in development for almost a decade. The public voted against the scheme by a ratio of 3:1 and it was 
consequently abandoned. This paper describes the evolution of the scheme, and presents results of 
research to determine the principle factors responsible for the public's overwhelming opposition to the 
scheme. The research used a postal, self-completion questionnaire that was distributed to 1300 randomly-
selected households in central and southern Edinburgh three months after the referendum. The 
questionnaire responses were analysed to assess the influence of several factors on the way respondents 
voted in the referendum. Car use was shown to be the principle determinant of voting behaviour, with car 
owners strongly opposing the scheme while non-car owners only weakly supported it. The public’s 
limited understanding of the scheme increased the strength of the opposing vote. Further, the public were 
largely unconvinced that the scheme would have achieved its dual objectives of reduced congestion and 
improved public transport. The findings suggest that more attention should have been paid to designing a 
simpler, more easily communicated, scheme and convincing residents, particularly public transport users, 
of its benefits. Some other aspects of the scheme that militated against its successful introduction are also 
briefly identified. 
 






Until 25 February 2005, the City of Edinburgh in Scotland, UK, had advanced plans 
for a congestion charging scheme. However, these plans were abandoned at that time 
due to public acceptability problems and in particular to a referendum on the issue, in 
which the public overwhelmingly rejected the proposed congestion charging scheme. 
                                                 
• Corresponding author: Simon Allen (simon.allen@ed.ac.uk) 
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This paper sets out the detail of the scheme and its development, and reports the results 
of a survey of Edinburgh residents, which was used to assess the importance of a range 
of factors that might have influenced the residents of Edinburgh to reject congestion 
charging in the referendum. The factors examined were: residents' habitual choice and 
frequency of use of transport mode; their understanding of the details of the scheme; 
and their attitudes towards congestion and the City of Edinburgh Council itself. 
 
 
Road user charging and public acceptability 
 
Road user charging (RUC) has recently emerged as a practical solution to the growing 
problem of congestion. Yet RUC is not a new concept. The theoretical advantage of 
RUC, namely improved economic efficiency via reduced traffic congestion, has been 
advocated by economists for decades (e.g. Pigou 1920, Vickrey 1955). Subsequently, 
transport planners have recognised the suitability of RUC, not only to improve 
efficiency, but also as a means to generate revenue and restrain the environmental 
degradation synonymous with congestion (e.g. Ministry of Transport 1964, May 1975). 
Yet with the notable exceptions of Singapore, Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim, Stavanger and, 
most recently, London, comprehensive RUC systems implemented at the urban level 
(otherwise known as congestion charging schemes) have failed to proceed beyond the 
planning stage. Examples of schemes that never materialised proliferate: London (some 
quarter of a century prior to the successful introduction of an alternative scheme; May 
1975), Kuala Lumpar (Jones 1998), Hong Kong (Hau 1990), the Netherlands 
(Stoelhorst and Zandbergen 1990, Emmerink et al. 1995) and several proposals in the 
United States (Jones 1998). In short, RUC is frequently discussed and debated, but 
seldom implemented. While public opposition has repeatedly inhibited the introduction 
of major RUC schemes, only in the case of the City of Edinburgh were the public given 
the opportunity to vote exclusively on the issue. The fate of Edinburgh’s congestion 
charging scheme, the best part of a decade in the making, was decided by public 
referendum in February 2005. 
It is recognised that significant institutional barriers to RUC remain in many countries 
(Glazer et al. 2001, Schade and Schlag 2003). Nevertheless, most commentators now 
acknowledge that the greatest impediment to implementation is public (and linked to 
this, political) acceptability (e.g. Jones 1998, 2003, Schade and Schlag 2003, Jaensirisak 
et al. 2005). As Gray and Begg (2001) state, ‘the likelihood of large-scale, city wide 
charging being delivered successfully depends as much on local authorities winning 
“hearts and minds” (of key stakeholders, the media and, ultimately, the public), as it 
does on producing an integrated transport strategy or overcoming any technical 
difficulties’. In a democratic society, ‘societal, political and technological innovations 
must be introduced via the democratic process and must prevail against competing 
innovations’ (Schade and Schlag 2003). As Edinburgh can now testify, RUC, like other 
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The City of Edinburgh’s proposed congestion charging scheme 
 
Transport governance in Scotland and Edinburgh 
 
The City of Edinburgh is located in the south-east of Scotland; it has a population of 
450000 and covers an area of 262 square kilometres (Marsden and May, 2004). 
Edinburgh is a unitary local authority, which is answerable directly to the devolved 
government for Scotland (the Scottish Parliament and Executive). There is no formal 
regional authority for transport since the local government reorganisation of 1996. 
However, a voluntary regional partnership, South East Scotland Transport Partnership 
(SESTRAN), exists and produces a Regional Transport Strategy. 
There are three tiers of directly elected politicians. Local politicians, serving the City 
of Edinburgh Council and (excluding European representation) two layers of national 
government with Members of the Scottish Parliament and Members of the UK 
Parliament. The City of Edinburgh Council has established an ‘arms-length’ delivery 
company (TIE Limited) that has been given responsibility for managing the 
implementation of major infrastructure schemes, integrated ticketing and congestion 
charging (Marsden and May, 2004). Decisions taken by TIE must be ratified by the City 
Council, although TIE itself is accountable to a majority private-sector board, though 
funded wholly by the Council and the Scottish Executive (devolved government). It 
should also be noted that the City of Edinburgh is surrounded by other local authorities, 
many of whose residents commute to Edinburgh for employment. 
Edinburgh has a rapidly expanding economy and is the focus of regional economic 
development. The Regional Transport Strategy states that it ‘focuses more on strategic 
links to the capital in order to improve connections to Edinburgh as it is the focus of 
jobs and services within the SESTRAN area’. In this regard, Edinburgh parallels other 
regional cities in being the focus for the economic development strategy, from which 
the surrounding areas will benefit. Because of this economic growth, traffic congestion 
caused by commuting – especially in and from the west of the city – was perceived by 
the Council to be a serious problem and one that needed to be dealt with by means of a 
congestion charging scheme. 
 
 
Details of the scheme proposed for Edinburgh 
 
The final proposal consisted of an inner and outer cordon, as shown in Figure 1. 
The system was to be operational on weekdays only, with a once-a-day charge of £2 
(maximum) for crossing one or both cordons in an inbound direction. The outer cordon 
would charge trips from 0700 to 1000, whilst the inner cordon would charge trips 
between 0700 and 1830. No residents’ discount was proposed, other than for those City 
of Edinburgh residents living outside the outer cordon. They would have been exempt 
from the outer cordon charge only. Exemptions would have been in place for people 
with mobility impairments, emergency vehicles, taxis, buses and motorbikes. 
There would have been no charge for driving wholly within one cordon or between 
cordons – this is a clear difference between the proposed Edinburgh and the successful 
London scheme. The reason for the choice of a twin cordon rather than area licence 
scheme was complex. Qualitative appraisal work carried out in 1999 found that multiple 
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cordon, screenline or area licence schemes would be more effective in traffic reduction 
terms than simple cordon schemes, but scored them low in relation to their public 
acceptability and ease of implementation. Modelling work carried out in 2001 and 2002 
considered variations on only two basic options: a city centre cordon, and a city centre 
plus outer cordon. In congestion management and traffic reduction terms the outer 
cordon had a somewhat greater predicted impact than a single inner cordon, but it was 
predicted to generate twice as much revenue (TIE, 2002). Perhaps for these reasons, as 
the plans for the scheme progressed, they were expanded to include an outer as well as a 
city centre cordon. 
 
 
Figure 1: Map of Edinburgh showing the network of major roads (grey) and the location of the proposed 
inner and outer charging cordons (black). The numbered circles show the location of charging entry 




This was also a politically expedient decision, since an area licence as in London 
would have affected many more Edinburgh residents (and therefore voters). In contrast, 
as proposed, the outer cordon would have mainly affected drivers from surrounding 
local authority areas, particularly those who commute into Edinburgh for work. 
However, this led to difficult relations with neighbouring local authorities, who 
perceived the scheme as unfairly penalising their residents, while not effectively 
controlling congestion, as Edinburgh residents could drive freely within the area 
between the inner and outer cordons without being subject to any charge. 
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Payment was to have been made at paypoints in retail outlets, by mobile phone Short 
Message Service (text messaging), on the Internet or via a telephone call centre. 
Automatic Number Plate Recognition technology (ANPR) was to have been employed 
for enforcement purposes. A vehicle whose number plate was registered on the database 
as having paid for that day would then have any record of its passing a cordon point 
immediately erased from the system. Vehicles for which there was no record of 
payment, and which crossed one or both cordons, would have had their numbers 
retained in the system and, ultimately, a penalty notice would have been issued for non-
payment. The choice of technology was influenced by considerations of cost and 
practicality and by what was to be used in London. The biggest challenge for the system 
would have been to keep operating costs to around £0.67 per charge payer, thus 
retaining around 66% of the charge to spend on transport improvements. This contrasts 
with an operating cost of £2.67 per £5.00 charge in London. At the time of the 
referendum, the actual cost of operating the Edinburgh scheme had not been confirmed. 
 
 
The predicted effects of the congestion charging scheme on traffic and transport 
 
Traffic modelling forecast the following benefits, by 2011, compared with the do-
nothing situation (TIE, 2002): 
 
• A 21% reduction in city centre traffic delays. 
• A 9% reduction in traffic delays city-wide. 
• A 30% reduction in vehicles entering the city centre on a typical weekday, and 
an 8% reduction across the outer cordon. 
• Increases of 22% and 8% in numbers of people entering the city centre and the 
city as a whole (respectively) by public transport on a typical weekday. 
 
Over the modelled 20 year life of the scheme, it was predicted that it would raise £706 
million at 2002 prices. The significant additional transport improvements that were 
forecast to be funded from this revenue included: 
 
• Around £200 million for additional bus services. 
• £154 million for a tram line to southeast Edinburgh. 
• £111 million for additional road maintenance. 
• £147 million for regional rail improvements. 
• £17 million for additional accessible transport. 
• £24 million for road safety projects. 
 
It is a possible criticism of the scheme that, at the time of the referendum, plans for 
these schemes were not well-developed and therefore quite difficult to “sell” to the 
public. In particular, there was some doubt over the level of bus service that could be 
secured for the amount available. 
A further issue that generated criticism was the nature of the projects that were to be 
put in place before the congestion charging scheme was due to start, that is, prior to 
April 2006. Such projects were required in order to satisfy the Scottish Executive’s 
policy guidance that a range of public transport improvements should be in place before 
charging was introduced. Between 2002 and 2006, the City Council has, or will have, 
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spent £100 million on projects in an attempt to meet this requirement. These included a 
new bus station, three new rail stations and a cross-city rail service, real-time bus 
information, a short section of guided busway, four park and ride sites, and extensive 
bus priority on most radial road corridors. Critically, however, it was not possible for 
the City Council to fund additional bus services prior to the introduction of congestion 
charging, since (without congestion charging) it is dependent on the Scottish Executive 
for transport funding. For macro-economic reasons, most additional funding for 
transport from the Scottish Executive has been in the form of capital money, for 
infrastructure investment, and not revenue for the subsidy of additional services. 
Therefore, the Council was necessarily limited in what it could do to put public 
transport improvements in place prior to the introduction of congestion charging, and 
was open to criticisms from many residents that the £100 million of improvements were 
of little use to them, because they were, in many cases, geographically specific. Had 
revenue funding been available, the Council could have improved bus services on an 
area-wide basis (as was the case prior to the introduction of congestion charging in 




Public consultation and referendum 
 
Although the Transport (Scotland) Act 2001 introduced legislation which permitted 
local authorities to impose congestion charging on public roads, the City of Edinburgh 
Council (and its predecessor Lothian Regional Council) had already been contemplating 
such a scheme for several years (Begg et al. 2004). A New Transport Initiative (NTI), 
and later an Integrated Transport Initiative (ITI) sought to refine the abstract concept of 
congestion charging into a more definite proposal. Between 1999 and 2003, five phases 
of public consultation were undertaken (by the Council and, latterly, TIE Limited) to 
determine the acceptability of the proposals. 
Phase IV (2002) was the most comprehensive of the consultation phases, with 240000 
leaflets distributed through a variety of media to residents of south-east Scotland. 
Residents were asked whether they supported or opposed three different scenarios: a 
single cordon congestion charging scheme, a double cordon scheme, or no charging. 
Just 34% of Edinburgh residents supported the proposed double cordon scheme. 
Nevertheless, with slight modifications, the Council opted to proceed with this option, 
‘due to this design’s ability to influence city-wide congestion levels and to fund region-
wide traffic improvements’ (PRoGRESS 2004). By phase V (2003), support amongst 
Edinburgh residents for the proposed double cordon scheme had increased very slightly 
to 36%. Following a Public Inquiry, the scheme was finalised and proceeded to a public 
referendum. 
It is interesting to ask why a public referendum was held in Edinburgh, after the 
successful introduction of congestion charging in London (February 2003) without a 
public referendum. Despite interviewing the key actors involved, it has proved 
impossible to obtain a clear answer to this question. Upon granting ‘Approval in 
Principle’ for the City of Edinburgh Council’s congestion charging proposal, the 
Scottish Executive stated: ‘At the Approval in Detail stage, you should be able to 
demonstrate clear public support for the scheme’ (Scottish Executive, 2002). However, 
the Council had, at its meeting on 17 October 2002, already taken the decision that 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 32 (2006): 95-113 
 101
‘clear public support’ could be demonstrated by means of a referendum (CEC, 2002). 
Rye et al. (2005) therefore suggest that the decision to hold a referendum was not 
necessarily a response to the Scottish Executive’s stated requirement. Rather, they 
suggest that the decision was in response to the press and public criticism that the 
Council had received in relation to the consultation exercises undertaken during 2002. 
Saunders (2005) was more explicit: ‘the referendum was not necessary… it was a 
political decision taken to diffuse opposition [to the scheme] as a local election issue in 
2003’. 
The public referendum was conducted by post in February 2005. Edinburgh residents 
(only those on the edited electoral register or those that had otherwise registered to vote) 
were asked to vote on the Council’s ‘preferred’ strategy: congestion charging and 
increased transport investment funded by the revenue raised by congestion charging. 
The participation in the vote was 179905 residents, a turnout of 61.8% of those 
registered. There were 133678 votes against and 45965 in favour. This represented a 
74.4% public rejection of the proposal. Consequently, the proposed scheme, and indeed 
the entire concept of congestion charging in Edinburgh, was abandoned and instead a 
‘base’ investment package has been adopted. A new Local Transport Strategy, without 





A questionnaire was designed for completion by residents of Edinburgh to investigate 
their voting behaviour in the referendum on the congestion charging proposals. The 
questionnaire consisted of 21 questions designed to elicit information on the residents' 
use of transport modes, most frequent journey, voting behaviour in the referendum, 
understanding of and attitude towards the congestion charging scheme, and 
demographic details. All questions were multiple choice, with the exception of one 
question inviting further comments from respondents. 
For practical reasons, and to ensure a sufficient spatial density in the data collected, an 
analysis of the entire city was rejected in favour of a specific study area from within the 
city boundaries. The study area consisted of a transect from central to south Edinburgh 
(six adjacent city electoral districts each with a population of around 7000) specifically 
selected as being representative of the demography and transport provision of the city as 
a whole. In May 2005, the questionnaire was sent by post to 1300 residents in the study 
area, randomly selected from the unedited electoral register (thus including potential 
voters, registered to vote in the referendum or otherwise). A response rate of 25.8% was 
achieved, with 336 residents returning useable responses in the reply-paid envelopes 
provided. Proportionally fewer responses were received from two lower income areas, a 
problem countered by making house-to-house calls to elicit further responses. The final 
dataset comprised 368 completed questionnaires. 
The representativeness of the sample was checked by comparison with census data for 
Edinburgh (CEC, 2001). The sample included an approximately equal number of males 
and females, consistent with the census data. Similarly, the age distribution of the 
sample was comparable with the census data. However, as regards housing tenure, 
outright owners were over-represented, with a subsequent under-representation of those 
residing in social rented housing. This misrepresentation was primarily due to 
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differential response rates. In addition, 79.3% of respondents owned or shared a car or 
van, an over-representation in comparison to Edinburgh as a whole, as shown by a 
survey average of 1.27 cars per household, somewhat higher than the 0.81 cars per 
household for the entire city (CEC, 2001). 
 
 
Results and discussion 
 
The influence of transport mode and frequency of use on voting behaviour 
 
Table 1: The influence of car ownership on turnout and non-participation of respondents in the Edinburgh 
congestion charging referendum. 
Car ownership         Turnout Chose not to vote Not registered to vote 
Own or share a car or van 81.6% 10.1% 8.3% 
Do not own or share a car or van 67.6% 17.6% 14.9% 
 
 
The simplest means of defining car availability is whether the respondent owns or 
shares a car or van (this will henceforth be referred to simply as car ownership). Table 1 
shows that more than 80% of car-owning respondents participated in the referendum. 
This is a substantially higher turnout than was witnessed amongst non-car-owning 
respondents, nearly a third of whom failed to use their vote. Clearly the motivation to 
vote in the referendum was greater amongst car owners. 
 
Table 2: Influence of car ownership on the proportion of respondents voting for and against congestion 
charging in the Edinburgh referendum. 
Car ownership       Voted for     Voted against 
Own or share a car or van 24.7% 75.3% 
Do not own or share a car or van 64% 36% 
 
The disparity in turnout between car owners and non-car owners would only have 
been important to the referendum result if there was also a disparity in the voting 
behaviour of the two groups. Table 2 shows that there was an enormous difference in 
the voting behaviour of respondents according to car ownership. Car owners were 
overwhelmingly opposed to the proposal, whereas non-car owners registered net 
support. Moreover, there was an inequality in the strength of these voting preferences: 
 
• For every 1 car owner supportive of the proposal, 3.05 were opposed; 
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Figure 2: Graphs showing the voting behaviour of respondents in the Edinburgh congestion charging 
referendum by their frequency of use of each of the major transport modes. The outputs of chi squared 
statistical tests of significance are shown beside the title of each graph. Graphs of the voting behaviour of 
respondents using motorcycle, train or taxi are not included due to insufficient respondents using these 
modes. 
 
In short, not only were car owners more likely to vote, their opposition to the proposal 
was far stronger than the support offered by non-car owners. 
Voting tendencies, by frequency of use for each of the major transport modes in 
Edinburgh, are shown in Figure 2. The pattern of voting behaviour of car-driving 
respondents shows a strong and highly significant (p < 0.01) variation with frequency of 
car use. Frequency of car use may be regarded as a measure of a respondent’s reliance 
upon the car. Figure 2 strongly suggests that the greater the reliance on car driving, the 
greater the opposition to congestion charging, and the greater the voter turnout. 
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Considering only those most reliant on the car, namely daily car users living in a 
household with two or more cars (25.7% of the entire sample), then a turnout of 87.1% 
was found, with seven times as many respondents voting against charging as voting for. 
Regular car passengers were slightly more opposed (p < 0.05) to congestion charging, 
as drivers were themselves. 
Figure 2 shows a highly statistically significant (p < 0.01) pattern of voting behaviour 
of respondents with frequency of bicycle use, the pattern being the opposite of that 
found for car drivers. Daily cyclists were strongly supportive of congestion charging, 
although weekly cyclists were equivocal and occasional cyclists showed net opposition. 
Opinion among regular bus users was equivocal verging on opposed (p < 0.01). Indeed, 
just 31.9% of daily bus users, perhaps the group likely to benefit most from congestion 
charging, supported the proposal. Almost as many, 29.8%, failed to vote at all. Even 
restricting consideration to those daily bus users who were not car owners, only 34.6% 
voted in favour, fewer than the number that didn’t use their vote. 
Whereas the lack of support amongst car users is to be expected, the net opposition 
amongst bus users was really surprising. It would appear that bus users did not perceive 
the referendum to be relevant to them. Turnout was relatively low amongst bus-using 
respondents, perhaps because they did not understand or believe in the benefits that 
congestion charging and the associated public transport improvements could bring to 
them. The socioeconomic profile of the bus users probably also tended to produce the 
lower turnout compared to car users. However, despite a significant financial outlay, it 
seems that the Council may have failed to effectively communicate the significance of 
the referendum vote to bus users. More importantly, of those bus users that did vote, 
support was far from guaranteed. The proposal even failed to convince non-car owning, 
daily bus users. In the case of bus users, a natural opposition to increased costs cannot 
be used to explain the significant levels of opposition. There must have been 
considerable reservations with the proposal, and perhaps some scepticism that the 
promised reduction in congestion and improvements in public transport provision would 
actually be achieved. 
 
 
The influence of public understanding of the proposed scheme on voting behaviour 
 
The study tested the public’s understanding of two aspects of the proposed congestion 
charging scheme: 
 
• The level of the charge 
• The applicability of the charge to each respondent’s most frequent journey. 




























Figure 3: Percentage frequency distribution of respondents' responses to the question: 'If the congestion 
charging scheme had been introduced, what would the maximum daily charge have been?'. Depends 
refers to: ‘Depends on whether you entered a charging area more than once’. 
 
 
If the scheme had been introduced, the congestion charge would have been set at £2. 
This represented a maximum amount chargeable per day, regardless of how many times 
either cordon was crossed. Respondents were asked: 'If the congestion charging scheme 
had been introduced, what would the maximum daily charge have been?'. Figure 3 
shows the percentage frequency distribution of responses to this question. The peak at 
£2 is immediately obvious. However, this represents less than half (47.8%) of 
respondents who correctly stated the charge at £2. Interestingly, 13.9% of respondents 
thought the charge would have been less than £2. It is conceivable that a small 
proportion of this figure consists of respondents who misread the question as ‘what 
would you like the maximum daily charge to have been’. Naturally, for most people this 
would have been as low as possible. 
A greater proportion, 20.2%, thought the charge would have been more than £2. This 
may have resulted from confusion with the Central London scheme. Indeed, in the run-
up to Edinburgh’s referendum, it was announced that the London charge was set to 
increase from £5 to £8. This served to nourish a belief that Edinburgh’s charge would 
rise (‘unfairly’) too, despite a commitment to only increase it by the ‘percentage uplift 
in accord with changes in the retail price index’ (Begg et al. 2004). 
Perhaps the greatest individual misconception uncovered by Figure 3 is the belief held 
by 18.2% of respondents that the maximum daily charge was dependent on whether a 
charging area was entered more than once. This suggests that they perceived the charge 
to be applicable an unlimited number of times per day. In the light of this 
misconception, it is unsurprising that these residents opposed the scheme by a ratio of 
3.5:1. 
 
Table 3: The influence of correctness of understanding of the level of the daily congestion charge on the 
voting behaviour of respondents in the Edinburgh referendum. The difference in the voting behaviour 
between the two groups was not statistically significant. 
Understanding of the level of the charge            Voted for     Voted against 
Charge correctly identified as £2 35.0% 65.0% 
Charge incorrectly identified 28.5% 71.5% 
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Table 3 shows the impact of misperceptions regarding the level of the charge on the 
voting behaviour of respondents. It is evident that those with a misconception over the 
level of the charge were slightly more opposed to the scheme than those with an 
accurate understanding. Nevertheless, opposition was still substantial amongst those 
respondents aware that the charge would have been £2. Misperceptions regarding the 
level of charge were therefore not the sole reason for the public rejection of the 
proposal. It was however, one of a number of contributory factors that served to 



























Figure 4: Percentages of respondents believing that they would or would not have been charged for their 
most frequent journey under the Edinburgh congestion charging scheme ('Perception') compared to the 
actual percentages of respondents that would or would not have been charged ('Reality'). 
 
 
Respondents were asked to provide details of their most frequent journey. They were 
then asked whether they thought the proposed charge would be applicable to their 
journey, if they used a car to make that journey. Using a route planner and an accurate 
knowledge of the scheme, each respondent's perception of the applicability of the 
charge to their most frequent journey was checked against reality. Figure 4 shows the 
comparison between the respondents' perception and reality. Just over a third (34.9%) of 
respondents would have been liable to pay the charge, if they used a car for their most 
frequent journey. Yet substantially more residents thought they were liable to have been 
charged than was actually the case. While few respondents (6%) were unaware that they 
were liable to be charged, 20.2% of respondents wrongly thought they would have been 
charged for their journey. The respondents' misconception therefore tended to 
exaggerate the applicability of the charge beyond what was actually the case. 
Very few respondents made their journey outside of charging hours, so imperfect 
knowledge of this feature of the scheme cannot account for the widely held 
misperceptions over the applicability of the charge. It seems likely that the single 
greatest source of confusion regarding the applicability of the charge was a 
misconception that the cordons were operational in both directions. There was a widely 
held belief that journeys crossing either the inner or outer cordon in an outbound 
direction would be subject to a charge. Of those respondents whose journey quite 
obviously crossed the outer cordon in an outbound direction (i.e. those travelling to a 
non-Edinburgh postcode), 37% wrongly thought that they would be charged. 
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Table 4: The influence of correctness of understanding of the applicability of the congestion charge to 
each respondent's most frequent journey on their voting behaviour in the Edinburgh referendum. The 
difference in voting behaviour between the two groups is statistically significant (χ2 = 4.432; df=1; 
p<0.05). 
Understanding of applicability of charge Voted for Voted against 
Correct 36.0% 64.0% 
Incorrect 22.1% 77.9% 
 
Table 4 shows the effect that the misperception of the applicability of the charge had 
on respondents' voting behaviour in the referendum. The strength of opposition was 
significantly (p < 0.05) greater amongst those respondents with an incorrect 
understanding of the applicability of the charge. Indeed, if we consider for a moment 
only those that thought they would have been charged, when in fact they wouldn’t, 
opposition increases to 80.8%. The divergence in voting behaviour between the 
respondents with a correct understanding and those with an incorrect understanding was 
greater in Table 4 than is evident in Table 3. This suggests misconceptions over the 
applicability of the charge had a greater effect on the referendum result than those 
concerning the level of the charge. However, net opposition to the scheme is apparent 
regardless of the understanding of the applicability of the charge. This again suggests 
that this misconception was a contributory, rather than the fundamental, factor in the 
public rejection of congestion charging. 
It seems logical that the greatest source of confusion was the scheme itself. The 
Edinburgh proposal, with its double cordon, inbound only charging system, with 
exemptions for ‘outer Edinburgh residents’ (but only for the outer cordon), was simply 
too complex for the public to grasp. There were of course technical justifications for the 
complexity of the proposal. What is more, the Public Inquiry found in favour of 
retaining the vast majority of the scheme details (Begg et al. 2004). Yet, despite the 
decision to hold a referendum on the introduction of the scheme, there appeared to be 
insufficient consideration of the impact of the complexity on how people would vote. If 
anything, the scheme became more complicated and confusing as the referendum 
approached, as the Council made desperate final concessions (e.g. proposing one hour’s 
free city centre parking for those who had paid the charge) in an attempt to gain greater 
support. A simpler scheme may not have so effectively fulfilled the dual objectives of 
reduced congestion and revenue generation. Yet it almost certainly would have 
produced greater public support, by avoiding opposing votes from residents who 
erroneously believed that they would be subject to the charge. 
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The influence of public attitudes to congestion and to the City of Edinburgh Council on 
voting behaviour 
 

























Figure 5: Percentage frequency distribution of respondents' level of agreement with the statement: 
'Congestion is a problem in Edinburgh'. 
 
It is interesting to consider whether the Edinburgh public’s perception of the level of 
congestion in the city matched that of the Council’s, who considered it serious enough 
to propose congestion charging. Respondents were asked their level of agreement with 
the statement: ‘congestion is a problem in Edinburgh’. The percentage frequency 
distribution of responses by level of agreement is shown in Figure 5. A large majority 
(74.7%) of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that congestion is a problem in 
Edinburgh. Unsurprisingly, those who voted in favour of the congestion charging 
scheme were strongly in agreement that congestion is a problem. Of greater 
significance, those who were opposed to the proposal actually still tended to agree that 
congestion is a problem. 
 
"If congestion charging had been introduced, it would




























Figure 6: Percentage frequency distribution of respondents' level of agreement with the statement: 'If 
congestion charging had been introduced, it would have significantly reduced congestion in Edinburgh'. 
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The questionnaire included questions to assess whether the respondents were 
convinced that the proposal would be able to achieve its two principle aims: to reduce 
congestion; and to improve public transport, using the revenue generated (CEC 2004a). 
Figure 6 shows that considerably fewer than half (37.4%) of the respondents expressed 
confidence that the scheme would have significantly reduced congestion. 
A common criticism of the scheme was that many drivers would simply have altered 
their route, in order to avoid crossing the inner cordon, the effect being merely to 
displace rather than reduce congestion. Thus there was a perception that the scheme 
would have failed to reduce congestion between the two cordons (i.e. in the suburbs). 
Although proponents may argue that the outer cordon would have reduced the total 
number of vehicles entering the city, the fact remains that if Edinburgh residents had 
wanted to make a trip entirely between the cordons, there would have been no charge 
payable to discourage them from using their cars. Of course, charging for such journeys 
would have been likely to reduce public acceptability even further. Nevertheless, the 
perception that congestion levels were unlikely to improve outside of the city centre was 
a major constraint to the perceived effectiveness of the proposal. 
 
"If congestion charging had been introduced, it would





























Figure 7: Percentage frequency distribution of respondents' level of agreement with the statement: 'If 
congestion charging had been introduced, it would have led to a big improvement in public transport'. 
 
 
Apparently unconvinced by the effectiveness of charging to reduce congestion,  
Figure 7 shows that respondents were equally sceptical of any improvements in public 
transport that the scheme may have induced. Despite a great deal of uncertainty, it is 
apparent that an overall majority of respondents disagreed with the statement that 
congestion charging 'would have led to a big improvement in public transport'. Indeed, 
just 28.9% of residents agreed with the statement. A number of factors may account for 
this high degree of scepticism. Firstly, 56.3% of residents already considered public 
transport to be ‘a good standard’. This would perhaps imply that a ‘big improvement’ 
would not be possible. While this argument would seem to infer that the Council was a 
victim of its own success, a more realistic explanation relates to the issue of trust. Just 
14.4% of respondents agreed that ‘the Council’s transport policy in the last ten years has 
been successful’. Similarly, only 16.8% agreed that ‘the Council can be trusted to 
improve the welfare of Edinburgh residents’. The negativity expressed towards the 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 32 (2006): 95-113 
 110
Council’s preceding transport policies (apparently despite a positive perception of 
public transport) would be unlikely to induce much confidence that substantial 
improvements would be forthcoming. This was not helped by the ill-defined nature of 
the proposed public transport improvements; Saunders (2005) accepted that many of the 
proposals were ‘vague and non-specific’. 
To assess the effect of respondents' perceptions of the effectiveness of the scheme on 
voting behaviour, they were divided into three groups, namely those who stated that the 
scheme would: 
 
• Reduce congestion and improve public transport (achieve both objectives); 
• Reduce congestion or improve public transport (achieve one objective); 














Number of objectives that respondents felt

















Figure 8: The voting behaviour of respondents grouped according to the number of objectives they felt 
the Edinburgh congestion charging scheme would have achieved. 
 
 
Figure 8 shows the voting behaviour of respondents falling into each of these groups. 
It is interesting to note that net opposition was only witnessed amongst respondents who 
stated that the scheme would achieve neither of its main objectives. Amongst 
respondents who expressed confidence that the scheme would achieve one objective, 
but fail in the other, support for the proposal outweighed opposition by a ratio of around 
1.7:1. This would suggest that, to have gained over 50% support in the referendum, it 
was not necessary to propose a perfect scheme. It was merely necessary to present one 





This paper has described the design and development of the proposed Edinburgh 
congestion charging scheme, noting several aspects which militated against its eventual 
introduction. There was no single implementing agency for the scheme. It was very 
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much dependent on the Scottish Executive for funding, and the bus and rail operators to 
undertake to improve public transport services prior to the introduction of the scheme. 
In addition, the delivery of public transport improvements outside the City of Edinburgh 
was dependent on neighbouring authorities, many of whom were hostile to the 
congestion charging scheme. The perception of surrounding local authorities was that 
the scheme (especially the outer cordon) was set up in such a way so as to charge their 
residents, whilst allowing City of Edinburgh residents to drive without paying, even 
though both groups could be seen to be contributing to congestion. Many people viewed 
the scheme as aimed only at revenue raising; moreover, they did not trust the Council to 
spend the revenue correctly. Further barriers to the implementation of the scheme, 
mainly related to local political issues, inadequate resourcing of the planning phase and 
complexity of the legislative framework are detailed by Rye (2005). 
A lack of public acceptability has been widely acknowledged as the single greatest 
barrier to the implementation of road user charging (e.g. Jones 1998, 2003, Schade and 
Schlag 2003, Jaensirisak et al. 2005). This paper has presented the results of research to 
evaluate the importance of a number of factors that contributed to the lack of 
acceptability of the proposed scheme in Edinburgh, which ultimately manifested itself 
in the public's rejection of the scheme in the referendum. 
The principal determinant of voting behaviour was car use. In short, and with 
exceptions, car owners opposed the scheme while non-car owners supported it. Car 
owners did not appear to recognise, nor appreciate, the potential benefits that congestion 
charging may have brought about. While reduced congestion and improved alternatives 
to the car were abstract possibilities, the prospect of being charged was very much more 
tangible. Indeed, not only was it tangible, but it was perceived to be more costly, and 
more frequently applied than would actually have been the case. Only a small minority 
of car owners were willing to embrace the concept of charging. Yet critically, support 
amongst public transport users was not nearly as reliable, or as enthusiastic, as the 
opposition of motorists. 
While natural opposition to an increase in the cost of car travel was fundamental to 
the public’s rejection of the proposal, opposition was clearly exacerbated by the 
limitations of the scheme. It was clear that it was too complicated to be understood, 
never mind supported, by a majority of the public. Although the public accepted that 
congestion was a significant and growing problem, they were unconvinced that the 
proposal represented an effective means of combating it. Indeed, the planned public 
transport improvements were perceived by many as arriving too late; and by others as 
insufficient, irrelevant, or ill-defined. The importance of this last point is rather 
compounded by an apparent widespread distrust of the Council. Considering that a 
referendum was ultimately held, the scheme should perhaps have been designed with a 
greater consideration for public acceptability. Strong public opposition to a double 
cordon scheme was evident as early as 2002. 
This study suggests some lessons for other cities considering the introduction of RUC 
as a means to solve the problem of traffic congestion. Firstly, the design of schemes 
should avoid unnecessary complexity. The findings of this study clearly show that in the 
Edinburgh case the strength of the negative vote was enhanced by residents' 
misunderstanding of the scheme, causing a substantial number to believe that the daily 
charge would be both higher, and applied more frequently, than in reality. These 
individuals might conceivably have voted for the scheme if they had understood the 
details clearly. Secondly, while the strong opposition arising from the narrow economic 
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self-interest of motorists is unsurprising, the weakness in support for the scheme from 
bus users who stood to gain from the public transport improvements that would have 
been funded by congestion charging was unexpected. This appears to have arisen from 
apathy, a lack of belief in the success of the proposed public transport improvements 
and a lack of trust in the City of Edinburgh Council. This suggests that the promoters of 
RUC need to engage strongly with public transport users using participative 
consultation processes to build ownership and trust, and show the flexibility and 
willingness to incorporate the outcomes of these processes into the final proposal. 
Furthermore, effective strategies should be developed to actively communicate the 
benefits of congestion charging to public transport users, building stronger support 
amongst a constituency that ought to be favourable, and thereby counterbalancing the 
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In this paper, we assess the potential impacts of different airport charges schemes that can be applied in 
Madrid Barajas airport. We use a model that has already been applied in the literature to calculate the 
social welfare of the different price regimes. The term social welfare refers to the social welfare generated 
from only aeronautical services, while the social welfare created from non-aeronautical activities will not 
be discussed here. We define, as is common in the literature, that the social welfare is the sum of 
consumer surplus and producer surplus. We analyze the potential impact of different pricing policies 
using the values obtained on social welfare, and using the concept of ‘potential loss of social welfare’ 
when the lack of adequate capacity preclude the potential demand from using the airport. Thus, we 
evaluate the “losses” or “gains” of each alternative pricing policy. Our results may contribute to the on-
going debate in Madrid and around Europe about the merits of adjusting airport charges to different 
scenarios, e.g. congestion or lack of capacity or excess of capacity, in which airports are usually involved. 
 





Barajas airport is the principal gateway of the Spanish airport system. In 2003 it 
moved a total of 35 million passengers, and accounted for 27% of air traffic between the 
EU and South America. Some analysts have foreseen that future air deregulation in 
Europe, the United States of America and Asia will continue to put pressure on the 
Spanish airport system. In the face of this situation, the government has given high 
priority to airport infrastructure expansion plans. The capacity expansion programme 
for Barajas airport will change the present capacity of 80 air traffic movements per hour 
up to 120 air traffic movements in two different phases. The first one will increase the 
capacity up to 100 movements and it is expected to be finished at the beginning of 
winter 2005,  the second one will definitely increase the capacity up to 120 movements 
and new aircraft could land and take-off at the beginning from the winter 2006. At the 
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opening of the new facilities, Barajas airport will have a design capacity of 80 million 
passengers per year with four runways and four passengers’ terminal buildings. 
A brief characterization of the air traffic at Madrid airport would read as follows: 
strong domestic linkages with simultaneous concentration of passenger volume on the 
main routes, primarily the routes to and from Barcelona, and other domestic routes to 
some industrial or tourist cities of Spain being Iberia the principal incumbent airline; 
strong European Union traffic less concentrated than the domestic one but with 
important linkages with the principal capital cities of Europe, in which Iberia share its 
incumbent role with other former flag carriers such as British Airways, TAP, KLM and 
Air France; and finally the densest intercontinental traffic is highly specialized in the 
trans-Atlantic routes to the United States and Latin America, with  Iberia again the 
principal incumbent airline in this market. It is against this background that the airport 
authorities of Spain (AENA) have planned the most ambitious expansion programme 
that would allow the airport to double its present capacity. 
In this paper, we study the impacts of slot allocation and slot pricing. We study these 
issues applying a model that has already been used in the literature (Starkie (1998), and 
Zhang and Zhang (1997)). We define, as is common in the literature, that social welfare 
is the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus, government revenue and externalities, 
and we analyze the potential impact of different pricing policies using the values 
obtained on social welfare, and using the concept of ‘potential loss or gains of social 
welfare’ developed by Lu and Pagliari (2004) when the lack of adequate capacity 
preclude the potential demand from using the airport.  
We compare distinct pricing policies, such as the optimal airport charge (“first best 
prices”), “second best prices” in which the financial constraint of cost recovery is 
considered for each period, and the “market clearing prices”, in which airport capacity 
is used at its maximum levels, and actual prices. Our results should contribute to the on-
going debate in Madrid and around Europe about the merits of adjusting airport charges 
to each situation in which airports may be involved. 
 
 
Slot allocation and pricing 
 
Insufficient runway capacity cause major airports delay problems around the world. 
Disequilibrium between capacity and demand has been explained by failure to properly 
price runway use. Charges at most airports are proportional to aircraft weight and 
invariant with respect to time of day. This practice disincentives airlines to consolidate 
traffic onto large planes, and also ignores the loss in capacity that comes from the 
greater in-trail separation requirements and slower approach speeds of small aircraft.  
Airport slot allocation is necessary when demand for airport’s services exceeds its 
capacity. This may be resolved in different manners, through congestion causing 
important economic inefficiencies, or through more efficient mechanisms to allocate the 
scarce capacity, such as slot auctions. Slot allocation issues have been discussed greatly 
in the literature, while these issues are really important it is necessary to take into 
account the strong links that exist between slot allocation and slot pricing mechanisms. 
Many airports have been privatised and subsequently disposed to regulation to avoid the 
exertion of monopoly power. Price regulation restrains the levels of prices an airport 
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may charge, and for this reason it may not be possible to rely entirely on price 
mechanisms to ration the airport capacity. 
Levine (1969) argues that pricing is a better means of allocating scarce airport 
capacity than other mechanisms being considered at the time, such as slot allocation. 
Carlin and Park (1970) estimated the marginal delay costs at various airports, 
concluding that in many cases these exceed actual charges by a factor of 10. Morrison 
(1983) computed optimal landing charges and investment levels at several US airports, 
finding similar disparities between actual charges and short-run marginal costs, but 
somewhat smaller ones when long-run marginal costs (which assume optimal runway 
capacity) are considered. 
Doganis (1991) examines the impacts of peak pricing at London Heathrow Airport on 
airline schedules, finding that changes in the time period when peak charges were in 
effect resulted in the anticipated shift in flight schedule. Barret et al. (1994) considers 
the effect of a hypothetical peak-period pricing scheme –in which all capacity-related 
airline costs are allocated to peak period operations- on airline schedules for Boston’s 
Logan Airport. They argue that effects on jet airline schedules would be negligible 
because the cost differences would be less than $1.00 per passenger. Commuter flights, 
on the other hand, would face substantial increases in cost per passenger during peak 
periods, which would in some cases lead to flight cancellations. Altogether, they 
estimate that the proposed pricing scheme would decrease peak period flights by 7 
percent but peak period seats by only 3 percent. Daniel (1995), focusing on hub airports 
where flight schedules of arrivals and departures are more complex, proposes a 
bottleneck model (as originally proposed by Vickrey (1969)) in which airlines trade 
delay against the cost of scheduling flights away from peak times. The model assumes 
that, in the absence of differential pricing, the sum of delay and schedule deviation cost 
is equal throughout the peak. Adding a fee that reflects external congestion costs (as 
estimated using a stochastic queuing model with time-dependent demand) induces a 
more even schedule and a 50 percent reduction in delays. Hansen (2002) analyzed 
runway delay externalities at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) using a 
deterministic queuing model. The model estimates the delay impact of each specific 
arriving flight on each other specific arriving flight. He found that, despite being only 
moderately congested (average queuing delay only 4 min per arriving flight), individual 
flights can generate as much as 3 aircraft-hours of external delay impact on other 
flights, with an average impact of 26 aircraft-minutes and 3400 seat-minutes. About 90 
percent of this impact is external to the airline as well as the flight, a consequence of the 
lack of a dominant airline at LAX. He also compared the delay impact of each 
individual flight to its contribution to schedule convenience by determining the amount 
of ‘‘schedule delay’’ that would result if the flight were eliminated and its passengers 
forced to use the previous flight flown by the same airline from the same origin, finding 
that a number of commuter flights serving high density, short-haul segments generate 
much more queuing delay than they save in schedule delay, with the ratio exceeding 10 
in several cases. Thus, he argued that social welfare would increase if such flights were 
eliminated, upsizing others as necessary to accommodate the displaced loads. 
It is relevant to mention that current slot allocation schemes are really controversial, 
and airport charges that cleared the market for landing slots are frequently invoked as a 
better mechanism to promote more efficient outcomes. 
However this issue is not exempt from criticisms, because it is not necessarily true 
that airport operators are the best option to reap the scarcity rents, and other important 
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facts are not analyzed in this context, such as, congestion externalities and revenue 
complementarities for non-aeronautical activities. 
 
 
Madrid Barajas airport 
 
This section discusses recent traffic trends at Madrid Barajas International Airport 
(MAD) and their implications both for the role that slot pricing could have played in the 
year 2004 and the potential for changes in social welfare due to different price policies 
or scenarios. The section first addresses the overall trends in traffic by type of carrier, 
then it examines three specific markets in more detail (domestic markets served 
predominantly by national airlines, Iberia and Spanair, traffic in the European Union, 
and the rest of international air traffic markets). These markets have been selected for 
more detailed examination because of their importance for different types of regulation. 
The national airlines operate the smallest aircraft, and a relatively small proportion of 
the total passenger traffic at the airport is carried by large aircraft operations. Clearly, a 
significant change in average aircraft size by regional airlines could have a big impact 
on the total number of operations. Spanish domestic markets are characterized notably 
both for the high volume of traffic and the high frequency of service. At the same time, 
they are typically operated with relative small aircraft, of the order of 91 passengers per 
air traffic movement. Accommodating traffic growth in these markets through increases 
in average aircraft size would still provide frequent service while reducing the growth in 
aircraft operations, especially at certain hours of the day. Finally, there is considerable 
discussion in the industry about the future prospects for new large aircraft, with seating 
capacity greater than the current Boeing 747-400 (e.g. Franke, 2004; O’Connor, 2003). 
Such aircrafts are most likely to be deployed on very long haul international services, 
such as the trans-Atlantic markets, where stage lengths favour larger aircraft and time-
zone differences create limited time windows for efficient service, which reduces the 
frequency advantages of using smaller aircraft1. In fact, it is also important to recognise 
that a small number of global gateway cities will remain the dominant feature of this 
trans-continental market. For the year 2000, the airports in three city-regions, London, 
New York and Chicago, accounted for more than 30% of the total passenger movement 
through the trans-Atlantic market. The continued role of these big city regions will keep 
the development and management of airport infrastructure at the forefront of airport 
planning in the immediate future. However, the introduction of large capacity planes, 
like new Airbus 380, may break this observed trend. In this sense, the Spanish airport 
authority AENA considers that Madrid Barajas may play an important role in the near 
future. 
The growth in passenger traffic at MAD, since 1970, shows that all market segments 
have experienced traffic growth including international, European Union and domestic 
                                                 
1 Franke (2004) sustains that for the short and medium term future, it would seem impossible for a 
reasonable intercontinental destination portfolio to be served without a hub. To fill an Airbus 380 and 
benefit from its huge unit cost advantages, a carrier still needs to bundle demand for one destination from 
several origins. Furthermore, passengers accept transfers on intercontinental rather than continental trips. 
Since major carriers can operate intercontinental routes on a profitable basis, hubs (and thus hub-and-
spoke carriers) will remain. Nonetheless, the author also anticipates that down-sizing and reshaping of the 
hub-and-spoke landscape is probable. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 32 (2006): 114-135 
 118
traffic. Less obvious perhaps is the fact that different patterns of growth are observed 
through this period of time, for example some passenger traffic of new entrant domestic 
airlines, such as Spanair and Air Europa have also grown faster than the domestic traffic 
of the incumbent large airline Iberia. For convenience in discussion, and to conform to 
common industry terminology, the large airlines will be referred to as air carriers 
(Iberia, Air France, Spanair and Air Europa), as distinct from the regional airlines, such 
as Air Nostrum. 
As expected, the average number of passengers per air carrier and regional airline 
operation varies significantly between the different markets (domestic, European Union 
and international operations), as shown in Table 1. International operations include both 
long-haul flights to other European countries not included in the European Union and 
flights to Canada, Asia, the United States, Africa and Latin America, which typically 
use similar aircraft to those used in some European Union operations. In consequence, 
the average number of passengers per international operation lies between 140 and 200, 
and are above 200 for trans-oceanic international flights. The average number of 
passengers per operation for Madrid-Barcelona for Iberia has been 105 for the year 
2002. The average number of passengers per operation for other domestic traffic has 
shown figures between 93 for the pair Madrid-Bilbao for Iberia and 160 for the pair 
Madrid-Las Palmas for Iberia. 
 
Table 1: Average Passengers per Operation (APO) from/to Madrid (2002). 
Airline Airport APO 
Iberia New York 207 
Iberia Havana 305 
Iberia Buenos Aires 286.8 
Iberia Tenerife 194.33 
Iberia Bilbao 93.71 
Air Europa Barcelona 112.41 
Iberia London 133.38 
Iberia Paris 108.56 
Air France Paris 92.46 
Iberia Las Palmas 160.53 
Iberia Malaga 131.36 
Spanair Barcelona 92.61 
Iberia Barcelona 105.21 
Source: Martín J.C. and Betancor, O. (2004). 
 
If we examine the results for the year 2002, in terms of traffic for the ten largest 
airline markets for each type of traffic (see Tables 2-4), it can be seen that all but three 
of the largest thirteen markets, are domestic markets, connecting Madrid with 
Barcelona, Las Palmas, Bilbao, Malaga, Palma de Mallorca, Alicante and Vigo. The 
three exceptional markets are routes to important European Union markets such as Paris 
and London. Therefore, it can be seen that location in these transport market matters. 
Table 2 shows the largest domestic markets in the year 2002. It can be seen that Iberia 
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dominates most of this densest markets, and Air Europa and Spanair serve three of the 
largest domestic markets that connect Madrid with Barcelona and Palma de Mallorca. 
Another remarkable element of Table 2 is the level of importance that the domestic 
market between Madrid and Barcelona represents. In total, this route represents more 
than 25 per cent of the total domestic traffic in Spain2. 
 
Table 2: Domestic Airline Traffic and Market Share in the Largest Domestic Airline Markets from/to 
MAD. 
Airline Airport Passengers Market Share 
Iberia Tenerife 382849 2.6% 
Iberia Valencia 386820 2.6% 
Iberia Vigo 401379 2.7% 
Air Europa Palma de Mallorca 414050 2.8% 
Iberia Alicante 437884 2.9% 
Iberia Palma de Mallorca 450122 3.0% 
Iberia Bilbao 459821 3.1% 
Air Europa Barcelona 464125 3.1% 
Iberia Las Palmas 601843 4.1% 
Iberia Malaga 693033 4.7% 
Spanair Barcelona 809327 5.4% 
Iberia Barcelona 2112845 14.2% 
Source: Martín and Betancor, (2004). 
 
With respect to European Union traffic handled by the air carriers (see Table 3), two 
characteristics are of importance: first there are no secondary airports in the largest 
routes, and second Iberia is still the incumbent airline but other former flag carriers and 
new entrants, such as Virgin Express compete fiercely with it in some markets. Table 3 
also shows that the importance of these largest routes is inferior to the one observed for 
in the domestic traffic, that is the domestic traffic is more concentrated around the 
largest routes than the European Union traffic. It also seems less convincing that HSTs 
could compete in these markets in the near future. Another important feature that can be 
noted is the loss of competitive force as a consequence of the formation of the 
Oneworld alliance. Tap, Iberia and British Airways are under the development of code-
                                                 
2 The European high-speed train network is currently at a medium stage of development, with a limited 
number of mainly unconnected lines, but a number of new links are planned in order to complete an 
European high-speed train network as part of the trans-European Transport Network. One of these 
planned links is the Madrid–Barcelona–French border line, which is currently under the last phase of 
construction. In fact, the new line is nowadays operative between Madrid and Lleida. Madrid–Barcelona 
services will run at up to 350 km/h, so that travelling times between the main cities on the corridor will be 
significantly reduced. It is difficult to anticipate the effects of the opening of this new line in the modal 
split between these two important cities of Spain. The potential for high speed trains (HST) modal shift 
was first demonstrated by France's TGV, which reportedly captured as much as 90% of the Paris–Lyon 
market. In Spain, the AVE service has over 80% of the Madrid–Seville market, compared to the 33% 
share held by conventional rail in 1991 (CAA, 1998).  
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sharing agreements that can affect the consumers’ surplus in these ten largest markets in 
the European Union.  
 
Table 3: EU Airline Traffic and Market Share in the Largest EU Airline Markets from/to MAD. 
Airline Airport Passengers Market Share 
TAP Lisbon 222573 2.4% 
Virgin Express Brussels 232363 2.5% 
Air Europa Paris 236901 2.6% 
Iberia Amsterdam 275152 3.0% 
Iberia Brussels 287067 3.1% 
Iberia Lisbon 294199 3.2% 
British Airways London 333755 3.6% 
Iberia Rome 343940 3.8% 
KLM Amsterdam 344228 3.8% 
Iberia London 482173 5.3% 
Iberia Paris 513705 5.6% 
Air France Paris 526761 5.8% 
Source: Martín and Betancor, (2004). 
 
Table 4 shows that the largest international markets by far are related to the trans-
Atlantic routes to the United States or to Latin America. The same patterns observed for 
the above markets are still present, that is, Iberia is by far the incumbent airline on these 
markets and the international traffic is less concentrated in these largest routes. The 
figures that appear in Tables 2-4 are usually referred to as segment traffic. The 
distinction between market traffic and segment traffic is usually important when figures 
of connecting passengers are not negligible. Market traffic counts passengers boarding 
at some origin airport and alight at some destination airport, irrespective of how many 
stops passengers have made. In this way, it is possible to count passengers that have 
made the trip directly, or with one or more stops. Segment traffic counts passengers on 
board nonstop flights, and includes passengers who are traveling on the same flight but 
perhaps with different origin or destination. Connecting passengers traveling to/from 
MAD represent an insignificant proportion of the total of passengers for most of the 
routes except for some long distance routes in Latin America.  
In summary, a brief characterization of the air traffic at MAD would read something 
like this: strong domestic linkages with simultaneous concentration of passenger volume 
on the main routes, primarily the routes to and from Barcelona, and other domestic 
routes to some industrial or tourist cities of Spain being Iberia the principal incumbent 
airline; strong European Union traffic less concentrated than the domestic one but with 
important linkages with the principal capital cities of Europe, as the airport is highly 
congested no secondary European airports present dense routes and Iberia share its 
incumbent role with other former flag carriers such as British Airways, TAP, KLM and 
Air France; and finally the densest intercontinental traffic is highly specialized in the 
trans-Atlantic routes to the United States and Latin America being Iberia again the 
principal incumbent airline in this market. It is against this background that the Spanish 
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airport authorities (AENA) have planned the most ambitious expansion programme that 
would allow the airport to double its present capacity. 
 
Table 4: International Airline Traffic and Market Share in the Largest International Airline Markets 
from/to MAD. 
Airline Airport Passengers Market Share 
Air Europa Havana 123892 2.1% 
Continental New York 129460 2.2% 
Iberia Lima 132360 2.3% 
Iberia New York 144659 2.5% 
Iberia New York 145800 2.5% 
Iberia Miami 152079 2.6% 
Iberia Mexico 182976 3.1% 
Iberia Havana 185736 3.2% 
Aerolineas Arg. Buenos Aires 198173 3.4% 
Iberia Buenos Aires 206215 3.5% 
Source: Martín and Betancor,(2004) 
 
 
Different pricing policies at Madrid Barajas 
 
Doganis and Nuutinen (1983) classified the services provided by an airport into two 
broad categories: aeronautical and non-aeronautical activities. The revenues from 
aeronautical services mainly encompass aircraft landing, parking and passenger charges, 
while revenues from all other sources are classified as non-aeronautical. The single-till 
approach takes not only aeronautical but also non-aeronautical revenues and costs into 
account to determine the level of aeronautical charges. The corresponding asset base 
comprises all airport assets regardless of their functions and characteristics. There may 
be cross-subsidies by revenues from non-aeronautical activities to cover the deficits 
from aeronautical services if a single-till approach is adopted. In other words, 
aeronautical charges could be set at a relatively lower level because of the existence of 
such cross-subsidies.  
Conversely, the dual-till approach separates aeronautical activities from non-
aeronautical ones. It determines the level of aeronautical charges by considering 
aeronautical revenues and costs only. Consequently, the corresponding asset base 
includes aeronautical assets only. Cross-subsidies are not permitted under this 
regulatory scheme. Aeronautical charges will be set at a relatively higher level under a 
dual-till approach than under a single-till approach. 
There is a large body of literature on airport pricing and cost recovery. Useful 
references include Levine (1969), Carlin and Park (1970), Walters (1973), Morrison 
(1983, 1987), Gillen et al. (1987), Oum and Zhang (1990), Oum et al. (1996), Zhang 
and Zhang (1997), Zhang and Zhang (2001) and Zhang and Zhang (2003). 
Morrison (1983) showed that if capacity is divisible and costs are homogeneous in 
volume/capacity ratio, then social-marginal-cost pricing leads to exact cost recovery for 
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the airports. Oum and Zhang (1990) showed that if capacity is lumpy, then social-
marginal-cost pricing would not guarantee cost recovery for the airport. Zhang and 
Zhang (1997) considered the effects of concession operations by the airports in a setting 
where capacity is divisible but social costs are not homogeneous in volume/capacity 
ratio. Zhang and Zhang (2001) obtained the optimal Ramsey prices, i.e., the mark-up of 
airport charge over the social-marginal-cost as a percentage of the full price that is 
inversely related to the demand elasticity3.  
First of all, it has already been discussed that there are only two groups of airport 
services: aeronautical and non-aeronautical services, each of which has specific 
aggregate demand and cost functions, and it is not difficult to anticipate that there are 
important complementarities between both activities4. In this section, we are going to 
follow a model that has already been used in the literature (Starkie (1998), and Zhang 
and Zhang (1997)). The term social welfare refers to the social welfare generated from 
aeronautical services only, while the social welfare created from non-aeronautical 
activities will not be discussed here. We define, as is common in the literature, that the 
social welfare is the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus. We will analyze the 
potential impact of different pricing policies using the values obtained on social welfare, 
and using the concept of ‘potential loss of social welfare’ developed by Lu and Pagliari 
(2004) when the lack of adequate capacity preclude the potential demand from using the 
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Where 
• ( )iP q is the willingness to pay (or utility) of airlines using aeronautical services 
when q units of aeronautical services are consumed during hour i; 
• iP  is the price charged for a flight using aeronautical services during hour i; 
• iq  is the demand (the number of flights) for using aeronautical services when 
price is set at Pi during hour i; 
                                                 
3 The authors also considered the situation where the demand for air traffic has a positive trend in the long 
run, and showed that the average airport charge will decline as the traffic increases over time in the long 
run. However, they argued that this situation is undesirable. The reason is clear: as the demand is low and 
the airport has excess capacity, airport charges are high while as demand increases and congestion builds 
up, airport charges are low. Putting it simple, they showed that when there is an excess capacity in the 
airport, the airport charge is above the social marginal cost, which would discourage an optimal use of the 
airport. However, when demand is approaching capacity, the airport charge will be below social marginal 
costs, which would encourage additional traffic that creates economic inefficiencies. In a sense, the users 
of the under-utilized airport are subsidizing the users of the congested airport. 
4 In fact, Beesley (1999) argued that the existence of important complementarities between aeronautical 
and non-aeronautical activities at major airports provides an adequate incentive for dominant airports to 
increase their output beyond the level that one would expect from profit-maximization behaviour obtained 
only from aeronautical services.  
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• c is the unit operating costs of providing each unit of aeronautical services; 
• Ki is capacity of aeronautical services during hour i; and 
• r is the capacity costs of providing each unit of aeronautical services. 
We assume that total capacity of airport aeronautical services for the economic life is 
fixed for each hour i. It is clear that due to externality constraints, the majority of 
airports impose some capacity limitations during the night hours and for this reason 
capacity may depend on the hour i considered. If we do not regard Ki as a fixed capacity 
(e.g., when a new runway is built), unit operating costs and capacity costs, c and r, may 
not be regarded as parameters of the model. If the number of flights using aeronautical 
services during hour i is less than capacity, the airport still has to spend capacity costs, r 
times Ki, to provide (and maintain) a certain level of quantity and quality of aeronautical 
services. Capacity costs may include fixed costs to build runways, passengers’ terminal 
buildings and taxiways, their depreciation and interest costs. 
Below, we will develop alternative airport pricing schemes that are linked to different 
conceptualizations of the objectives of the aeronautical services function. First, we will 
consider the case of a publicly owned airport whose objective is to maximize social 
welfare without any financial constraint5. Second the conceptualization of the “second-
best” situation will be developed. In this case, the airport is subject to a short-run break-
even financial constraint, i.e., the airport cannot receive any subsidies of the regional 
economy or they are not allowed to exploit profits beyond reasonable returns on 
aeronautical services. So the financial break-even situation is achieved period by period. 
And finally we will also employ the concept of the ‘market-clearing price’, where the 
airport tries to reach a situation where capacity is fully utilized. Thus, the market-
clearing price is the price at which demand is equal to the level of available airport 
capacity (CAA, 2002a). Setting aeronautical price at the market-clearing level ensures 
that airport users who are willing to pay the market-clearing price will obtain access to 
aeronautical capacity6, and that all capacity will be consumed. 
We will calculate the prices for each period of time for the different alternative 
pricing schemes and compare their gains (losses) in social welfare with respect to the 
pricing policy that was applied in the year 2002 by the Spanish airport authorities of 
MAD. We will also try to anticipate if some pricing policies based on single-till or dual-
till approaches may be possible under each scenario. 
In Fig 1-3, we represent the different situations that can be obtained when we 
calculate the market-clearing prices. D is the demand curve for aeronautical services, 
the x-axis and y-axis are the output level (the number of aircraft movements) and the 
price level of aeronautical services respectively. We have obtained the charts of the 
notice of airport capacity for the different days of the week for MAD during the summer 
season of the year 2002, thus we have obtained 168 pairs (Pt, Qt) corresponding to the 
seven days of the week and the 24 hours of each day. For the majority of the hours of 
the weekdays, we have seen that the potential demand is higher than the capacity. This 
situation is shown in Fig. 1, where slots are allocated following IATA guidelines. Under 
this allocation, there is no guarantee that slots are used by those airlines that value them 
most. The lower the aeronautical price, the more scarcity will prevail and it is more 
                                                 
5 This is the well-known situation called “first-best”, where price is equal to operating marginal cost. 
6 We will see below that this ‘market-clearing price’ may imply airport-subsidies to airlines due to the 
position of the demand curve for some periods of time.  
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likely that low-slot-valuation airlines could prevent high-slot-valuation airlines from 
obtaining slots implying some potential loss of social welfare. This outcome can result 
in substantial allocative inefficiency and subsequently reduce the level of social welfare. 
An efficient allocation of airport resources requires the price paid by any user to reflect 
the costs. In this situation, prices are not reflecting the “scarcity costs”, some airlines are 
purchasing particular airport services because they have obtained some privilege but 
they do not value them as highly as the opportunity cost of this scarce slots reveal7. 
 
 
Figure 1: Market Clearing Prices. Situation of Scarcity in MAD. 
 
During certain hours of some days, especially during weekends, the situation is better 
reflected by Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. In these situations, the scarcity costs are low or important 
excess of capacity exists. However, these situations share one common feature; the 
prices are higher than the first best prices. In order to obtain social welfare gains, it 
would be necessary to reduce the prices in both cases. It can be said that there is a cross-
subsidisation by revenues from these periods of time to cover the allocative deficits 
created in the situation discussed above, where the scarcity costs are really important 
because aeronautical charges have been set at a relatively low level. Accordingly, if the 
market mechanism based on demand and supply were at work, the equilibrium price of 
using the airport would need to be raised to the price needed to recoup the scarcity cost. 
In effect, as traffic exceeds the capacity of the airport, scarcity costs at the airport 
become an issue. This would allow many busy airports in the world to levy the so-called 
“peak-hour” surcharge. The purpose of this surcharge is twofold. Firstly, it would be 
possible to reduce the scarcity costs as the surcharge discourages demand for 
aeronautical services during busy hours when capacity has been reached. Secondly, the 
surcharge will produce extra benefits and reflect in a better way the real opportunity 
costs of slots, giving the correct signal to airport authorities for future expansions of 
airport capacity. 
                                                 
7Inefficient outcomes may be avoided if airlines who value the airport access the most get the scarce slots. 
For example, suppose that a Boeing 747 passenger jet operator values the right to land at 08:00 a.m. on 
Monday morning at €10,000 and some freight operator would also like to land at the same time values the 
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Figure 2: Market Clearing Prices. Situation of Moderate Scarcity in MAD. 
 
 
Figure 3: Market Clearing Prices. Situation of Excess Capacity in MAD. 
 
In summary, we look at different airport charges schemes and cost recovery policies 
where the capacity divisibility is not assumed. In this more general setting, we will 
study the optimal airport charge (“first best prices”) with other pricing policies, such as 
“second best prices” in which the financial constraint of cost recovery is considered for 
each period, comparing “market clearing prices” in which airport capacity is used at its 
maximum levels and actual prices. As discussed below, our results should contribute to 
the on-going debate in MAD and around Europe about the merits of adjusting airport 
charges to each situation in which airports may be involved. We will take into account 
the actual controversy about the merits of different price regulation with respect to the 



















We have been assisted by the Directorate of Slots Coordination in MAD in terms of 
data collection. The Directorate of Slots Coordination is the main coordinator for 
Spanish airport authority AENA and is in charge of the allocation of airport slots in 
accordance with Council Regulation (EEC) 95/93. The data presented in this section are 
based on slots requested and allocated as part of the biannual schedule coordination 
process. 
Capacity at MAD is reviewed twice yearly in advance of each scheduling season 
(winter and summer seasons). Capacity is assessed against an agreed average delay 
criterion. The process involves simulating the impact on average delays of adding 
additional slots at particular times of day. Where the additional slots do not result in a 
breach of the delay criterion, they are made available for allocation. 
 
Table 5: Madrid Runway Capacity: Slots per Hour-Winter 2003. 
Local time Arrivals Departures Total 
0:00 20 20 40 
1:00 20 20 40 
2:00 20 20 40 
3:00 20 20 40 
4:00 20 20 40 
5:00 24 20 44 
6:00 40 40 80 
7:00 40 40 80 
8:00 40 40 80 
9:00 40 40 80 
10:00 40 40 80 
11:00 40 40 80 
12:00 40 40 80 
13:00 40 40 80 
14:00 40 40 80 
15:00 40 40 80 
16:00 40 40 80 
17:00 40 40 80 
18:00 40 40 80 
19:00 40 40 80 
20:00 40 40 80 
21:00 40 40 80 
22:00 24 20 44 
23:00 20 20 40 
Total 808 800 1608 
Source: Martín and Betancor, (2004) 
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This process has resulted in a declared runway capacity that can be seen on Table 5. 
During the winter season of 2003, the number of daytime (06:00 - 22:59) slots available 
each day achieved the figure of 1364. The same capacity has been declared since 
summer 2001. The number of slots per hour generally varies around 40 arrivals and 40 
departures, with the following exceptions: 
Arrivals in the 05:00 – 05:59 and 22:00 – 22:59 periods are limited to 24 slots. This is 
largely due to the fact that environmental constraints on aircraft arriving at this time are 
applied.  
Departures in the 05:00 – 05:59 and 22:00 – 22:59 periods are limited to 20 slots. This 
is largely due to the same environmental constraints. 
Arrivals and departures in the 23:00 - 04:59 period are limited to 20 and 20 slots 
respectively. This is partly due to lower demand at these times and the prevalence of the 
Night Quota Period (23:30 – 06:00). Significant increases in capacity in these hours are 
likely to result in an unacceptable increase in unplanned aircraft movements during this 
Night Quota Period due to neighbouring vicinities annoyance. The number of 
permissible movements at night is strictly limited by a task group and the quota is 
already proving very controversial. 
Demand for MAD slots exceeds capacity by some variable margin for most part of a 
weekday. However, during weekends the demand does not usually exceed capacity. 
Over the 06:00 - 21:59 period, demand exceeded total capacity by 16% in a typical 
week for the summer 2002 season. Figure 4 below shows the detailed demand vs. 
capacity for a typical Tuesday. In this figure the extent of excess demand is clearly 
illustrated reinforcing the idea of MAD airport planners that the expansion capacity 
programme was required.  
 
 
Figure 4. Slot Demand vs. Capacity by hour in MAD. 
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The degree of excess demand for runway slots results in a high level of capacity 
utilization during the 06:00 - 21:59 period. The allocation data used here is based on a 
typical week in the summer 2002 season after the industry slot return deadline of 31st 
January 2002. This is the date by which airlines finalize their planned schedules. 
Based on the above analyses of capacity, patterns of demand and the resultant scarcity 
of runway slots at MAD, we will calculate the market-clearing prices for each period of 
time of the day. We will make some assumptions about the demand function for 
aeronautical activities. The functional form and the elasticity of the demand are the most 
critical points. There are not many studies analyzing the elasticity of the demand for 
aeronautical services. Kanafani and Ghobrial (1985) estimated that the elasticity of 
demand for flights was between -0.148 and -0.38, while in Australia, it was estimated to 
fall in the range of -0.1 to -0.225 for interstate flights in the early 1990s (CC, 2002). In 
our case, we will suppose that the demand function is linear and that the elasticity of the 
demand is -0.15. 
Doganis (2002) points out two reasons why demand for aeronautical services is so 
inelastic. First, aeronautical charges represent only a small part of an airline’s total 
operating costs (generally less than 8% for intra-European routes and 4% for trans-
Atlantic routes). However, the ratio of aeronautical charges to total operating costs 
varies from 7.8% to 13.2% for low-cost carriers. For this reason, using price 
mechanisms to allocate scarce capacity may more strongly affect these new low-cost 
carriers. Therefore, such policies may have unanticipated consequences on competition. 
There can also be equity implications as this approach will affect consumer groups 
differently. It is more likely that some low-dense or leisure routes (that are serviced by 
low-cost carriers) suffer an increase in aeronautical charges differently from other 
routes that are serviced by global incumbent carriers. 
A 50% reduction in aeronautical charges at one end of the route would cut only 2% of 
total operating costs for intra-European routes and 1% for trans-Atlantic routes. 
Secondly, airlines’ decisions on operating a route from and into the airport are primarily 
dependent on the level of anticipated demand for that route but not on the level of 
aeronautical charges. Therefore, if the above two examples prevail, price mechanisms to 
allocate scarce capacity may not be an effective option. However, it may be a better 
option if funding is provided to invest in additional capacity in order to reduce the 
scarcity costs created for a highly busy airport.8 
Crew et al. (1995) provide an interesting note about the fact that, in airports, peak and 
off-peak prices have not had the expected effects on demand shifting because of the 
level of persistence of non-price mechanisms, such as grandfather rights. These authors 
argue that the impact of the price mechanisms on demand shifts would be quite small as 
long as these rights prevail, and that only overall reforms on slot trading may provide a 
basis for applying efficiently any type of price mechanism. Their concerns certainly 
satisfy the equity considerations that have been explained above. 
In order to calculate first-best prices and second-best prices, we also need some 
information about the aeronautical charges and costs of the airport. The model shown in 
equation 1 uses the aircraft movements as the output variable, and it considers that 
airports operate under constant returns to scale9. 
                                                 
8 Funds for new airports expansion projects are provided by AENA. 
9Pels et al. (2003) showed that if air traffic movements are considered as the output, then the average 
airport of a sample of European airports is operating under constant returns to scale and under increasing 
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MAD bases its charges on the IATA guidelines and applies a maximum take-off 
weight (MTOW) price, which classifies the aircraft according to the weight and the type 
of market. It distinguishes three different weights (small, medium and heavy) and three 
different types of market (Domestic, European and International). The airport 
discriminates by these groups but it applies a uniform price during the 24 hours of the 
day. There is not any surcharge by peak time or night time or noisy aircraft. There is a 
large range of charges for different services like parking, aerobridge use, etc., but 
movements and handling charges are the most important ones.  
Aircraft characteristics have an important impact on aeronautical costs. The use of 
both the airport airside and landside facilities depend highly on operating characteristics 
of the aircraft that lands or takes-off at/from the airport. On the airside, the 
characteristics of the aircraft will determine the use of the runway and width, the 
minimum separation between runways and taxiways, the geometric project of taxiways, 
and the pavement strength. Additionally, environmental issues such as noise and air 
pollution are also based on the aircraft which will make use of the airport. On the 
terminal area, aircraft characteristics will influence the number and size of gates, and 
consequently the terminal configuration. Finally, the aircraft passenger capacity will 
influence the size of facilities within the terminal -such as passenger lounges and 
passenger processing systems -, and the size and type of the baggage handling system. 
The differences observed between the different aircraft that have used MAD facilities 
during the year 2002 may help explain the difficulty that we have found in order to 
obtain an average aeronautical charge. The results on the side of costs are even worse, 
because there is not a separation of costs that can be assigned to aeronautical and non-
aeronautical activities. For instance, runway length requirements range from 1,100 m 
(ATR-42) to over 4,400 m (DC-10-40), a difference of 300 %. The passenger capacity 
range is even wider: from 30 seats (EMB-120) to 400 seats (the capacity of B747-400). 
Finally, the maximum takeoff weight ranges from 11,500 kg (EMB-120) to over 
362,871 kg (B747-X). It is very important to have in mind that these differences would 
have implications on different costs and prices of air traffic movements (ATMs), since 
they have a high influence on the cost function for aeronautical services. Runway length 
is highly limited by land availability and land costs; the amount of runway required by 
aircraft is therefore an important determinant for the airport cost. Wheel track and 
wingspan determines the runway and taxiway widths, and the separation between those 
ways. Additionally, wingspan and aircraft length rules the design of the apron area. 
Pavement strength determination is based on the aircraft weight. Passenger terminal 
facilities are sized to accommodate peak hour demand, which is highly influenced by 
aircraft passenger capacity.  
Due to the lack of data availability and for the sake of simplicity, we finally decided 
to calculate an average aeronautical charge per air traffic movement, and we obtained a 
figure of 4650 euros per operation. With respect to the cost side, we have already 
mentioned that we did not have any disaggregate information for both aeronautical and 
non-aeronautical activities, so we have supposed that the proportion of revenues 
obtained by aeronautical activities over the total of revenues of the airport would be the 
same as the one observed on the cost side (42%). Thus, we got a very rough estimate of 
                                                                                                                                               
returns to scale if passengers are considered as the output. This situation suggests that it is an optimal 
policy both to increase the load factor of airplanes or the size of the airplanes. 
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aeronautical costs of MAD10. Traditionally, airports have relied on revenues raised from 
aeronautical activities; whereas non-aeronautical revenues have grown rapidly in 
proportion and in magnitude over the past ten years, partly because non-aeronautical 
services have generally fallen outside the scope of economic regulation, and partly 
because airports tend to earn more from non-aeronautical activities after the new role 
that airports are playing being units with more commercial orientation. Behnke (2000) 
points out that the ratio of non-aeronautical revenues to total revenues for a sample of 
more than 1,400 airports by Airports Council International had grown from about 30% 
in the late 1980s to over 50% in 199811. 
Many airports generate a much higher proportion of their revenues from concession 
activities rather than from aeronautical operations. Doganis (1992) has reported that in 
medium to large US airports, concession operations represent between 75 and 80% of 
the total airport revenue. Indeed, in 1990, more than 90% of the total revenue of Los 
Angeles airport resulted from commercial operations. Furthermore, concession revenues 
have grown faster than aeronautical revenues. For example, Hong Kong International 
Airport generated an equal amount of revenue from its aeronautical and commercial 
operations in 1979, while in the late 1980s and 1990s its concession revenue accounted 
for 66–70% of total revenue (Zhang and Zhang, 1997). 
We have calculated rough estimates of operating and capacity costs for Barajas 
airport, and their respective unit costs r and c per aircraft movement when capacity is 
fully used, using the percentage of capital cost over the total costs and supposing that 
this percentage is invariant on the aeronautical activities. In the next section, we will 
show the results of the different pricing schemes and the relationships between the 
different price mechanisms and the social welfare obtained. 
 
 
Social welfare implications 
 
Turning to equation 1 again, we will find that if we have an aeronautical charge that 
produces important scarcity costs (excess of capacity), then the price charged is lower 
than the market-clearing price. This situation is shown in Starkie (1998). In order to 
calculate the airline surplus, an extreme case is assumed where the whole tail of the 
excess of capacity (but low value) demand displaces an equivalent quantity of high 
value demand. Thus, the airline surplus, producer surplus and social welfare from 
aeronautical services will all decrease significantly. If the average aeronautical charge 
was also below the average aeronautical cost, the airport would have deficits from 
                                                 
10 It would be advisable to estimate a cost function separating aeronautical activities and non-aeronautical 
activities in order to obtain better estimation of unitary costs of aeronautical services. Lack of data 
precludes us from doing this exercise, so we finally use average operating costs (c=4200 euros) and 
average capital costs (r=1800 euros). In this last case, we make the assumption that airport is operating at 
full capacity. 
11 A number of airport operators, such as BAA, AENA and Schiphol Group, are attracted to become 
involved in the airport business all over the world due to the importance that the potential growth 
opportunities from non-aeronautical services present. This is usually reflected in the final bidding price 
paid. The operators need proper information about unexploited commercial potential in retail, trading, car 
parking, ground transport, and property development in order to bid with confidence. Retail operations, in 
particular, have become an important source of revenue for airports, and an area that airport operators 
have largely developed since privatisation. 
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aeronautical activities and would require cross-subsidization of these deficits by non-
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It can be seen that if airport authorities set aeronautical prices as close to market-
clearing level as possible, then the potential loss of social welfare will be minimized and 
the excess of demand will be reduced.  
We proceeded to calculate the four alternative pricing schemes: first-best, second-
best, market-clearing and actual average charges. The results can be seen in Figure 5.  
 























Figure 5: Alternative Pricing Schemes on Thursdays in MAD. 
 
Thursday is typically very busy in Barajas airport, and it can be seen that for most part 
of the day, the market-clearing prices coincide with the first-best prices because the lack 
of adequate capacity to attend the excess of demand prevails. It is also interesting to 
remark that for this reason, the first best prices are higher than the present and second 
best prices. For example, if airport authorities in MAD applied a first-best pricing 
scheme, they would raise the aeronautical charge by about 143% on Thursdays from 
11:00 to 11:59.  
Forsyth (1976) showed that there are three possible reactions for airlines to an 
increase in aeronautical charges: to raise airfares, to cut flights, or to switch operation to 
another airport. In May 2001, the ACCC decided to permit Sydney Airport Ltd. to 
increase aeronautical charges by 97%. If these increases were passed on to passengers, 
the increase in air ticket fares would add around $3.0 to a domestic return flight and 
                                                 
12 See Lu and Pagliari, 2004. 
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around $14.0 to an international return flight (ACCC, 2001). It is believed that very few 
passengers, as a result of these price increases, would alter their travel choice to another 
airport or cancel their flight.  
It can also be seen that when excess of capacity prevails, then first-best prices and 
market-clearing prices are lower than present average aeronautical charges. In this case, 
airport authorities would need to cut prices in order to reduce the potential loss of social 
welfare. This situation is common during the night hours. In the case of market-clearing 
prices, the airport authorities would even need to subsidize the use of the airport during 
these hours. This result would be difficult to implement due to the existing problems 
during the night hours with the surrounding vicinities. If airport authorities in MAD 
applied first-best pricing scheme, they would need to cut the aeronautical charge by 
about 68% on Thursdays from 00:00 to 04:59. This situation is not strange when there is 
extreme excess of capacity. Zhang and Zhang (2001) commented that Hong Kong 
airport charges were very high, but due to the severe under-utilization of the airport, the 
Airport Authority was obliged to review the charges in August 1999 and after lengthy 
negotiations with the airlines, the airport managers finally decided to cut the charges by 
15%, making this cut effective from 1 January 2000. 
In the following we will interpret and comment on the results of the different price 
schemes on the social welfare obtained from the application of the different pricing 
policies. The results for an average Thursday can be seen in Figure 6. 
 














Figure 6: Alternative Pricing Schemes on Thursdays in MAD. 
 
It is interesting to note that the gains in social welfare of first-best pricing policies 
with respect to the present situation show a range from 3 per cent during night hours to 
11 per cent from 11:00 to 11:59. We have also obtained that if airport authorities set 
aeronautical prices to the first-price level, the average potential gains per year would be 
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about 6 per cent. If a second-best policy is applied the potential gains would be about 2 
per cent. Finally, if the use of the airport is expanded to its maximum declared capacity 
(market-clearing policy), the potential losses of social welfare would be about 17 per 
cent. It is also interesting to note that with the model assumptions, Barajas airport is 
being operated with cross-subsidization of non-aeronautical activities because the 
aeronautical prices are lower than the average aeronautical cost. 
 
 
Final remarks and conclusions 
 
Our results suggest that for the majority of the hours in the weekdays, potential 
demand is higher than capacity. For most parts of the day, the market-clearing prices 
coincide with the first-best prices because the lack of adequate capacity to address the 
excess of demand prevails. On the contrary, when there is excess of capacity, first-best 
prices and market-clearing prices are lower than present average aeronautical charges. 
In this case, airport authorities would need to cut prices in order to reduce the potential 
loss in social welfare. This situation is common during night hours. In the case of 
market-clearing prices, the airport authorities would even need to subsidize the use of 
the airport during these hours. Nevertheless, this result would be difficult to implement 
due to the existing problems during night hours with the surrounding vicinities. 
In summary, the relationship between airport pricing schemes and social welfare from 
aeronautical activities has been clearly established. It is shown that social welfare from 
aeronautical services will increase by 6 per cent if a first-best pricing scheme (rather 
than the present pricing policy) is applied in MAD (where aeronautical demand usually 
exceeds capacity for most part of the day during all the weekdays). We have also shown 
that a policy pursuing a higher level of capacity use does not provide a higher social 
welfare and for this reason such a policy must not be encouraged.  
However, it is clear that one of the caveats that this analysis presents is that the social 
welfare from non-aeronautical services has not been considered, and results can change 
significantly if there are strong complementarities between these two activities. The 
demand for non-aeronautical services is closely related to the demand for aeronautical 
services. An increase in the quantity consumed for aeronautical services will increase 
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